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AND JUSTICE FOR ALL-INCLUDING
THE UNREPRESENTED POOR:
REVISITING TIE ROLES OF THE JUDGES,
MEDIATORS, AND CLERKS
Russell Engler*
INTRODUCTION
TTNREPRESENTED litigants are flooding the courts. In theJ"poor people's courts," civil cases involving at least one unrepre-
sented litigant are far more common than cases in which both sides
are represented by counsel.' This phenomenon is hardly surprising,
given widespread reports that over eighty percent of the legal needs of
the poor and working poor currently are unmet in the United States. 2
Judges, clerks, and lawyers bemoan the difficulties that unrepresented
litigants cause for other participants in the legal system.3
An impressive variety of assistance programs, developed by bar as-
sociations, legal services offices, and the courts themselves, have
sprung up in many settings in response to the "pro se crisis."' Individ-
* Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Programs, New England School of
Law. I am grateful for the helpful feedback I have received from many of my princi-
pal co-authors for this symposium issue, from clinicians in attendance at the New
England Clinician's Conference in June, 1998, and from Allan Rodgers, Raun Ras-
mussen, Lonnie Powers, Jane Murphy, Tracy Miller, Jeanne Miller, David Matz, Dan
Manning, Judi Greenberg, John Greacen, Jona Goldschmidt, and Andrew Dwyer.
This work was supported in part by a Summer Stipend from the Board of Trustees of
New England School of Law.
1. See Jona Goldschmidt et al., Meeting the Challenge of Pro Se Litigation: A
Report and Guidebook for Judges and Court Managers 49 (1998) [hereinafter Meet-
ing the Challenge] ("Court managers believe that the volume of cases involving self-
represented litigants has increased substantially in recent years."); infra Part I1.
2. See, e.g., Wiliam P. Quigley, The Unmet Civil Legal Needs of the Poor in Loui-
siana, 19 S.U. L. Rev. 273, 273 (1992) ("Between 85% and 92% of the low income
people in Louisiana who had civil legal needs in 1991 were not represented by an
attorney."); Janet Reno, Address Delivered at the Celebration of tie Seventy-Fifth An-
niversary of Women at Fordlam Law Sdhool, 63 Fordham L Rev. 5, 8 (1994) (-Ladies
and gentlemen, at least eighty percent of the poor and the working poor in the United
States do not have access to legal services." (citing Talbot D'Alemberte, Racial Injus-
tice and American Justice, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 58, 59)). See generally Roy W.
Reese & Carolyn A. Eldred, Legal Needs Among Low-Income and Moderate-In-
come Households: Summary of Findings from the Comprehensive Legal Needs Study
42 (1994) (finding that 71% of low income people who face legal problems do not
have access to the legal and judicial system).
3. See infra Parts L.A, I.D, II.B.1, II.B.3. See generally Meeting the Challenge,
supra note 1, passim (discussing how self representation has increased greatly in re-
cent years); Jona Goldschmidt, How Are Judges and Courts Coping with Pro Se Liti-
gants?: Results from a Survey of Judges and Court Managers passim (May 1997)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (considering the policy issues raised
by the increase in pro se litigants).
4. See infra Part I.B.
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ual judges and clerks worry publicly and privately about what they can
and cannot do-or what they should and should not do-in handling
cases involving unrepresented litigants.' Some lawyers and judges
even express concern that unrepresented litigants are using their sta-
tus to gain an unfair advantage over represented parties, who are try-
ing to play by the rules.6
Missing from the discussion is a fundamental re-examination by the
judiciary of the roles of judges, mediators, and clerks in cases involv-
ing unrepresented litigants. The roles of these players were developed
in the context of an adversary system.7 An underlying assumption this
system is that both sides will be represented by an attorney. The un-
represented litigant, having "chosen" to appear without a lawyer, is an
aberration. Despite the vast number of unrepresented litigants, and
the significant impact on the courts in which the unrepresented liti-
gant is the norm, the roles of the players remain largely those devel-
oped for an idealized world in which all litigants are represented by
lawyers.
Part I of this Article examines the traditional rules governing clerks,
mediators, and judges in their interactions with unrepresented liti-
gants. The examination reveals that the legal system has erected bar-
riers that hinder the ability of unrepresented litigants to obtain the
assistance necessary to make informed choices about their cases. The
rules primarily prohibit clerks, mediators, and other court players
from giving legal advice to unrepresented litigants. In theory, the pro-
hibition is intended to protect the unrepresented litigant from receiv-
ing legal advice from someone not qualified to give such advice.8 In
practice, however, the prohibition deprives the unrepresented litigant
of the opportunity to obtain legal advice throughout the course of the
proceeding. She is forced to make choices at every turn without un-
derstanding either the range of options available or the pros and cons
of each option.
Despite being deprived of the opportunity to make informed
choices, the unrepresented litigant is deemed to be an informed, ra-
tional actor. Most cases settle, usually under pressure from the court.9
Where the unrepresented party faces a represented one, additional
settlement pressure comes from the opposing lawyer.' 0 Judges rou-
tinely make, at most, a minimal inquiry before rubber-stamping the
agreements and rarely undo the agreements in the face of a subse-
quent challenge.11 The judges are driven by docket control, which de-
5. See infra Parts I.A, I.D.
6. See infra notes 132, 134 and accompanying text.
7. See infra Part II.A.1.
8. See infra Part I.A.
9. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Part I.B.3.
11. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
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pends on the court's ability to settle cases quickly and with minimal
oversight. The need for docket control leaves judges with little incen-
tive to expend precious judicial resources on educating and protecting
unrepresented litigants. Even where cases proceed to trial, many
judges are unwilling to provide more than token assistance to the un-
represented litigant.' 2 Judges typically explain their reluctance to pro-
vide greater assistance as a necessary byproduct of impartiality. Some
judges go further, declaring that the unrepresented litigant, having
chosen to appear without counsel, must live with the consequences of
her decision. 13
These consequences are devastating for unrepresented litigants.
Settlement agreements routinely involve the waiver of significant
rights by unrepresented litigants. 4 Unrepresented litigants appearing
before mediators suffer a similar fate, after being deemed to have
made an informed choice to participate in mediation in the first
place.15 Where cases do not settle, unrepresented litigants also rou-
tinely forfeit important rights due to the absence of counsel."b
The forfeiture of rights flows from the barriers facing unrepresented
litigants at each stage of the proceeding and each encounter with the
various players in the system. As revealed in part I, the roles of the
different players typically are discussed in isolation. In reality, how-
ever, the roles are inextricably intertwined. The difficulties at each
stage are compounded, rather than corrected, as the case proceeds.
Re-examination of the roles must therefore be part of a systemic re-
sponse to the problems facing unrepresented litigants.
Part II revisits the roles of the actors in the system with an eye to-
ward helping, rather than hindering, unrepresented litigants. To
frame the discussion of the individual roles, part II.A first revisits cen-
tral principles that must shape a re-examination of the individual
roles. A fundamental goal of the adversary system is to provide fair-
ness and justice.' 7 Where the operation of the traditional rules frus-
12. See infra Part I.D.
13. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Part I.C. As described in part I.C, court-connected mediation is
mandatory in some settings. In most settings, the court-connected mediation is la-
beled voluntary. To many unrepresented litigants, however, pressure from the court
to mediate makes the mediation feel mandatory.
16. See infra Part I.D.
17. See infra Part lI.A. It is unnecessary and foolhardy to attempt to provide a
comprehensive definition of "fairness and justice." It is unnecessary because the pro-
fession repeatedly invokes the goals of "fairness and justice" without having provided
a universal definition of the terms. Achieving "fairness and justice" nonetheless re-
mains a fundamental goal of our legal system. See infra note 169. It is foolhardy
because an attempt to define these terms would distract from the urgent and immedi-
ate task of assisting the unrepresented poor.
Fairness and justice as used in this Article mean more than procedural fairness.
The terms must require examination of the underlying rights of the unrepresented
litigants. A system in which litigants forfeit important rights through ignorance or
1999] 1989
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trates that goal, the rules, rather than the goal, must be modified. A
system in which represented parties routinely prevail over unrepre-
sented parties-without regard to the merits of the case-cannot be
viewed as fair or impartial; the notion of impartiality should compel
judges and mediators to assist unrepresented parties, rather than pre-
vent them from doing so. Most indigent litigants are forced to appear
without counsel, and have access to limited advice; the unrepresented
poor must not be viewed as appearing voluntarily without counsel,
and their decisions must not be presumed to be those "of rational, in-
formed actors. Where any credible definition of "legal advice" in-
cludes much of the assistance unrepresented litigants desperately
require, a prohibition against giving legal advice must not constrain
those to whom the unrepresented litigant must turn.
The systemic approach requires that re-examination of the roles of
the judges, mediators, and clerks be driven not only by the general
principles, but also by a realization that the roles of the players are
interconnected, and must be shaped by context.18 What is necessary
and appropriate for clerks in a particular context may depend on the
role of mediators and judges and the existence of other assistance pro-
grams in that context; what is necessary and proper conduct for judges
will depend, in part, on the roles of those with whom the unrepre-
sented litigant has dealt prior to appearing before the judge. While
the details of the roles will be shaped by context, general guidelines
may be developed in light of the concepts discussed in part II.A. Part
II.B therefore proposes revised roles for judges, mediators, and clerks
in light of those general guidelines.
Given the importance of context, part II.C identifies factors to
guide a context-based analysis regarding the extent to which the roles
of the players must be revised, and the features of supplemental pro-
grams that must be developed. Using the factors as guidelines, part
III examines three different contexts struggling with large numbers of
unrepresented litigants: family, bankruptcy, and housing courts. Each
setting presents somewhat different problems, requiring differences in
the overall response. Family courts, which have received the greatest
attention in terms of reports and articles focusing on the "pro se prob-
lem," have faced surging numbers of unrepresented litigants for years;
many of the cases involve unrepresented parties facing one another,
while others pit unrepresented parties against represented ones.' 9
The numbers of unrepresented litigants in bankruptcy court, while far
powerlessness cannot be viewed as fair; nor can a system in which the outcomes of
cases are determined not according to their merits, but according to the status of a
party's representation. If the concepts mean less than this, judges, mediators, and
lawyers must-at a minimum-educate the public accordingly. For articles discussing
the debate between substantive and procedural fairness in the context of mediation,
see infra note 97.
18. See infra Part II.A.6.
19. See infra Part III.A.
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lower than those in family court, have recently surged; the problems
are compounded by complex laws and procedures that keep some
needy debtors out of the system while trapping others, who do not
belong, in the system.20 Housing courts present perhaps the ultimate
breakdown of the adversary system, with the typical case pitting rep-
resented landlords against unrepresented tenants. Part III.C exam-
ines the different official responses to the problems in housing court in
two settings: the Boston Housing Court and the New York City
Housing Courts.
Despite the differences in context and the increased attention to the
"pro se problem" in each setting, a common failure hinders the efforts
to help unrepresented litigants. The judiciary has failed to provide
any guidelines redefining the roles of the judges, mediators, and
clerks. Absent revised rules that not only permit, but require, the
players in the system to help unrepresented litigants, those litigants
will continue to forfeit important rights due, not to the merits of their
cases, but to the absence of counsel.2 ' The continued absence of such
rules provides a striking contrast to the plethora of rules designed to
streamline dockets and foster speedy disposition of cases. '
The judiciary can respond to the flood of unrepresented litigants in
one of three ways. First, it may revise the roles of the various players
in the court system as outlined in this Article. This first route allows
the judiciary to reclaim its promise of providing fairness and justice by
authorizing court personnel, themselves, to protect the unrepresented
poor from the forfeiture of important rights.
To the extent the judiciary is unwilling or unable to revise the roles
of court personnel, or to the extent these revisions alone fail to protect
the unrepresented poor, the judiciary must identify others who can do
so. The judiciary must nurture and oversee the increased use of
skilled lay advocates. Judges should exercise their discretion in civil
cases to appoint counsel, particularly in cases pitting an unrepresented
indigent litigant against a represented party. Rather than seeking re-
sources from their legislatures to appoint more judges, mediators, or
clerks-who also will be unwilling or unable to provide the necessary
assistance-the judiciary must urge the targeting of available re-
20. See infra Part III.B.
21. Proposals to create "pro se divisions" or courts are therefore at most only
partial responses. See, e.g., Robert Gottsfield, Let's Talk About lt-A Superior Court
Pro Se Division, Ariz. Att'y, May 1992, at 49,49 (describing a model of a pro se court
in which the decision would not be binding unless both parties consent to it); William
W Schwarzer, Let's Try a Pro Se and Small-Stakes Civil Calendar in the Federal
Courts, FJC Directions, June 1996, at 14 (suggesting an expedited calendar for "fair
and efficient disposition" of pro se litigation). The issue of the roles of the players
remains critical regardless of whether the cases are segregated.
22. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 (outlining federal pretrial conference scheduling
and management rules). The contrast unwittingly speaks volumes about the notion of
justice in the courts: justice apparently is measured by case dispositions, not case
outcomes.
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sources to the provision of skilled advocates for the unrepresented
poor.
The third choice is to maintain the status quo. This choice places
band-aids on a crumbling system while giving lip service to the idea of
fairness and justice for all. The dockets will continue to churn. Justice
will continue to be measured by how swiftly the courts dispose of their
cases, rather than by what happens in the cases and whether the rights
of the unrepresented poor have been trampled in the process.
Achieving justice will remain a goal reserved for those with lawyers.2 3
I. THE PLAYERS-RULES AND REALITY
A. Court Personnel: Clerks
Unrepresented litigants typically will encounter a variety of court
personnel during the course of their cases, beginning with clerks in the
clerk's office.24 The primary restriction on the ability of the clerks to
provide information is that clerks may not give legal advice.25 In some
23. Throughout this Article, I consciously choose the term "unrepresented liti-
gants" in most cases instead of "self-represented," "pro se," or "pro per." The prefix
"un-" means "not," the "opposite of." Webster's Third International Dictionary of the
English Language 2481 (1986). The literal definition therefore is "not represented,"
indicating a "lack of" representation. Because the focus of this Article is the unrepre-
sented poor, the concept of "not represented" best captures the plight of indigent
litigants who appear without lawyers and who, essentially, are not heard by the court.
See, e.g., Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of
Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 533, 562-63 (1992) (stating
that only 3.7% of tenants in observed cases were represented, mostly by non-attor-
neys); Erica L. Fox, Alone In the Hallway: Challenges to Effective Self-Representation
in Negotiation, 1 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 85 (1996) (discussing the disadvantages of
hallway settlements between the parties themselves). The concept of "self-represen-
tation" connotes the choice to forego counsel and probably some perceived ability to
carry out the representation of oneself. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
816-18 (1975) (discussing criminal cases in which courts allowed defendants to waive
the right to counsel). This does not describe the predicament of most of the unrepre-
sented poor and should not form our operating assumptions in attempting to fashion
solutions. See generally infra Part II.A.5 (discussing the notion that most unrepre-
sented litigants are not voluntarily unrepresented). For similar reasons, and because I
prefer English to Latin, I prefer the term "unrepresented litigants" to "pro se" ("for
himself") and "pro per" (the abbreviation for "in propria persona," California's ver-
sion of "pro se," meaning "in one's own proper person").
24. As the proceeding progresses, unrepresented litigants may seek additional
help from the clerks and may also encounter other court personnel, such as court
officers and clerks, in the courtrooms. Although the focus of this section is on the
clerks, the restrictions apply to the range of nonjudicial court personnel. See, e.g.,
John M. Greacen, "No Legal Advice from Court Personnel" What Does that Mean?,
Judges' J., Winter 1995, at 10, 10 (discussing the types of advice court staff may and
may not give).
25. See, e.g., In re Amendments to the Fla. Small Claims Rules, 601 So. 2d 1201,
1216 (Fla. 1992) ("The clerk is not authorized to practice law and therefore cannot
give you legal advice on how to prove your case."); State v. Walters, 411 S.E.2d 688,
691 (W. Va. 1991) (stating that no magistrate clerk may act as an attorney for any
party): Standing Comm. on the Delivery of Legal Servs., American Bar Ass'n, Re-
sponding to the Needs of the Self-Represented Divorce Litigant 24-25 (1994) [herein-
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jurisdictions, the prohibition is explicitly set forth by statutez 6 In
other jurisdictions, this prohibition derives from restrictions that pro-
hibit clerks from practicing law27 and require clerks to remain impar-
tial.' Although most jurisdictions have resisted efforts to provide a
precise definition of the practice of law,29 courts providing examples
of what constitutes the practice of law routinely include the giving of
legal advice in the list of activities incorporated within the definition."
after Responding to the Needs] ("[I]t is important that court clerks not practice law
by giving substantive legal advice .... "); Graecen, supra note 24, at 10 ("Members
shall not give legal advice unless specifically required to do so as part of their office
position." (quoting The National Association for Court Management, Model Code of
Conduct art. 1(B))). One survey of court administrators, administered non-
randmonly, revealed that 59% of courts with policies guiding court staff assistance to
the public included the explicit prohibition against giving legal advice. See Gold-
schmidt, supra note 3, at 21. Forty-eight percent of the administrators reported that
their courts had no policies at all. See id.; see also Meeting the Challenge, supra note
1, at 50, 123 (reporting that about half the responding courts had a policy concerning
the giving of legal advice to unrepresented litigants).
26. See, eg., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-403 (West 1990) (concerning the -practice
of law prohibited to certain officers"); In re Amendments, 601 So. 2d at 1216 (stating
that a clerk cannot practice law).
27. See, e.g., Fed. R. App. P. 45(a) ("Neither the clerk nor any deputy clerk shall
practice as an attorney or counselor in any court while continuing in office."); Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. Rule 3:02(2) (West 1997) ("All clerks of court.., and their assistants
and employees in their offices are prohibited from engaging in the practice of law
... ."); Greacen, supra note 24, at 11-12 (providing examples of various state rules
prohibiting clerks from giving legal advice); Letter from Julia M. Freit, Assistant At-
torney General, Office of the Maryland Attorney General, to the Honorable Mary
Boergers, Senator 1 (October 22, 1991) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Freit
Letter] ("The Annotated Code of Maryland, Business Occupations and Professions
Article... § 10-603(b) provides that a clerk, deputy clerk, or employee of the clerk's
office may not practice law. .. ").
28. See, eg., Greacen, supra note 24, at 14 ("Court staff must always remember
the absolute duty of impartiality"); Open Letter from the Supreme Judicial Court of
the Massachusetts Advisory Committee on Ethical Opinions for Clerks of the Courts
4 (November 8, 1995) (on file with the author) ("[T]he Canons [of the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility for Clerks of Court], in particular Canons 4 and 5, require
clerks to remain impartial .... ").
29. See, e.g., Committee on Prof'l Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n
v. Baker, 492 N.W.2d 695, 701 (Iowa 1992) ("It is neither necessary nor desirable to
attempt the formulation of a single, specific definition of what constitutes the practice
of law." (citation omitted)); State Bar v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co., 575 P.2d 943,
948 (N.M. 1978) ("There is no comprehensive definition of what constitutes the prac-
tice of law in our basic law or the cases. The Court has specifically declined to take on
the onerous task."); Oregon State Bar v. Security Escrows, Inc., 377 P.2d 334,337 (Or.
1992) (in banc) (citing State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 366 P.2d 1, 8-9
(Ariz. 1961), for the proposition that an exhaustive definition is impossible); Utah
State Bar v. Summerhayes & Hayden, 905 P.2d 867, 869 (Utah 1995) ("The practice of
law, although difficult to define precisely, is generally acknowleged to involve the
rendering of legal services that requires the knowledge and application of legal princi-
ples to serve the interests of another with his consent."). An examination of cases
discussing the unauthorized practice of law is beyond the scope of this Article.
30. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Schramek, 616 So. 2d 979, 984 (Fla. 1993) (stating that
the giving of legal advice constitutes the unauthorized practice of law); People er rel
Ill. State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 176 N.E. 901, 907-08 (Il1.
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The ease with which courts announce the rule prohibiting advice-
giving belies the difficulties in understanding and applying the rule.
Some courts have sought to distinguish between the giving of legal
advice, which is prohibited, and the giving of legal information, which
is not.31 Another opinion indicates that clerks may identify options,
but may not assist the litigant in choosing among the options.32 One
jurisdiction prohibits clerks from preparing forms or providing sample
pleadings;33 but another permits the "routine" filling out of forms,
while continuing to prohibit the giving of legal advice 4.3  Notwith-
standing the various efforts to help clerks draw the line, one clerk's
candid assessment resonates from jurisdiction to jurisdiction: "We
have been told here ... not to give 'legal advice' but I have never
heard this term defined so I do struggle with what to tell [pro se liti-
gants] ... because sometimes this can be a fine line. 35
John M. Greacen provides a thoughtful exploration of these issues
in his article "No Legal Advice from Court Personnel" What Does that
Mean?36 Greacen acknowledges that clerks are taught from day one
that they must not give legal advice, but suggests that the clerks them-
selves are unable to identify what constitutes legal advice. Greacen
ultimately argues that "the phrase has no inherent meaning. ' 37 As
1931) (same); Baker, 492 N.W.2d at 701-2 (same); In re Opinion of the Justices, 194
N.E. 313, 317 (Mass. 1935) (same); Guardian Abstract, 575 P.2d at 948 (same); R.J.
Edwards, Inc. v. Hert, 504 P.2d 407, 417 (Okla. 1972) (same); Security Escrows, 377
P.2d at 339 (same); Summerhayes & Hayden, 905 P.2d at 869 (same); see also Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 757.30(2) (West 1981 & Supp. 1997) (stating that every person who gives
legal advice is practicing law).
31. See, e.g., Walters, 411 S.E.2d at 691 (distinguishing between the giving of infor-
mation and the giving of legal advice by a magistrate); see also Freit Letter, supra note
27, at 1 (discussing the prohibition against lay persons practicing law).
32. See, e.g., Massachussetts Advisory Comm. on Ethical Opinions for the Clerks
of the Courts, Op. 95-6 (November 8, 1995) (identifying several scenarios in which a
court clerk may assist a litigant without engaging in the practice of law).
33. See Freit Letter, supra note 27, at 2. According to one reading of the opinion
put forth in this letter, "[tihe circuit clerk's office cannot provide information, forms,
or sample pleadings to [unrepresented] clients." Advisory Council on Family Legal
Needs of Low Income Persons, Increasing Access to Justice for Maryland's Families:
A Joint Project of the Maryland Legal Services Corporation and the University of
Baltimore School of Law 10 (1992) [hereinafter Increasing Access to Justice].
34. See Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm. of the Arizona Supreme Court, Op. 88-5
(1988).
35. Pro Se Issues & Answers: An On-Line Forum, FJC Directions, June 1996, at
33, 34 (quoting eletronic message from Pamela Mitchel, CJRA Staff Attorney, W.D.
La., dated Oct. 20, 1995).
36. Greacen, supra note 24, at 10. A slightly different version of the article ap-
pears under the title "Clerk's Office Staff Cannot Give Legal Advice" What Does that
Mean?, in Court Manager, Winter 1995, at 35, 35. When he wrote the articles,
Greacen was the Clerk of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the District of New Mexico,
Albuquerque, New Mexico.
37. Greacen, supra note 24, at 10. Greacen illustrates the difficulty by providing
nine common scenarios that clerks face and suggesting that the prohibition against
giving legal advice provides no insight as to how to answer the questions: (1) "las a
complaint.., been filed?"; (2) "I just got this here summons and complaint.... What
1994 [Vol. 67
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Greacen notes, "[a] deputy clerk's inability to define the term 'legal
advice' and to apply it consistently to ambiguous situations puts him
or her in pretty good company. '38 After examining some of the defi-
nitions provided by courts, Greacen concludes that none of the dis-
tinctions "is satisfactory for the poor deputy clerk who needs to decide
whether to answer a question. '39 Arguing that the ambiguity has neg-
ative consequences for the courts and the public, Greacen ultimately
argues for the adoption of principles for court staff in providing advice
and information to court users in place of the "traditional prohibition
against 'giving legal advice.""
If anything, Greacen understates the difficulties in employing a pro-
hibition against the giving of legal advice. The term is used not only in
the context of defining the practice of law and articulating the proper
role of court personnel, but also in the context of alleged attorney
malpractice,4 efforts to obtain documents claimed to be protected
by the attorney-client privilege,42 and a lawyer's dealings with
unrepresented adverse parties.43 Given the varying contexts,
is an answer? What does one look like? What does it say?"; (3) "When is my answer
due?"; (4) "What does 'interrogatory' mean?"; (5) "I got this summons for jury ser-
vice .... What happens if I don't show up?"; (6) "When will the court decide my
case?"; (7) "Do I have to do anything else?"; (8) "Here is the situation I am in ...
how should I bring this issue before the court for resolution?"; (9) "Hi.... I'm a new
attorney... I need to file a motion .... Does the court have a local rule I should be
aware of? ... How is the judge likely to react ..... Id. at 10.
38. Id. at 11; see also supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (discussing courts'
attempts to explain what is meant by "legal advice" in the context of what is meant by
"the practice of law" and the further attempts to provide guidance to clerks by distin-
guishing between "advice" and "information" and "law" and "procedure").
39. Greacen, supra note 24, at 12. As Greacen explains, "[cases are often won
and lost on procedural issues. It is hard to know what is information, when an inquir-
ing citizen is clearly going to rely and act on what you say." Id.
40. ld. at 15. Greacen articulates five such principles, which have begun to attract
attention. See id. at 14-15; see also Committee on the Treatment of Litigants and Pro
Se Litig., Report of the Minn. Conference of Chief Judges 14 (1996) [hereinafter
Minn. Conference Report]; Jona Goldschmidt, Cases and Materials on Pro Se Litiga-
tion and Related Issues 11 (May 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the au-
thor) (prepared for the ABA Lawyer's Conference Annual Meeting in Tuscon,
Arizona). For an analysis of the principles, see infra Part II.B.3.
41. See, e.g., Franko v. Mitchell, 762 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (hold-
ing that an attorney is held to the same standard of care in proffering legal advice
whether or not such advice is gratuitous); Togstad v. Vesey, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291
N.W.2d 686, 693 (Minn. 1980) (holding that plaintiff was injured when defendant at-
torney advised her that she had no medical malpractice claim).
42. See, e.g., Crane v. Crane, 614 A.2d 935, 940-42 (D.C. 1992) (Terry, J., concur-
ring) (discussing the attorney-client privilege and the crime-fraud exception regarding
communications involving an attorney).
43. See generally Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Reg-
ulation of Lawyers' Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 Cal. L Rev. 79
(1997) (commenting on lawyers' abuses of ethical rules regarding the giving of advice
to unrepresented parties). The ethical rules governing a lawyers' interactions with an
unrepresented party prohibit not only the giving of "legal advice," but also of "ad-
vice." Depending on the context of the interaction, the terms may have little, if any,
difference in meaning. See id. at 97-98.
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confusion over the definition of "legal advice" is hardly surpris-
ing.44
The purpose of the unrepresented litigant's encounters with the
clerks is to obtain help in a legal matter. The purpose of the inquiry is
to gain advice, information, and assistance in the specific case in which
the litigant is involved. Rules that prohibit the providing of informa-
tion and assistance helpful to litigants in their cases either are doomed
to be broken or would render clerks of very little use to litigants.
Even the most basic duties of the clerks might be construed as legal
advice. For example, if a litigant, having been served with a com-
plaint, appears at the clerk's office, the clerk might inform the litigant
that the complaint needs to be answered. In jurisdictions that have
developed forms for litigants, the clerk might simply hand the litigant
an answer form; yet if the same litigant took the complaint to an attor-
ney, a very different discussion might occur. Although the attorney
might ultimately file an answer on behalf of the litigant, the attorney
might first engage in a discussion as to what might go into the answer.
The attorney also might discuss with the client the possibility of pursu-
ing a different first step, such as filing a motion to dismiss. The pro-
cess of deciding which step to take involves a discussion of options for
the client, a process central to the attorney's role.45 By deciding to file
44. It would not be surprising to find courts relying on a narrow definition of what
constitutes "legal advice" where the "expected" or "routine" interactions between
unrepresented litigants and clerks or opposing lawyers are at issue. A somewhat
broader definition of the term is needed to protect clients or potential clients from the
actions of attorneys on whose advice they have relied. See generally supra notes 31-43
and accompanying text (discussing the ambiguity of the meaning of "legal advice").
I have described elsewhere the importance of resisting the tendency to employ nar-
row definitions of the terms "advice" and "legal advice" in understanding and regulat-
ing a lawyer's interactions with unrepresented adversaries. See Engler, supra note 43,
at 97-98. In understanding and enforcing the prohibition against advice-giving, I ar-
gued that context-in particular, the identity of the unrepresented party and the set-
ting of the attorney's statement-is critical in determining whether a particular
statement or action constitutes advice-giving. See id. at 98. Because the key to the
inquiry is the effect or potential effect on the unrepresented party, I urged that for the
prohibition on advice-giving to have any meaning, it needs to include "prohibiting a
lawyer from both giving an opinion or counsel and proposing or recommending a
course of action." Id.
45. See, e.g., Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.4(b) (1998) ("A lawyer
shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions."). Leading texts on the skill of client counseling make clear that
this process includes a discussion of options for the client. See, e.g., Robert M. Bas-
tress & Joseph D. Harbaugh, Interviewing, Counseling, and Negotiating: Skills for
Effective Representation 256 (1990) (describing the attorney-client encounter to in-
clude: "work[ing] together to identify priorities, alternatives, consequences, and ac-
tion steps[,] . . . predict[ing] consequences, reflect[ing] and clarify[ing] clients'
concerns and ensure that all consequences for each alternative are considered[, and]
•.. guid[ing] the clients through discussion and analysis of the alternatives and their
consequences"); see also David Binder et al., Lawyers As Counselors: A Client-Cen-
tered Approach (1991) (describing how lawyers can better serve their clients). Binder
and his co-authors define "Counseling" as follows:
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an answer, the client foregoes the choice of filing a motion instead.
By choosing certain defenses or counterclaims, the client foregoes the
opportunity to raise others. Few would question that the process of
helping the client decide these issues involves the giving of legal ad-
vice. Yet a clerk's action in simply handing a litigant an answer form
with certain defenses listed essentially helps the litigant decide to file
an answer raising defenses from a limited list. A presentation of the
broader range of choices available, and advantages and disadvantages
of each, is missing.46
Viewed in this light, clerks are, at best, not giving legal advice. In
reality, clerks are giving legal advice all the time. The context of the
discussions and the nature of the inquiries necessitates this conclusion
under any credible definition of "legal advice." Yet, notwithstanding
the best of intentions, the legal advice could be viewed as poor legal
advice. The presence of the rules and customs surrounding the clerk's
office guarantees that what will not occur is a discussion of available
options, along with the advantages and disadvantages of each. Even if
the course of action taken is an appropriate one, the decision occurs as
a result of limited information and advice. Litigants are being led to
make choices without the information, guidance, or expertise neces-
sary to ensure that the choices are informed ones.
The difficulties facing unrepresented litigants at the clerk's office
are compounded by the bias and hostility some clerks exhibit toward
unrepresented litigants. In the words of one observer, there exists a
"pervasive institutional bias in our courts against self-represented liti-
gants," a bias that includes the clerks' differential treatment of unrep-
resented litigants in comparison to their treatment of lawyers. 7 One
Counseling is the process by which lawyers help clients decide what course
of action to adopt in order to resolve a problem. The process begins with
identifying a problem and clarifying a client's objectives. Thereafter, the
process entails identifying and evaluating the probable positive and negative
consequences of potential solutions in order to decide which alternative is
most likely to achieve a client's aims.
Id. at 259-60 (footnote omitted). Their definition of advice-giving includes advising
clients about the likely legal and/or nonlegal consequences of their decisions, as well
as giving the lawyer's opinion "about which alternative a client should adopt." Id. at
260. Throughout their text, Binder and his co-authors underscore the importance of
proposing solutions or options, and advising clients of the potential consequences of
their choices. See id. at 28, 273-74.
46. The purpose of the illustration in the preceding paragraph is not to suggest
that clerks should be giving advice to the full extent one's lawyer might. Rather, it is
to demonstrate that prohibiting clerks from giving "legal advice" is an unworkable
and ill-advised prohibition. For a discussion of suggested guidelines for clerks, see
infra part II.B.3.
47. Steven R. Elias, Bias Against Pro Per Litigants 1 (n.d.) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the author). Elias suggests that posted signs stating "Ve don't
provide legal advice!" most often mean that the clerks want the self-represented liti-
gant to get a lawyer. See id. As Elias explains, "[i]f a lawyer's office calls the clerk and
asks about a particular scheduling procedure, the clerk will provide all sorts of infor-
mation without thinking twice. But let a self-represented person ask for the same (or
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study of self-represented litigants found that "[s]ome judicial person-
nel even display a marked degree of antagonism for the self-helper."48
The Massachusetts Gender Bias Report describes hostility from the
clerks as a major problem facing unrepresented women in the Massa-
chusetts courts.49 Greacen frankly acknowledges that invoking the
phrase "I am not allowed to give legal advice" is an easy way to "get
rid of" an unrepresented litigant seeking assistance. 0
Despite the extensive time and effort expended by clerks in assist-
ing unrepresented litigants, the unrepresented litigant emerging from
the clerk's office must be viewed as having made "choices" based on
limited information and advice. Officially, litigants encountering
court personnel will not have had the benefit of legal advice, since
court personnel are prohibited from giving such advice. More prob-
able, however, is that some litigants may receive "legal advice" which
is likely to be limited and may even constitute poor legal advice.
Moreover, the encounter may be permeated by bias or hostility to-
ward the unrepresented litigant.
B. Assistance Programs
In addition to court personnel, unrepresented litigants may encoun-
ter various other actors during the course of the proceeding. The ac-
tors may include people in many of the assistance programs that have
sprung up inside courthouses around the country, lawyers and lay peo-
ple providing limited assistance to litigants outside the courthouse,
and opposing lawyers. As shown below, however, unrepresented liti-
even much less) information, and it suddenly becomes legal advice." Id. at 5. Elias
urges that clerks provide the same information to the self-represented as they would
to lawyers and their staffs, that the boundary as to what is considered legal advice be
pushed back, and that a requirement of being a clerk be a genuine desire to facilitate
equal access regardless of whether a party is represented by counsel. See id.
48. Steven R. Cox & Mark Dwyer, A Report on Self-Help Law: Its Many Per-
spectives 50 (n.d.) (unpublished report, on file with the author) (sponsored by the
ABA Special Committee on the Delivery of Legal Services but not formally endorsed
by the ABA); see also Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling of Legal Services and the Family
Lawyer, 28 Fam. L.Q. 421, 435 (1994) (discussing lawyer and judicial prejudice toward
pro se litigants).
49. See Gender Bias Study Comm., Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., Report of
the Gender Bias Study of the Supreme Judicial Court 20 (1989) [hereinafter Mass.
Gender Bias Study].
50. Greacen, supra note 24, at 12. Outside one clerk's office hangs the sign: "The
District Court Clerk's Office Cannot Answer Any Questions Regarding Pro Se
Cases." Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 34. "While court clerks have traditionally as-
sisted attorneys and their staff by providing instructions as to the appropriate rule to
follow or form to file, they are hesitant to provide the same information and forms to
self-represented litigants." Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 3 (footnote omit-
ted); see also Patricia Nealon, Electronic Equality Is Tested in Court, Boston Globe,
August 5, 1997, at B1 (describing litigation by a non-lawyer denied access to a com-
puter service in the Massachusetts Superior Courts, called Superior Court Remote
Inquiry for the Bar, that allows lawyers to view court dockets from computers in their
homes).
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gants heading to mediators or judges must still be presumed to be
making uninformed choices despite the array of assistance programs.
1. Limited Assistance Inside the Courthouse
As the numbers of unrepresented litigants have swelled, courts have
created pro se clerks,5' attorneys 5 2 assistants, 3 law clerks,' or offices
to assist unrepresented litigants. 5 In some courts, information tables
staffed by non-lawyers, 6 court clinics staffed by law students, 7 and
51. See, e.g., N.Y. City Civ. Ct. Act § 110(o) (McKinney 1989) (requiring a -suffi-
cient" number of pro se clerks to assist persons not represented by counsel in housing
court). The federal courts have made extensive use of pro se law clerks in the context
of prisoner litigation. See Federal Judicial Ctr., Resource Guide for Managing Pris-
oner Civil Rights Litigation 35 (1996) (describing the role of the federal pro se law
clerk).
52. The New York City Housing Courts have a "pro se attorney" on staff in each
borough to assist litigants. See, e.g., infra note 346 (discussing the lack of sufficient pro
se attorneys to assist unrepresented litigants). Staff attorneys in the Pro Se Legal
Services Unit in Family Court in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, provide assistance and
advice to unrepresented parties. See Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 69, 86.
53. See Bruce D. Sales et al., Is Self-Representation a Reasonable Alternative to
Attorney Representation in Divorce Cases?, 37 St. Louis U. LI. 553, 560 (1992) ("The
Domestic Relations Division of the Maricopa County (Phoenix, Arizona) Superior
Court hired a full time paralegal to provide procedural assistance to self-represented
litigants."). One Florida Court has established a full-time assistant for family law
cases, who reviews required documentation submitted by pro se litigants, schedules,
and dockets hearings once the paperwork is in order. See First Circuit's Pro Se Liti-
gant System Delivers Results, Full Court Press (Office of the Courts Administrator,
Tallahassee, Fla.), July-Aug. 1994, at 2, 2.
54. See Harvey Halberstadter, Help for the Pro Se Litigant, State Ct. J., Winter
1982, at 9, 11.
55. See, e.g., Erin St. John Kelly, Yourself Esq.: When You're Up Litigation Creek
Without a Lawyer, N.Y. Tunes, Nov. 16, 1997, § 14, at CY3 (describing the Office for
the Self-Represented in New York Supreme Court). Most federal courts have had a
pro se division of the clerk's office since the early 1980s. See id.
56. See, e.g., Responding to the Needs, supra note 25, at 20-23 (describing models
for courthouse-based assistance to pro se family law litigants in the District of Colum-
bia, King County, Seattle, Washington, and Maricopa County, Phoenix, Arizona).
The City-Wide Task Force on Housing staffs information tables in many of New York
City's Housing Courts. See Miller v. Silbermann, 832 F. Supp. 663, 667 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (describing allegations of landlords' groups that the systemic operation of the
Housing Court, including the presence of the information tables, deprives landlords of
their due process and equal protection rights).
57. See Michael Millemann et al., Rethinking the Full-Service Legal Representa-
tional Modek A Maryland Experinent, 31 Clearinghouse Rev. 1178, 1178 (1997)
(describing "an experimental project in which law students provide legal information
and advice to otherwise unrepresented parties in family law cases").
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
"lawyers-for-the-day" programs staffed by volunteer lawyers58 may be
available to unrepresented litigants.59
In addition, various information sheets, booklets, and court forms
are available in many courthouses for many types of proceedings;
60
websites increasingly provide information as well.6 Courts in Ari-
zona and Utah employ information kiosks "to enable court users to
rapidly obtain the necessary forms and instructions for legal proceed-
ings in which litigants often represent themselves. '6 Various states
have begun to explore the concept of a "multi-door courthouse" or
"self-service" center, pioneered by the Superior Court of Maricopa
County, Arizona. 63 The concept is "a system of integrated services to
assist primarily unrepresented litigants," including elements such as
public education; intake services to identify needs of unrepresented
58. See Daniel Golden, Probate Plaintiffs at Risk Without Lawyers, Boston Globe,
Nov. 27, 1995, at 1 ("[M]any lawyers who regularly practice in family court have be-
gun volunteering one day each year to help impoverished pro se litigants. Most fam-
ily courts now offer 'lawyer for the day' [('LFD')]services."); see also Family Law
Section Comm. on the Probate and Family Court, Massachussetts Bar Ass'n, Chang-
ing the Culture of the Probate and Family Court 34-37 (1997) [hereinafter Changing
the Culture] (describing such programs in the Probate and Family Court in Massachu-
setts in seven different counties).
59. See Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 72-104 (describing fourteen "Illus-
trative Pro Se Assistance Programs and Services").
60. See, e.g., Howard M. Rubin, The Civil Pro Se Litigant v. The Legal System, 20
Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 999, 1010 (1989) ("Some of the circuit courts in Illinois and several
bar associations have written materials to assist the pro se litigant.").
61. See, e.g., Supreme Court of Fla., Florida Supreme Court: Self Help Center,
(visited Oct. 22, 1998) <http://www.firn.edu/supct/selfhelp.html> (providing links to
summaries, written by the Florida Bar for the layman, on various aspects of Florida
law); HALT, HALT-An Organization for Legal Reform, (visited Oct. 22, 1998)
<http://www.halt.org> (providing an online "Everyday Law Series" with answers to
common legal questions); New York Law Journal & NYS Unified Court System, New
York Courts' Law Guide, (visited Oct. 22, 1998) <http://www.nylj.com/guide> (includ-
ing "more than 100 documents, written in plain English, that explain the courts and
laws of New York to non-lawyers"); Nolo Press, Nolo Home Page, (visited Oct. 22,
1998) <http://www.nolo.com> (providing "Nolo's Legal Encyclopedia" for informa-
tion on law relating to small businesses, wills and estate planning, employment, etc.).
62. Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 69. Various reports around the coun-
try include descriptions of the Arizona kiosk, as other states prepare to implement a
similar approach. As one such report describes the kiosk:
[t]hese kiosks, called QuickCourt, permit persons to obtain information on
how to bring or respond to certain family law actions and to fill out court
forms. The kiosk prompts users with questions that are answered by utiliz-
ing a touch screen and keyboard. For example, in a divorce proceeding, the
litigant is prompted to enter information such as gross income, household
expenses, community assets, etc. The computer calculates child support and
prints out documents with directions concerning notarization, filing and
service.
Memorandum from David Long and Susan Lee to the Board Committee on Courts
and Legislation, State Bar of California, regarding the Pro Per Crisis in Family Law 36
(Aug. 15, 1998) (on file with the author).
63. See Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 71; Long & Lee, supra note 62, at
37-38.
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litigants; a variety of referral options, including referral to court
processes, mediation, and social service agencies; and a self-help
center with facilitators and computers to provide information on court
procedures and assist litigants in completing forms.M The develop-
ment of court forms has often been accompanied by simplification of
court procedures, to increase accessibility and thereby reduce the de-
mand for assistance.65
Despite the variation in detail and structure, the programs may be
grouped into two categories: those designed to provide legal advice
and those designed to provide assistance short of legal advice. Most
programs, since they are staffed either by non-lawyers or by court per-
sonnel, are limited by the traditional prohibition against giving legal
advice.66 Even some programs staffed by volunteer lawyers or law
students do not include providing legal advice as part of the program's
stated goal.67 Of the few programs in which the limited assistance in-
cludes the giving of legal advice, most involve a high volume of cases
64. See Long & Lee, supra note 62, at 37. The Self-Service Center in Maricopa
County includes not only screening and referral services, but also user-friendly court
forms and instructions, a list of professionals including lawyers prepared to provide
representation at a reduced fee and alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") neutrals,
and general education and information. The court has dedicated a floor in the court-
house, which includes videotapes, forms and instructions for filling them out, com-
puters and printers for completing forms, serve advisors to answer questions about
materials and court forms, a law library and access to an information specialist, and
services from other agencies such as a volunteer lawyer program and the state division
of child support enforcement. See Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 73-75; Long
& Lee, supra note 62, at 37.
65. Legal scholars have vigorously debated whether more formal or informal pro-
cedures might better protect the rights of the disempowered. See, eg., William H.
Simon, Legal Informality and Redistributive Politics, 19 Clearinghouse Rev. 384, 384
(1985) ("Until recently ... [t]he left critique [of the legal system] portrayed formality
as facilitating the manipulation of the legal system by the privileged to the disadvan-
tage of others.").
66. See, e.g., Responding to the Needs, supra note 25, at 20-24 (describing models
for courthouse-based assistance to pro se family law litigants in the District of Colum-
bia, King County, Seattle, Washington, and Maricopa County, Phoenix, Arizona). In
each model the assistance provided by the personnel does not include legal advice.
See id. at 22. Maricopa County has since added a lawyer referral service component,
which includes brief legal advice. See id. at 23; see also Kelly, supra note 55, at 3
(stating that in New York State Supreme Court, litigants should not expect legal ad-
vice from the Office of the Self Represented, but rather prepare to fill out all the
forms themselves).
67. See Changing the Culture, supra note 58, at 35 (describing how participants in
the Bristol County LFD program "are not allowed to give legal advice or provide
actual representation" but merely "assist with the paper work, which relieves the
clerks from the task"); see also Millemann et al., supra note 57, at 1187 ('The students
gave legal information to any person who requested it but gave additional legal advice
(pursuant to the state's student practice rule) only to indigent clients."). While cau-
tioning that the clinic was located in Montgomery County, an affluent jurisdiction,
Millemann and his co-authors reported that "80 percent of the pro se litigants who
asked for legal information and advice were employed." Id. at 1187 n.28. Presumably,
many of those seeking help from the clinic students were ineligible to receive legal
advice.
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per person.68 The programs either serve a small number of those who
need assistance or provide a limited amount of time per litigant.69 In
neither instance do litigants receive extensive legal advice. Programs
rarely provide for continued assistance throughout the course of the
proceeding,7" with only a handful even mentioning the provision of
representation.7'
Despite the help these programs provide, the unrepresented liti-
gants who have received the help still must be viewed as lacking the
benefit of legal advice. Because the structure of most programs pro-
hibits the giving of legal advice, by definition the users of the program
have not received legal advice.7" Similarly, the litigant receiving tech-
nological assistance alone cannot be viewed as having received legal
advice.73 Even where programs permit the giving of legal advice, the
68. See Changing the Culture, supra note 58, at 30 (concluding, with respect to
Massachusetts LFD programs, "[w]e must develop the ability to provide education to
potential litigants not only on procedural requirements, but also on their rights");
Responding to the Needs, supra note 25, app. H at 38 (describing program in Los
Angeles in which local legal services organization staffs a part-time program to pro-
vide assistance to pro se litigants; the one to two lawyers see about 50 persons a day);
Golden, supra note 58, at 1 ("Pro se litigants take a number and stand in line. Some
wait as long as two hours .... With so much paperwork, [the LFD] can help only a
dozen people in eight hours-just a small fraction of all the pro se litigants . . .");
Millemann et al., supra note 57, at 1181 ("During a 17-month period in 1995-96, 34
law students conducted diagnostic interviews and gave basic legal information and
advice (generally 30-60 minute sessions) to approximately 4,400 people .... ").
69. See, e.g., Responding to the Needs, supra note 25, at 23 (describing the court-
house lawyer referral service component of the Maricopa County program, which
does not arrange for overall representation but provides on-the-spot legal advice for
up to 30 minutes for a $20 fee); Mark Thompson, Help Wanted: Few Programs Aid
Pro Pers in Maneuvering Though Legal System, L.A. Daily J., Feb. 1, 1995, at 1
(describing pro per counseling projects in some California county courts as so busy
that they do not advertise, since they are barely able to help walk-ins).
70. The more typical scenario is the description of the Massachusetts LFD pro-
gram: "Most court personnel see the LFD role as only assistance for the day, not as
representation." Changing the Culture, supra note 58, at 37.
71. Indeed, attempts to provide representation led to the demise of the LFD pro-
gram in Barnstable County, Massachusetts. "Previously, the person performing
[LFDJ services provided actual representation where appropriate. A disgruntled liti-
gant in a custody battle sued the [LFD] who assisted the opposing party. Since then
the bar has been understandably wary of involvement." Changing the Culture, supra
note 58, at 34-35. Where representation arises from contact with the LFD, the repre-
sentation typically is for a fee or reduced fee. See, e.g., id. at 36 (describing Plymouth
County Massachusetts LFD program).
72. In reality, the litigants may be receiving what should properly be defined as
limited or partial legal advice. See supra Part I.A. That reality does not eliminate the
propriety of viewing the litigants as uninformed actors, or the need to revisit the re-
strictions on those who provide assistance.
73. The technological and procedural innovations are a critical component of any
effort to increase the accessibility to the court of unrepresented litigants. For some
litigants, the ability to overcome traditional barriers of mystifying and complicated
procedures may be the primary form of assistance needed. It is hard to imagine that
the developers of the information kiosks would contend that the kiosks are providing
legal advice.
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limited and rushed nature of the encounter between the lawyer and
litigant similarly precludes a presumption that the litigant has received
the benefit of full and complete legal advice. Not surprisingly, propo-
nents of the programs, while praising their utility, uniformly acknowl-
edge that the programs alone are often inadequate and require follow-
up or supplemental measures. 74
2. Limited Assistance Outside the Courthouse
Outside the courthouse, unrepresented litigants may receive advice
and information from a variety of sources, including books, videos,
websites, lay people, and lawyers. The lay advice may come from fam-
ily and friends, presumably ranging from helpful and accurate to mis-
leading, incorrect, and harmful.' Help from lay advocates is limited
in most jurisdictions by the legal profession's prohibition on the unau-
thorized practice of law.7 6 Though still unwilling to eliminate the re-
strictions on lay advocacy, the legal profession has begun to relax
these restrictions.' This trend is apparent in "do-it-yourself' kits and
form preparation services for pro se litigants.7" While the profession
increasingly has recognized that some amount of advice-giving and
providing of information can, and perhaps should, accompany the
services, it typically prohibits the giving of legal advice.79
74. See, e.g., Responding to the Needs, supra note 25, at 34 ("[Alny program to
provide direction to pro se litigants should include resources for giving substantive
advice."); Changing the Culture, supra note 58, at 42 ("[O]ur committee was inclined
to agree that court appointments for indigent persons or restoration of funded legal
services are necessary long-term solutions."); Millemann et al., supra note 57, at 1190
("The qualified success of limited representation does not suggest that the nation
needs fewer, rather than significantly more, legal services attorneys and pro bono
lawyers."); id. at 1191 ("Some people would need no more than onetime-only legal
information and advice such as that given by the project students. More would need
follow-up legal assistance, however."); Thompson, supra note 69, at 9 ("Those who
helped set up [the California pro bono] counseling programs have no illusions that
they are solving the problems stemming from the flood of pro pers into family
courts."); Robert B. Yegge, Divorce Litigants Without Lawyers, Judges' J., Spring
1994, at 8, 10 ("Yet, in certain circumstances, pro se litigants must be warned about
the need for the advice-if not actual representation-of a lawyer.").
75. As one scholar recently noted in the context of client counseling: "Lawyers
often represent clients who are uninformed or misinformed about the law. The clients
may have only received information from the media, from well-meaning, but inaccu-
rate friends or relatives, or from the street." Kimberlee K. Kovach, The Lawyer as
Teacher: The Role of Education in Lawyering, 4 Clinical L Rev. 359, 367 (1998).
76. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.5 (1998).
77. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Law-
yers, 4 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 209,216-21 (1990) (discussing the extent to which enforce-
ment of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law has diminished). For
an excellent overview of the history and current trends in lay advocacy, see Commis-
sion on Nonlawyer Practice, American Bar Ass'n, Nonlawyer Activity in Law-Re-
lated Situations 13-72 (1995) [hereinafter Nonlawyer Practice].
78. See Rhode, supra note 77, at 213-14.
79. See supra notes 24-27. One commentator describes the practical restriction:
"Since paralegals may not provide fact-specific advice in light of unauthorized prac-
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Where unrepresented litigants seek assistance from attorneys, pri-
vate and public lawyers provide limited assistance, including helping
litigants with pro se pleadings or motions for court. Legal services
offices may offer various pro se assistance programs, including tele-
phone advice and in-person clinics.8"
The phenomenon of limited assistance by lawyers, although wide-
spread, has caused problems for a profession that recognizes only two
types of litigants: those who are represented and those who are not.8'
Courts have therefore condemned the practice of "ghost-writing," in
which lawyers prepare papers for unrepresented litigants without dis-
closing to the court that the pleadings were written by lawyers.82 As
one court explained, "ghost-writing is far more serious than might ap-
pear at first blush[ ]" since it "necessarily causes the court to apply the
wrong tests in its decisional process and can very well produce unjust
results."83
tice of law regulations, paralegals conducting classes may either refuse to respond [to
fact-specific questions] or choose to explain the law in only general terms." Helen B.
Kim, Legal Education for the Pro Se Litigant: A Step Towards a Meaningful Right to
Be Heard, 96 Yale L.J. 1641, 1654 (1987) (footnote omitted).
80. See, e.g., Elizabeth McCulloch, Let Me Show You How: Pro Se Divorce
Courses and Client Power, 48 Fla. L. Rev. 481, 481-83 (1996) (discussing problems
with legal services designed to aid pro se litigants); Jane C. Murphy, Access to Legal
Remedies: The Crisis in Family Law, 8 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 123, 137 n.66 (1993) (describ-
ing pro se programs run by the Legal Aid Bureau in Maryland).
81. Compare Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.2 (1984) (prohibiting
lawyers from communicating with represented parties), with id. Rule 4.3 (providing
guidelines for communications between lawyers and unrepresented parties).
82. See, e.g., Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 987 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (con-
demning attorneys who help pro se litigants with materials they know will be used in
court); Somerset Pharm., Inc. v. Kimball, 168 F.R.D. 69, 72 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (finding
that "ghost-writing" taints the legal process); Johnson v. Board of County Comm'rs,
868 F. Supp. 1226, 1232 (D. Colo. 1994) (holding that "ghost-writing" may subject
lawyers to contempt charges), affd on other grounds, 85 F.3d 489 (10th Cir. 1996);
Klein v. H.N. Whitney, Goadby & Co., 341 F. Supp. 699, 702-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (con-
demning a pro se litigant's surreptitious enjoyment of the benefits of an attorney);
Klein v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 309 F. Supp. 341, 342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (stating
that ghost-writing "smacks of... gross unfairness"); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Pro-
fessional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1414 (1978) [hereinafter ABA Informal Op.
1414] (discussing the appropriate conduct for lawyers assisting pro se litigants).
83. Johnson, 868 F. Supp. at 1231. The Johnson court relied on a variety of cases
and ethics opinions to support the proposition that ghost-writing without disclosure of
the lawyer's identity amounted to "a deliberate evasion of the responsibilities im-
posed on counsel" by Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and misrepresentation in violation of Model
Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(4). Id. at 1231-32 (citing Ellis v.
Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1328 (1st Cir. 1971)). Other courts have condemned such prac-
tices by attorneys. See H.N. Whitney, 341 F. Supp. at 702-03; Spear, Leeds & Kellogg,
309 F. Supp. at 342-43. Ethics opinions, therefore, typically require disclosure of the
fact of the lawyer's participation, and often the lawyer's identity as well. See, e.g.,
ABA Informal Op. 1414, supra note 82 ("Extensive undisclosed participation by a
lawyer... that permits the litigant falsely to appear as being without substantial pro-
fessional assistance is improper.... .") (emphasis added); Committee on Prof'l Ethics,
Massachusetts Bar Ass'n, Op. 98-1 (1998), reprinted in 26 Mass. Law. Wkly. 2350,
2350 (1998) (noting "concerns about substantial and undisclosed involvement by at-
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In response to the profession's difficulties in dealing with limited
attorney assistance, a growing call for the "unbundling" of legal serv-
ices has emerged. Forrest Mosten, a leading proponent of the move-
ment, has contrasted the notion of "unbundling" with the full service
package involved in traditional legal representation. 4 As Mosten ex-
plains, "[u]nbundling these various services means that the client can
be in charge of selecting from lawyers' services only a portion of the
full package and contracting with the lawyer accordingly."s 5 While
the concept has attracted increased attention,' the profession clings
to its dualistic recognition of litigants as either represented or
unrepresented.
Despite the various forms of assistance potentially available outside
the courthouse, the presumption must remain that the unrepresented
litigant does not appear as an informed actor at the decision-making
stages. As non-attorneys are prohibited in most jurisdictions from giv-
ing legal advice, unrepresented litigants assisted by non-attorneys
must be viewed as litigants who have not had the benefit of legal ad-
vice. Limited encounters with lawyers may not have provided the liti-
gants with enough assistance and information to enable them to make
informed choices. Such encounters may have produced partially-pre-
pared, and often confused, litigants. Moreover, it may not be clear,
torneys in cases where the client is acting pro se"); Committee on Prof'l Ethics, New
York State Bar Ass'n, Op. 613 (1990), reprinted in N.Y. L.J., Oct. 15, 1990, at 4 (re-
quiring disclosure both of the fact that the pleading was prepared by a lawyer and the
lawyer's name).
84. See Mosten, supra note 48, at 422. The full package may, implicitly or explic-
itly, involve: "(1) gathering facts, (2) advising the client, (3) discovering facts of the
opposing party, (4) researching the law, (5) drafting correspondence and documents,
(6) negotiating, and (7) representing the client in court." Id. at 423.
85. Id. at 423. Mosten continues:
Further, the client may, in some cases specify the depth or extent of each
service. For example, a client may want representation at trial, but may want
to handle court filings, discovery, and negotiations without the lawyer. Con-
versely, a client may seek the advice and support of a family lawyer in nego-
tiating a settlement, but may choose to self-represent or retain another
attorney for actual court representation.
Id With respect to "service depth" the client may desire research in the form of a
five-minute check, or an exhaustive memorandum. See id.
86. See, e.g., Minn. Conference Report, supra note 40, at 16 (recommending sup-
port for unbundled legal services); Mary Helen McNeal, Redefining Attorney-Client
Roles: Unbundling and Moderate-Income Elderly Clients, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev.
295, 335-39 (1997) (cautioning attorneys who may provide unbundled legal services to
the elderly); Millemann, supra note 57, at 1178 (encouraging increased use of limited
lawyer representation); Ilene Mitchell, Unbundling Legal Services and Access to Jus-
tice, Mass. B. Ass'n Access to Justice Sec. News (Massachussetts Bar Inst., Boston,
Mass.), April 1998, at 1, 3 (noting the benefits of unbundling whiled encouraging care-
ful consideration of possible ethical conflicts); Lonnie A. Powers, Pro Bono and Pro
Se: Letting Clients Order Off the Menu Without Giving Yourself Indigestion, Boston
B.J., May/June 1998, at 10, 10-11 (discussing ethical concerns in providing unbundled
legal services); Long & Lee, supra note 62, at 40-41 (recommending support for un-
bundled legal services).
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absent inquiry, which litigants have received assistance, how much
they have received, and how much they have understood.
3. Interactions with Opposing Counsel
Where the unrepresented litigants' adversaries are represented by
counsel, the opposing counsel becomes a source of information upon
which unrepresented litigants often rely. In some courts, such as those
handling housing and debt collection cases, the typical case involves
an unrepresented party pitted against a party represented by coun-
sel.87 In other contexts, such as courts handling family law cases, some
cases involve two represented parties, some involve two unrepre-
sented parties, and some pit a lawyer against an unrepresented
party.88 Despite the good intentions of many lawyers forced to deal
with an unrepresented party, attorney misconduct permeates the in-
teraction between counsel and an unrepresented adversary.8 9 Law-
yers routinely engage in impermissible advice-giving, often including a
misleading presentation of the law or facts, and over-reaching.90 Law-
yers present legal and factual issues in a strategically favorable light,
selectively control the flow of information, and manipulate their un-
represented adversary by misusing argument, appeals, threats, and
promises.91 Whatever assistance an unrepresented litigant has re-
ceived may be undercut by the litigant's encounter with the opposing
lawyer.
4. The Limits of Limited Assistance
Despite the array of people from whom unrepresented litigants may
receive assistance, unrepresented litigants heading toward judges and
mediators must not be presumed to be informed actors. The litigants
may have received extensive help, some help, or no help at all. Where
the help is from forms, hand-outs, and kiosks, the litigants cannot be
viewed by the court as having received trained and expert counseling
regarding the existence and merits of their potential claims and de-
fenses, or having had the benefit of advice as to various courses of
action. Where the help is from lay advocates, such help presumptively
did not include legal advice. Where the help is from lawyers, the un-
represented litigant may or may not have understood the advice or
have been capable of acting on it. Regardless of the source and na-
87. See generally Engler, supra note 43, at 104-22 (discussing the prohibition of
advice giving in housing and consumer cases).
88. See id. at 122-30.
89. See generally id. at 130-57 (discussing steps for addressing attorney misconduct
with unrepresented litigants).
90. See id.
91. See id. at 103. The broader issue of the profession's need to regulate and elim-
inate lawyer misconduct in interactions with unrepresented parties is beyond the
scope of this Article. See id. at 83-84 (discussing alternative responses to attorney
misconduct with unrepresented litigants).
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ture of the help, the advice would not reflect subsequent encounters
with clerks, other court personnel, opposing parties, or opposing
counsel, which may have confused the unrepresented litigants' under-
standing of their cases and undercut the effectiveness of the
assistance.
C. Court-Connected Mediation
Courts, including those with significant numbers of unrepresented
litigants, have increasingly turned to mediation as a means of docket
control.92 In some settings, mediation is mandatory.93 More often,
the mediation is labeled voluntary, but often appears to be mandatory
to the uninformed litigant.94
Despite the varying contexts for court-connected mediation, stan-
dard restrictions govern the mediator's role. As with clerks,
mediators are prohibited from giving legal advice. 95
92. For articles generally referring to the increased use of mediation, in part as a
means of docket control, see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1075
(1984); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale
of Innovation Co-opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1991);
Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice Through Law,
74 Wash. U. L.Q. 47, 57-63 (1996); and Edward F. Sherman, Court-Mandated Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution: What Form of Participation Should Be Required?, 46 SMU L
Rev. 2079,2081-84 (1993). For references to courts with significant numbers of unrep-
resented litigants using court-connected mediation, see infra parts IIl.A, III.C (dis-
cussing courts' handling of family law and housing cases).
For the purposes of this Article, I define the concept of mediation broadly enough
to include all forms of court-connected ADR. Absent explicit rules to the contrary,
the constraints on the person conducting the court-connected ADR session will be
similar to the rules governing mediators discussed in this section.
93. See, eg., Karla Fisher et al., Procedural Justice Implications of ADR in Special-
ized Contexts: The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic Vio-
lence Cases, 46 SMU L. Rev. 2117, 2150 (1993) (discussing the use of mediation in
divorce and child custody cases as well as criminal assault and battery cases); Craig A.
McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to En-
suring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 1317, 1357 (1995) (discussing
mediation in family law cases in Maine). California's mandatory mediation includes
the feature of excluding lawyers from the mediation. See Cal. Fain. Code § 3182(a)
(West 1994).
94. See, e.g., Access to Justice Project, American Civil Liberties Union, Justice
Evicted: An Inquiry into Housing Court Problems 15 (1987) ("This inquiry [of the
New York City Housing Courts] observed ... the frequent lack of consistently clear
explanations regarding the mediation process . .."); Fox, supra note 23, at 91-92
(describing how unrepresented tenants in the Boston Housing Court are simply re-
ferred by court officials "upstairs to mediation" with little or no explanation as to
what mediation is, that mediation is voluntary, and that there might be advantages or
disadvantages to mediation).
95. See, eg., Mass. Unif. R. on Dispute Resolution 9(c)(iv), reprinted in 26 Mass.
Law. Wkly. 2129, 2131 (1998) ("A neutral ... shall not provide legal advice .... ");
Florida Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, MQAP 96-003 (1997) (answering
questions posed by an attorney regarding a mediator's duty not to give legal advice);
Jamie Henikoff & Michael Moffitt, Remodeling the Model Standards of Conduct for
Mediators, 2 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 87, 90 n.14 (1997) ("Neither attorney-
mediators nor non-attorney-mediators may provide parties with legal advice."); Rob-
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Mediators also must remain "impartial" and/or "neutral '9 6 and are
required to be "fair."9 7 A 1997 Florida advisory opinion illustrates the
devastating effect these seemingly innocuous rules can have on the
ert B. Moberly, Mediator Gag Rules: Is It Ethical for Mediators to Evaluate or Ad-
vise?, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 669, 675 (1997) ("Many bar ethics committees have
distinguished between giving 'legal advice,' which is often prohibited, and giving 'legal
information,' which generally is permitted." (citations omitted)); James H. Stark, The
Ethics of Mediation Evaluation: Some Troublesome Questions and Tentative Propos-
als, from an Evaluative Lawyer Mediator, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 769, 770 n.2 (1997) ("In
addition to the Joint Standards [of Conduct for Mediators], the ABA Standards of
Practice for Lawyer Mediators in Family Disputes (1984) and mediator codes in Colo-
rado and Texas either limit or prohibit legal advice by a mediator."). As with court
personnel generally, the prohibition against giving legal advice often flows from the
fact that mediators often are not lawyers, and therefore are prohibited from "practic-
ing law." See, e.g., Henikoff & Moffitt, supra, at 90 n.14 ("Non-attorney mediators,
like all non-attorneys, would likely be prohibited from dispensing legal advice be-
cause such actions would probably constitute the unauthorized practice of law."). In
the mediation context as well, however, commentators have recognized the difficulty
in identifying what constitutes information and what constitutes legal advice. See Joel
Kurtzberg & Jamie Henikoff, Freeing the Parties from the Law: Designing an Interest
and Rights Focused Model of Landlord/Tenant Mediation, 1997 J. Disp. Resol. 53, 83,
90 (1997); Moberly, supra, at 677; Stark, supra, at 784-86.
96. See Mass. Unif. R. on Dispute Resolution 9(b), reprinted in 26 Mass. Law.
Wkly. 2129, 2131 (1998) ("A neutral shall provide dispute resolution services in an
impartial manner."); John D. Feerick et al., American Arbitration Assoc. et al., Model
Standards of Conduct for Mediators Standard II (n.d.) (developed jointly by the
American Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association, and the Society of
Professionals in Dispute Resolution) ("The concept of mediator impartiality is central
to the mediation process."), available in <http://www.adr.org/standard.html>;
Henikoff & Moffitt, supra note 95, at 101 ("Virtually every proposed code of mediator
ethics mentions the importance of neutrality .... " (citations omitted)); Kurtzberg &
Henikoff, supra note 95, at 81-84. This requirement provides a further source of the
prohibition against giving legal advice. See, e.g., Florida Mediator Qualifications Ad-
visory Panel, MQAP 96-003 (1997) (explaining mediators' obligation to refer partici-
pants to independent legal counsel in certain situations); Moberly, supra note 95, at
677 (discussing the interrelationship between impartiality and providing legal advice).
97. The general proposition that mediators must conduct the mediation fairly is
widely accepted. See, e.g., John D. Feerick et al., American Arbitration Assoc. et al.,
Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators Standard VI (n.d.) ("A Mediator shall
Conduct the Mediation Fairly"), available in <http://www.adr.org/standard.html>.
The "fairness" debate focuses around the issue of whether mediators must simply
provide "procedural" fairness, or must provide for "substantive" fairness and a fair
outcome as well. For an overview of the "fairness" debate, see McEwen et al., supra
note 93, at 1323-29. For an exploration of the complexities in defining fairness, see
Carol Bohmer & Marilyn L. Ray, Notions of Equity and Fairness in the Context of
Divorce: The Role of Mediation, 14 Mediation Q. 37 (1996). For an example of this
debate in the context of the rules for court-connected mediation in Massachusetts,
compare Lawrence D. Shubow, Neutrals Should Have Ethical Responsibility, 25 Mass.
Law. Wkly. 1921, 1921 (1997) (contending that the Uniform Rules on Dispute Resolu-
tion mistakenly define the responsibility of neutrals in aiding disputants to reach
agreements out of a "loyalty to a rigid and utopian shibboleth about mediation"),
with Peter W. Agnes, Jr., Mediator's Duty to Ensure Fairness Limited, 25 Mass. Law.
Wkly. 1921, 1921 (1997) (arguing that a neutral's observance of all the responsibilities
set forth in the Uniform Rules is the best assurance that justice will be achieved in the
adjudication).
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outcome of cases involving unrepresented litigants.9 A mediator ini-
tially asked:
Is a mediator who becomes aware that a plaintiff in a wrongful
death action is making no claim for loss of consortium, which claim
would appear to the mediator to be appropriate under the circum-
stances, bound to inform that party of this matter?99
The panel replied, "[i]t is the opinion of the panel that it is an ethical
violation for a mediator to give legal advice to a party."'"0 The media-
tor asked whether he could tell the plaintiff of the right to make a
claim without advising as to whether the claim should be made, and
also whether he could ask why the claim was not being made. 1 He
inquired further as to how he could ascertain whether a party "does
not understand or appreciate how an agreement may adversely affect
legal rights or obligations" and how he might "assure that the plaintiff
understands the legal consequences" of the agreement. °2
The Advisory Panel emphatically responded that the prohibition
against giving legal advice barred the mediator from informing the
plaintiff of the right to make a certain claim, or even to ask why a
claim was not being made, regardless of whether the mediator is an
attorney. 0 3 The mediator's approved course of action is to "advise
the participants to seek independent legal counsel."' 1° With respect
to whether the parties are competent to enter into negotiations, the
panel recommended that the mediator ask questions such as "Have
you consulted legal counsel? Do you wish to? Do you feel comforta-
98. See Florida Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, MQAP 96-003 (1997).
99. I. at 1 (quoting Florida Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, MQAP 95-
005C).
100. l (quoting Florida Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, MQAP 95-
005C).
101. See id. Rule 10.090(a) of the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed
Mediators permits a mediator to "provide information" that the mediator is -quali-
fied by training or experience to provide." Id.
102. Ild. Rule 10.060(a) of the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed
Mediators provides that the mediator "shall assist the parties in reaching an informed
... settlement." Id. The mediator asked for answers first assuming that plaintiff was
represented by counsel, and then assuming that the plaintiff was pro se. See id. Not-
ing that Rule 10.020(b) of the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed
Mediators declares that mediation is a "nonadversarial process," the mediator ended
the inquiry as follows:
How much deference must be given by mediators to the idea (clearly drawn
from the adversarial trial model) that legal issues (such as defenses and
claims) may only be raised by the parties, and never by the third party? If
mediation is intended to be truly not adversarial, then the role of the third
party should be markedly different than that of a judge in an adversarial trial
system.
Id. at 2.
103. See id. at 2-3. The mediator in this case was a qualified mediator and a mem-
ber of the Florida Bar. See id.
104. Id. at 3 (citing Rule 10.090(b) of the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-
Appointed Mediators).
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ble that you have considered all possible legal rights and responsibili-
ties in this situation? 10 5
The mediator may encourage the unrepresented party to seek coun-
sel or may terminate the mediation if he determines that one party is
not competent to participate. Otherwise, he must attempt to mediate.
Since efforts to inform an unrepresented litigant that the agreement
entails the waiver of certain rights apparently amount to impermissi-
ble legal advice, the mediator must simply watch silently while the
unrepresented litigant's rights are waived. 10 6
From a mediator's point of view, the role described in the Florida
decision flows naturally from the concept of mediation, a process vol-
untarily selected by the parties as a means of dispute resolution differ-
ent from an adversarial trial.'07 From an unrepresented litigant's
point of view, however, the effect of the rules can be devastating. The
pressure exerted by courts to send cases to mediation and the lack of
explanation of the mediation process raise serious questions about the
"voluntary" nature of the decision to mediate. 108 Once in mediation,
the pressures on mediators to obtain settlements are immense.' 0 9
With a large number of unrepresented litigants, this pressure guaran-
tees that mediators will rarely, if ever, exercise the option to terminate
the mediation due to the incapacity of an unrepresented litigant to
105. Id.
106. The panel also answered that it is improper for the mediator to intervene with
respect to represented parties. See id. ("If the party is represented, the mediator must
assume that counsel is competent and has considered all relevant issues and causes of
action. It is improper for a mediator to substitute his or her judgment for that of
counsel.").
107. The Florida opinion should be viewed as representative of how similar bodies
in different jurisdictions would answer the queries. The decision flows from basic
rules such as the prohibition against giving legal advice and the need for impartiality.
See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. Individual mediators, of course, may
vary greatly in the manner in which they conduct mediation. The practices of some
mediators may diverge from the general rules described in this section. That some
mediators may choose to ignore or bend the rules, however, does not eliminate the
need to assess the rules as written and change them as necessary to require the de-
sired practices. For an additional case study illustrating similar harm to an unrepre-
sented litigant, see Nolan-Haley, supra note 92, at 67-71.
108. Yet, voluntariness is a cornerstone of successful mediation. See, e.g., John D.
Feerick et al., American Arbitration Assoc. et al., Model Standards of Conduct for
Mediators Standard I (n.d.) ("Self-determination is the fundamental principle of me-
diation. It requires that the mediation process rely upon the ability of the parties to
reach a voluntary, uncoerced agreement."), available in <http://www.adr.org/stan-
dard.html>; Henikoff & Moffitt, supra note 95, at 103 ("Voluntariness in the media-
tion context means both that a party must be free to accept or reject possible
settlement options and that a party must be free to accept or reject continued partici-
pation in the mediation process.").
109. See, e.g., Andree G. Gagnon, Ending Mandatory Divorce Mediation for Bat-
tered Women, 15 Harv. Women's L.J. 272, 281 (1992) (discussing how mediators han-
dling family law matters in the Massachusetts Probate and Family Courts-called
"family service offices"-report pressure from judges to settle cases, and indicate that
they believe their job effectiveness is evaluated based on how many cases they settle).
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participate. The mediation will proceed, with the mediator pressing
for an agreement, and prohibited from protecting the unrepresented
litigant from waiving significant rights. In mediated settlements, the
routine waiver of rights by unrepresented litigants flows from pre-
sumptions that the choice to mediate is voluntary and informed; that
the litigant has a realistic opportunity to obtain counsel and chooses to
forego counsel; that the litigant has access to independent advice; and
that the litigant appears in mediation aware of her legal rights and
capable of participating in mediation. 110
In theory, judges could provide a check on the dangers identified
above in mediation, because mediated agreements are usually sent to
them for approval."' In reality, judges typically rubber-stamp agree-
ments reached in mediation, as revealed by the following examination
of the judge's role, both in trial and settlement.' 12
D. The Judges
By the time the unrepresented litigant appears before a judge for
resolution of her case, the litigant most likely has interacted with
clerks in the clerk's office and possibly wvith a variety of other court
personnel. Depending on the context, the litigant may have consulted
outside counsel or someone in a program providing additional assist-
ance to unrepresented litigants. The litigant may have engaged in ne-
gotiations with an opposing attorney or appeared before a mediator in
a court-connected mediation program. Mediation or negotiation may
have resulted in a settlement awaiting court approval, or the case may
be awaiting resolution by a judge." 3
Although the role of judges in dealing with unrepresented litigants
has received attention both in the case law" 4 and in legal scholar-
ship," 5 the attention largely has been limited in two key respects.
110. Precisely this scenario occurs in Boston Housing Court, where mediation is
often a more favorable forum for landlords than resolution before the judges. See
infra Part II.C.1. Similarly, observers in the New York City Housing Courts have
commented that the landlords' attorneys control the mediation process. See Monitor-
ing Subcomm., City Wide Task Force on Housing Ct., 5 Minute Justice or "Aint [sic]
Nothing Going on But the Rent!" 42-43 (1986) [hereinafter 5 Minute Justice].
111. Where settlement is not reached, the cases are sent to a judge for resolution as
well.
112. See McEwen et al., supra note 93, at 1345-46; infra Part I.D.
113. The sequence may be different. The unrepresented litigant may appear before
the judge earlier in the sequence, resulting in a recommendation that the unrepre-
sented litigant try to settle the case with the attorney, go to mediation, go to the
clerk's office for assistance, or seek assistance from some other court-connected or
outside source. The analysis discussed in this section applies regardless of the actual
sequence.
114. See infra notes 116-32.
115. See, e.g., Julie M. Bradlow, Procedural Due Process Rights of Pro Se Civil Liti-
gants, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 659, 660 (1988) (advocating the use of a "sliding scale" test
which will result in more leniency for pro se civil litigants); Kim, supra note 79, at
1643 (proposing an alternative to attorney representation); Rubin, supra note 60, at
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First, although most cases settle, the decisions rarely focus on the
judge's role in settlement. They focus instead on either the court's
role in dealing with pro se pleadings and other filings16 or with the
court's role during a trial involving an unrepresented litigant." 7 Sec-
ond, the discussions largely ignore the more general context in which
the case arises. They resort instead to general language regardless of
whether the case is civil or criminal, whether the setting is one in
which unrepresented litigants are commonplace or rare, or whether
the law involved is relatively complex or simple.
The basic principles surrounding the judge's role are easily recited.
Judges must remain impartial and neutral." 8 Judges should be fair
and provide substantial justice. 19 Beyond the general rules, however,
"[t]he proper scope of the court's responsibility to a pro se litigant is
1000-01 (discussing judges' dilemma of balancing fairness and order in pro se pro-
ceedings); Joseph M. McLaughlin, Note, An Extension of the Right of Access: The
Pro Se Litigant's Right to Notification of the Requirements of the Summary Judgment
Rule, 55 Fordham L. Rev. 1109, 1112 (1987) (arguing that judicial notification of the
requirements of the summary judgement rule is a necessary element of the right of
access to the courts).
116. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam); Mazur v.
Pennsylvania, 507 F. Supp. 3, 4 (E.D. Pa. 1980), affd, 649 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1981);
Solimine v. Davidian, 661 N.E.2d 934, 934 (Mass. 1996); Mmoe v. Commonwealth,
473 N.E.2d 169, 171-72 (Mass. 1985); Rubin, supra note 60, at 1004-05; McLaughlin,
supra note 115, at 1115.
117. See United States v. Pinkey, 548 F.2d 305, 308-09 (10th Cir. 1977); Homecraft
Corp. v. Fimbres, 580 P.2d 760, 762-63 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Connecticut Light and
Power Co. v. Kluczinsky, 370 A.2d 1306, 1308-09 (Conn. 1976); Commonwealth v.
Jackson, 647 N.E.2d 401,405 (Mass. 1995); Commonwealth v. Barnes, 504 N.E.2d 624,
628-29 (Mass. 1987); International Fidelity Ins, Co. v. Wilson, 443 N.E.2d 1308, 1312
(Mass. 1983); Austin v. Ellis, 408 A.2d 784, 785 (N.H. 1979); Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669
P.2d 1207, 1213-14 (Utah 1983); Standards Relating to Trial Courts § 2.23 (1992);
Rubin, supra note 60, at 1001-07.
118. See, e.g., In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 357 So. 2d 172, 179 (Fla. 1978)
(stating that a judge "may not withhold justice from one litigant in favor of another");
Austin, 408 A.2d at 785 (stating that the courts' essential function is "to serve as an
impartial referee"); Indiana Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications, Op. No. 1-97 (stating
that the judge must ensure that pro se litigants are not denied relief only of the basis
of minor deficiencies in their case); Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3 (1990)
("A Judge Shall Perform the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and Diligently").
119. See, e.g., Kluczinsky, 370 A.2d at 1308 (stating that courts should "endeavor to
see that ... a [pro se] litigant shall have the opportunity to have his case fully and
fairly heard" (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); Rodriguez v. Owaynat, 485
N.E.2d 438, 441 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (holding that fundamental fairness and justice
required vacatur of the judgment entered after a trial involving a pro se litigant who
failed to understand the nature of court proceedings); Blair v. Maynard, 324 S.E.2d
391, 396 (W. Va. 1984) ("The fundamental tenet [is] that the rules of procedure should
work to do substantial justice .... The court should strive ... to ensure that the
diligent pro se party does not forfeit any substantial rights by inadvertent omission or
mistake." (footnote omitted)); Indiana Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications, Op. No. 1-
97 (1997) ("Fairness, courtesy, and efficiency also are hallmarks of an honorable judi-
cial system."); Standards Relating to Trial Courts § 2.23 (1992) ("When litigants un-
dertake to represent themselves, the court should take whatever measures may be
reasonable and necessary to ensure a fair trial.").
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necessarily an expression of careful exercise of judicial discretion and
cannot be fully described by specific formula. ' 120 Not surprisingly, in
one survey, "91% of the judges [reported] that their courts had no
general policy addressing the manner in which pro se litigants should
be handled in the courtroom or in the litigation process generally."121
In justifying their decisions involving unrepresented litigants, courts
routinely recognize that unrepresented litigants generally must play
by the same rules as represented litigants and can expect no special
treatment. 1' - Some decisions emphasize that the judge may not play
the role of advocate or attorney for the unrepresented litigant.12
Others suggest that the judge needs to provide a measure of assistance
to the unrepresented litigant, particularly to avoid a miscarriage of
justice, and is required to do so in construing pro se pleadings.124 One
Illinois court articulated this approach as follows:
120. Austin, 408 A.2d at 785 (quoting Standards of Judicial Administration, Trial
Courts § 2.23) (alteration in original).
121. Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 16.
122. See, e.g., Pinkey, 548 F.2d at 311 (stating that pro se litigants have no greater
rights than those represented by lawyers); Oko v. Rogers, 466 N.E.2d 658, 662 (IlI.
App. Ct. 1984) (Barry, J., dissenting) ("Defendant was entitled to a fair opportunity
to present his evidence, but nothing more."); Solimine v. Davidian, 661 N.E.2d 934,
934 (Mass. 1996) (stating that a pro se litigant "is held to the same standards to which
litigants with counsel are held"); Jackson, 647 N.E.2d at 405 (holding that no lenience
is required on the part of the judge toward a pro se defendant); Barnes, 504 N.E.2d at
629 (observing that the same rules of procedure apply to a pro se litigant as to those
represented by an attorney); Mmoe v. Commonwealth, 473 N.E.2d 169, 172 (Mass.
1984) ("[T]he rules bind a pro se litigant as they bind other litigants."); Wilson, 443
N.E.2d at 1312 ("[A] pro se litigant is bound by the same rules of procedure as liti-
gants with counsel."); Newsome v. Farer, 708 P.2d 327,331 (N.M. 1985) (stating that a
pro se litigant "enjoy[s] no greater rights than those who employ counsel"); Sun-
power, Inc. v. Hawley, 296 N.W.2d 532, 533 (S.D. 1980) (per curiam) (holding that a
judgment should not be set aside because a pro se litigant was unfamiliar with the
rules of pleading or trial practice); Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1213 ("[A] party who repre-
sents himself will be held to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any
qualified member of the bar."); Osborn v. Manning, 685 P.2d 1121, 1125 (\yo. 1984)
("[A] pro se litigant has no greater right that other litigants.").
123. See, e.g., Mazur v. Pennsylvania, 507 F. Supp. 3, 4 (E.D. Pa. 1980) ("[A) judge
may not become the surrogate attorney for a party, even one who is proceeding pro
se."), affd 649 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1981); In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 357 So. 2d at
182 (stating that judges must not act as advocates for one side or the other); Sn-
power, 296 N.W.2d at 533 (stating that the trial court "has no duty to practice law for
the pro se litigant"); Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1213 (stating that a court should not attempt
"to redress the ongoing consequences of the party's decision" to represent himself);
Kim, supra note 79, at 1646 ("Courts cannot be expected to assume the awkward
position.., of serving as both adjudicator and counsel for the pro se litigant."); Long
& Lee, supra note 62, at 7 ("Judges are not supposed to practice law on behalf of pro
pers."). Some judges have been informed that they cannot provide legal advice and
that they impermissibly practice law in providing various forms of assistance. See
Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 27-30.
124. See, eg., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam) (holding
that the trial court erred in refusing to allow pro se complainant to present evidence
supporting his allegations); Mazur, 507 F. Supp. at 4 (noting that courts "must pro-
ceed painstakingly" to discern the nature of a pro se plaintiff's claim); Oko, 466
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The heavy responsibility of ensuring a fair trial in ... a situation
[involving a pro se litigant] rests directly on the trial judge. The
buck stops there.... In order that the trial proceed with fairness...
the judge finds that he must explain matters that would normally
not require explanation and must point out rules and procedures
that would normally not require pointing out.
1 2 5
Some commentators respond to the divergent statements regarding
the judge's role by dividing the cases into those employing a "strict"
approach in dealing with unrepresented litigants and those employing
a "liberal" approach.' 26
An examination of the decisions, however, suggests that the out-
comes may be driven as much by the particular facts of the case as by
a given judge's approach. For example, some cases articulating a strict
approach often arise in the criminal context, where the defendant has
a right to counsel and has chosen to appear pro se despite the availa-
bility of counsel. 127 Others involve litigants who insist on remaining
unrepresented, contrary to the recommendations of the court,1 2 8 and
litigants who persist in filing overbroad and unintelligible pleadings
despite instructions from the court.' 29 In contrast, cases generating a
more "liberal" approach have appeared to the court to have more
sympathetic litigants, such as litigants whose limited education or lack
of understanding materially affected the substance of the case, 130 or
N.E.2d at 660 (noting that the trial judge ensured the pro se litigant received a fair
trial); Standards Relating to Trial Courts § 2.23 (1992) ("When litigants undertake to
represent themselves, the court should take whatever measures may be reasonable
and necessary to insure a fair trial."); Indiana Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications, Op.
No. 1-97 (1997) (stating that a judge should "ensure that a pro se litigant in a non-
adversarial setting is not denied relief sought only on the basis of a minor or easily
established defense").
125. Oko, 446 N.E.2d at 661.
126. See Rubin, supra note 60, at 1001-02; see also Kim, supra note 79, at 1644-46
(discussing the strict versus the liberal approach to pro se litigants); Goldschmidt,
supra note 40, at 12-16 (discussing judges' views regarding pro se litigants); Long &
Lee, supra note 62, at 7-8 (discussing the "compromise position" of family law judges
in cases with unrepresented litigants); Maureen McKnight, Dealing with the Unrepre-
sented Opponent 6-8 (1996) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the Oregon Family
Law Conference 1996, on file with author) (discussing the court's need to assist pro se
litigants without compromising the adversarial process).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Pinkey, 548 F.2d 305, 310 (7th Cir. 1977) (affirming
the trial judge's refusal to allow a pro se defendant to engage in irregular conduct);
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 647 N.E.2d 401, 405 (Mass. 1995) (same); see also In re
Tuntland, 390 N.E.2d 11, 14-16 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (upholding a petition for hospitali-
zation alleging the respondent was in need of mental treatment where the respondent
represented himself despite the right to appointed counsel).
128. See, e.g., Connecticut Light and Power Company v. Kluczinsky, 370 A.2d 1306,
1310 (Conn. 1976); International Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 443 N.E.2d 1308, 1312
(Mass. 1983) (noting that the litigant appeared pro se after the trial judge ordered the
original counsel to withdraw); Blair v. Maynard, 324 S.E.2d 391, 396 (W. Va. 1984).
129. See Mmoe v. Commonwealth, 473 N.E.2d 169, 171-72 (Mass. 1985).
130. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Owaynat, 485 N.E.2d 438,441 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (hold-
ing that a pro se defendant who failed to understand the nature of court proceedings
was improperly denied his motion to vacate); Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213-
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who otherwise seemed at a disadvantage through no fault of their
own.
13 1
While the principles may govern the decisions in one sense, the facts
drive the selection of the principles. One can almost predict the out-
come, and the choice of articulated principles, from the annoyance
level of the court. The more annoyed the court is with an unrepre-
sented litigant, the more likely the invocation of precedent requiring
impartiality, the application of similar rules, and a prohibition of play-
ing advocate for the litigant. The more sympathetic the litigant, and
the more the absence of counsel seems beyond the litigant's control,
the more likely the court will be to articulate a need to provide addi-
tional assistance to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
The decisions reflect not only judges' attitudes toward individual
litigants, but also judges' general discomfort with cases involving un-
represented litigants. By resorting to a "strict" approach, judges often
reveal a fear that accommodating unrepresented litigants might invite
an increase in people choosing to by-pass lawyers and appear without
counsel. 132 Unrepresented litigants must not be permitted to "capital-
ize" on their unfamiliarity with court procedure, because of a possibil-
ity that litigants will forego representation to gain a tactical
advantage. 133 Thus, a number of the decisions begin their analysis
from the proposition that the litigant has "chosen" to appear without
counsel in the first place.'
At a minimum, the decisions consistently attempt to deter litigants
from appearing without counsel. 35 Yet some judges do not simply
14 (Utah 1983) (discussing a judge's help and consideration for a pro se litigant
harmed by unfamiliarity with court processes and the "factual compelexities of the
case").
131. See Oko v. Rogers, 466 N.E.2d 658, 661 (Il1. App. Ct. 1984).
132. See, e.g., Kluczizsky, 370 A.2d at 1308-09 (refusing to make allowances for a
pro se litigant's lack of education); Oko, 466 N.E.2d at 662 (Barry, J., dissenting)
(warning that leniency toward pro se litigants invites pro se representation and diffi-
culties at trial). One survey of judges asked to describe the ideal pro se assistance
program provoked responses revealing a fear that such programs "would open the
floodgates and attorneys would revolt." Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 18 (-1 would
not adopt such a program. Soon virtually every litigant would seek to be included in
it. I think if too much attention is given to it, there will be a tremendous increase in
pro se litigation, much of which will be by non-indigent parties.").
133. See Homecraft Corp. v. Fimbres, 580 P.2d 760,762 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Sun-
power, Inc. v. Hawley, 296 N.W.2d 532, 533 (S.D. 1980) (per curiam).
134. See Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1365 n.7 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Pinkey, 548 F.2d 305, 310-11 (7th Cir. 1977); Austin v. Ellis, 408 A.2d 784, 785 (N.H.
1979); Kluczinsky. 370 A.2d at 1310.
135. See Robert W. Schachner et al., How and When to Be Your Own Lawyer 159
(1993) ("The majority of judges I have interviewed would just as soon not deal with a
pro se situation if they had a choice ...."); Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 13 ("Many
judges make an effort to deter litigants from proceeding pro se."). At a minimum,
judges frequently mention the "difficulties" involved in dealing with cases involving
unrepresented litigants. See id at 11-19. One judge phrases the negative ramifications
differently:
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deter unrepresented litigants, they silence them. One study of Balti-
more's Rent Court described the systematic way in which judges in-
timidate and silence unrepresented tenants, effectively precluding the
tenants from having their claims heard.136 Observers report judicial
silencing of unrepresented litigants in other settings as well. 1 7 In light
of these types of behavior and attitude, some observers conclude that
many judges are biased against unrepresented litigants. 138
Decisions reflecting a discomfort with cases involving unrepre-
sented litigants should not constitute appropriate precedent for courts
in which unrepresented litigants are commonplace. Moreover, the de-
cisions cited above typically come from courts in which the unrepre-
sented litigant is still the exception, rather than the rule. The
applicability of "precedent" from the federal or higher state courts, or
from criminal cases, to courts handling a high volume of civil cases
involving the unrepresented poor, should be suspect at best. Even if
there should be concern about the judicial role where litigants truly
have the means and opportunity to "choose" to appear without coun-
sel, the concerns should dissipate when considering the role of judges
in the "poor people's courts," where large numbers of litigants appear
without counsel due to the shortage of available counsel for the
poor.1
3 9
As unrepresented litigants become the norm in many courts around
the country, precedent from the small claims courts and administra-
tive agencies should provide more compelling guidance than cases in
One of the sad things is that we are driving attorneys out of the practice [of
law] because they can't afford to sit there all day as pro se people go on and
on. Lawyers just can't afford that. The more that happens, the more you
have the self-fulfilling prophecy of turning the court into a pro se system,
which is not good. The responsibility of the court is to resolve disputes. It is
not an emergency room of a hospital. It is not a therapy session.
Bench Conference: Judge Edward M. Ginsburg, Probate & Family Court, 25 Mass.
Law. Wkly. 252, 252 (1996).
136. See Bezdek, supra note 23, at 566-75. The unrepresented tenants typically are
poor, black women. See id. at 534 n.4.
137. See, e.g., 5 Minute Justice, supra note 110, at 65-68 (observing New York City
Housing Court judges in interactions with unrepresented tenants); Frank S. Bloch,
Framing the Clinical Experience: Lessons on Turning Points and the Dynamics of
Lawyering, 64 Tenn. L. Rev. 989, 999 (1997) (describing the silencing of an unrepre-
sented tenant in an eviction case in Tennessee); Mark H. Lazerson, In the Halls of
Justice, the Only Justice Is in the Halls, in 1 The Politics of Informal Justice 119, 119-21
(Richard L. Abel ed., 1982) (describing the bias of judges in New York City Housing
Courts against tenants, most of whom were unrepresented); Beatrice A. Moulton,
Note, The Persecution and Intimidation of the Low-Income Litigant as Performed by
the Small Claims Court in California, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 1657, 1664-65 (1969) (discussing
judicial intimidation of pro se litigants).
138. See Elias, supra note 47, passim; Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 18 (observing
"negative judicial philosophies about and attitudes toward pro se litigants": "some
judges went beyond stating their fear of 'opening the floodgates' of pro se litigants;
they evidenced a general anti-pro se litigant sentiment").
139. See infra Part III. For self-representation to comprise more than a hollow
right, litigants should not be punished for exercising that right.
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which the court's primary goal seems to be to deter litigants from "by-
passing" lawyers. In Massachusetts, for example. judges presiding
over small claims cases are required to "conduct the trial in such order
and form and with such methods of proof as it deems best suited to
discover the facts and do justice in the case." 40 In Florida small
claims cases, "[i]n an effort to secure substantial justice, the court shall
assist any party not represented by an attorney on: (1) procedure to
be followed; (2) presentation of material evidence; and (3) questions
of law."'' In Illinois,
[i]n any small claims case, the court may, on its own motion or on
motion of any party, adjudicate the dispute at an informal hearing.
At the informal hearing, all relevant evidence shall be admissible
and the court may relax the rules of procedure and the rules of evi-
dence. The court may call any person present at the hearing to tes-
tify and may conduct or participate in direct and cross-examination
of any witness or party.14 2
Judges must assume similar roles in agency settings, such as Social
Security cases. The Administrative Law Judges ("ALJs") have a "ba-
sic obligation to develop a full and fair record" which "rises to a spe-
cial duty when an unrepresented claimant unfamiliar with hearing
procedures appeals before him.' 4 3 "To satisfy this special duty the
administrative law judge must 'scrupulously and conscientiously probe
into, inquire of, and explore for all the relevant facts."' ' 4 The obliga-
tion for administrative judges to provide extensive assistance to liti-
gants extends beyond Social Security law, to areas such as welfare, 45
and unemployment benefits cases. 46
140. Unif. Small Claims R. of the Mass. Trial Cts. 7(c).
141. In re Amendments to the Florida Small Claims Rules. 601 So. 2d 1201, 1209
(Fla. 1992).
142. Ill. S  Ct. R. Ch. 110A, Rule 286(b).
143. Lashley v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 708 F.2d 1048, 1051 (6th
Cir. 1983) (citation omitted); Clark v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 399, 404 (5th Cir. 1981).
144. Lashley, 708 F.2d at 1052 (citations omitted).
145. See, e.g., Mass. Regs. Code tit. 106, § 343.450(A)(2) (1995) (describing the
Powers and Duties of Hearing Officials in Massachusetts welfare benefits as including
the duty "[t]o assist all those present in making a full and free statement of the facts in
order to bring out all the information necessary to decide the issues involved and to
ascertain the rights of the parties").
146. In Massachusetts unemployment hearings, for example, the hearing officer,
called a "Review Examiner," has obligations set forth in Massachusetts Regulations
Code title 801, section 1.02(10)(g). The specific obligations include:
2. [to) assist all those present in making a full and free statement of the facts
in order to bring out all the information necessary to decide the issues in-
volved and to ascertain the rights of the Petitioner,
3. [to] ensure that all Parties have a full opportunity to present their claims
orally, or in writing; [and to] ...
10. examine witnesses and ensure that relevant evidence is secured and in-
troduced ....
Mass. Regs. Code tit. 801, § 1.02(10)(g) (1993).
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The precedents from small claims courts and administrative agen-
cies serve as an important reminder that impartiality does not require
judges to be passive. Like other judges, small claims judges must re-
main impartial. 14 7 ALJs in Social Security, 148 welfare,149 and unem-
ployment benefits'50 cases must also remain impartial. Judges may
therefore be active in assisting unrepresented litigants without com-
promising their impartiality.
In contrast to the many decisions articulating the judicial role where
trials or pro se pleadings are at issue, few cases discuss the role of the
judge in settlements involving unrepresented litigants. Yet, since most
cases settle, the role of the judge in settlement perhaps is more impor-
tant than the role of the judge at trial. 5 '
A picture of the judicial role in settlement emerges by inference
from cases involving motions to vacate settlements or consent agree-
ments. For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court dis-
cusses the propriety of vacatur by measuring whether the resulting
agreement was "fair and reasonable";' 52 the trial court therefore has a
duty to consider the fairness and reasonableness of agreements before
accepting them. Indeed, "[a]t the final hearing most jurisdictions im-
pose a duty on the judge to review a divorce agreement for fairness or
lack of unconscionability.' ' 53 Decisional law in New York City hous-
ing cases allows courts to exercise their discretion to vacate stipula-
147. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1994) ("The functions of presiding employees and
of employees participating in decisions . . . shall be conducted in an impartial
manner.").
149. In Massachusetts, for example, welfare hearings are "conducted by an impar-
tial referee." Mass. Regs. Code tit. 106, § 343.110 (1997); see also Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) ("And, of course, an impartial decision maker is essential.").
150. For example, Article 29 of the Massachusetts Declaration Of Rights, guaran-
teeing the right to have cases heard by impartial judges, applies to administrative
agency officials as well. See, e.g., Police Comm'r v. Municipal Court, 332 N.E.2d 901,
905 (Mass. 1975) ("Article 29 extends beyond judges to all persons authorized to de-
cide the rights of litigants." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). See gen-
erally 38 Alexander J. Cella, Massachusetts Practice: Administrative Law and
Procedure § 313, at 585 (1986) (requiring administrative agency officials and presiding
officers to render impartial decisions); 39 id. § 581, at 68-69 (same).
151. The paucity of guidance regarding the judge's role in settlement is understand-
able, since, where cases settle, the conflicts ostensibly have been resolved. Contested
trials and pleadings require judicial action.
A notable exception to the general lack of guidance for judges in settlement is Jona
Goldschmidt & Lisa Milord, Judicial Settlement Ethics: Judge's Guide (1996). The
driving force for the project was "the lack of adequate guidelines for judges and
others who host settlement conferences." Id. at 1. Despite its impressive breadth, the
project does not distinguish between cases involving unrepresented parties and cases
involving represented ones; few of the cited cases appear to involve unrepresented
litigants at all. The project is therefore at best a partial response to issues raised in
this Article.
152. Moore v. Moore, 448 N.E.2d 1255, 1257 (Mass. 1983).
153. Penelope Eileen Bryan, The Coercion of Women in Divorce Settlement Negoti-
ations, 74 Denv. U. L. Rev. 931, 937 (1997) (footnote omitted).
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tions that are unduly harsh or one-sided;'-' courts therefore should
not approve agreements that are unduly harsh or one-sided. As con-
tract principles underlie the interpretation and enforcement of the
agreements, some courts may be expected to ask basic questions to
determine whether the unrepresented litigant understands the terms
of the agreement and has entered into the agreement voluntarily.'5 5
Occasionally, a court even articulates the need for judges to ensure
that unrepresented litigants understand their options prior to agreeing
to settlement terms. 6 The judicial principles articulated in the cases
involving pro se pleadings and trials apply as well, requiring the judges
to be impartial and neutral, granting the judges the discretion to pro-
vide at least some assistance to unrepresented litigants, and reserving
for the judge the general role of overseeing a fair proceeding designed
to provide substantial justice.'5 7
The general principles of providing fairness and justice are severely
challenged by the manner in which courts typically approve settle-
ments. Particularly in the "poor people's courts," where the numbers
of unrepresented litigants are the highest, the judicial oversight in set-
tlement is typically minimal. Courts handling housing, consumer, and
family law matters routinely face a high volume of cases and a high
rate of settlement, with minimal judicial oversight. 158 Vast numbers of
154. See, e.g., Amsterdanz Co. v. Levy, N.Y. LJ., Mar. 9, 1987, at 14 (App. Term.
Mar. 9, 1987) (vacating a "one-sided stipulation"); McEvoy v. Chaplin, N.Y. LJ., July
15, 1983, at 13 (App. Term. July 15, 1983) (holding that "it would be inequitable to
hold the pro se [litigant] to the terms of the stipulation"); Solack Estates, Inc. v.
Goodman, 425 N.Y.S.2d 906, 907 (App. Term. 1979) (holding that a stipulation of
settlement may be vacated when "the stipulation is unduly harsh or unjust"), aff'd,
432 N.Y.S.2d 3 (App. Div. 1980).
155. See, e.g., Benchmark Apartment Management Corp. v. Mercer, No. 96-00949,
at 8-9 n.8 (Mass. Housing Ct. Jan. 3, 1997) (unpublished opinion, on file with the
Fordham Law Review) (listing several determinations that a judge should make when
approving a landlord-tenant settlement); In re Marriage of Foran, 834 P.2d 1081, 1090
(Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming decision that a prenuptial agreement was unenforce-
able because it was patently unfair and wife did not have a full understanding of the
legal consequences of the contract and could not voluntarily and intelligently waive
her rights). For further discussion of mediation, see infra notes 311,322 and accompa-
nying text.
156. See, eg., Table Run Estate, Inc. v. Perez, N.Y. LJ., Feb. 23, 1994, at 21 (App.
Term. Feb. 23, 1994) ("In the colloquy attending execution of the stipulation, these
allegations were not examined.... It is clear that the unrepresented tenant did not
appreciate the available alternatives to signing the stipulation ....").
157. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of the
need for impartiality in settlement, see Goldschmidt & Milord, supra note 151, at 19-
29. The author's primary recommendation for judges in the context of guiding or
influencing settlement is: "The judge should guide and supervise the settlement pro-
cess to ensure its fundamental fairness. In seeking to resolve disputes, a judge in
settlement discussions should not sacrifice justice for expediency." Id. at 51.
158. See 144 Woodruff Corp. v. Lacrete, 585 N.Y:S.2d 956, 960 (Civ. Ct. 1992) (dis-
cussing crushing volume in New York City Housing Courts); David Caplovitz, Con-
sumers in Trouble: A Study of Debtors in Default 218-24 (1974) (discussing how
debtors who do not default in debt collection cases are pressured into settling their
cases without a trial); Bryan, supra note 153, at 937 ("Currently, however, for many
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cases are resolved in under five minutes at the bench, often reducing
the judicial role to that of a rubber-stamp. 159 Courts rarely exercise
their power to vacate the agreements.
160
Far from playing a minimal role in settlement, however, judges rou-
tinely encourage and pressure litigants to settle. 161 Court rules en-
courage judges to clear their dockets.' 62 Judges will need to explain to
their Administrative Judges why a relatively old case has remained
unresolved before they will be asked to justify the fairness of a case
settled on the first day. The frequent cautionary advice urging judges
to refrain from coercing litigants in the settlement process speaks
volumes about the temptation to do so.'
63
The unrepresented litigant, therefore, must expect to appear before
a judge intent on clearing the docket by achieving a settlement. The
typical judge will encourage and even pressure the litigant to settle.
The judge will be cognizant of the difficulties involved in cases with
unrepresented litigants, finding the cases easier where the parties have
reasons, judges pay only cursory attention to the actual provisions of divorce agree-
ments." (footnotes omitted)); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining
in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950, 951, 956 (1979)
(describing how most family cases settle, with minimal intervention of the court); Hil-
lard M. Sterling & Philip G. Schrag, Default Judgments Against Consumers: Has the
System Failed?, 67 Denv. U. L. Rev. 357, 386-87 (1990) (similarly describing how most
small claims debt collection cases in the District of Columbia do not make it to trial).
159. See Lacrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 960 (describing how most cases in New York
City's Housing Courts are "disposed of at an average rate of five to fourteen minutes
per case, with many settlements in the range of five minutes or less"); Bohmer & Ray,
supra note 97, at 40 ("[J]udicial scrutiny [of settlements] is in fact pro forma."); Mc-
Culloch, supra note 80, at 504 (describing how judges in divorce cases "expect each
case to take three minutes or less"); McEwen et al., supra note 93, at 1345-46 ("Court
review [of mediated agreements] has traditionally been viewed as a check on only the
most egregious and obvious unfairness, because the judge receives only the written
result of negotiations and has no advocate for non-signature .... [Tihe 'sheer quan-
tity of cases . . .[prevents] a judge [from] attend[ing] to cases prone to injustice."
(citations omitted)); Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Cus-
tody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 168, 177 (1984) ("Divorce
decrees are typically drafted for the parties after compromises reached through pri-
vate negotiation. These compromises are then approved by a judge, who generally
gives them only the most perfunctory sort of review.").
160. See, e.g., Bryan, supra note 153, at 938 ("In support of the state's policy of
favoring settlement of divorce disputes, the Illinois courts have created a presumption
in favor of the validity of settlement agreements."); Engler, supra note 43, at 142-43
("[T]o expect courts facing crushing volume to raise the [vacatur] challenge sua sponte
or regularly to undo [the parties' settlement] work only to create more work is
unrealistic.").
161. See Caplovitz, supra note 158, at 218-19; Gagnon, supra note 109, at 281. For a
general picture of the situation faced by poor people in the court system and pressure
placed upon them to settle, see infra Part III.
162. See Fiss, supra note 92, at 1073-75; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against
Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L.
Rev. 485, 491-93 (1985) (discussing effect of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16).
163. See Goldschmidt & Milord, supra note 151, at 41-56.
[Vol. 672020
AND JUSTICE FOR ALL
counsel."6 Where the case has not settled, and the judge is forced
either to act on pleadings or motions, and even conduct a trial, the
level of assistance the unrepresented litigant will receive may depend
on a variety of factors. To the extent the court feels that the litigant is
choosing to appear without counsel, is making a poor decision not to
settle, or is otherwise acting in a way of which the court does not ap-
prove, the litigant should expect very little help. The judge will re-
mind the parties that the same rules apply to unrepresented litigants
as to represented ones, that the judge must remain impartial, and that
the judge cannot act as advocate for the unrepresented litigant.
Though a sympathetic judge may provide some assistance to the un-
represented litigant, the notions of impartiality and need to avoid
playing the role of advocate remain.
The picture of the typical judicial behavior may ignore the practices
of some judges who deal regularly wvith unrepresented litigants. Judi-
cial treatment of unrepresented litigants varies widely.165 The prac-
tices of some judges may vary from the principles described in this
section. That reality does not eliminate the need to revisit rules for
judges developed in contexts in which the unrepresented litigant is the
exception. Absent explicit rules to the contrary, the level of assistance
provided by judges typically will fall short of that provided in small
claims courts and administrative agencies.
IX. REVISITING THE ROLES OF THE PLAYERS IN THE SYSTEM
Part I explored the rules and realities governing the roles of the
various players in the court system in their interactions with unrepre-
sented litigants. The discussion identified barriers that prevent vari-
ous players from providing unrepresented litigants with the help they
need to enable them to participate meaningfully in the legal system.
This part re-examines the roles of the judges, court personnel, and
other players to demonstrate how they can and should provide the
necessary assistance. Because the roles must be reshaped as part of a
systemic response to the problems facing unrepresented litigants, the
next part begins with a discussion of underlying principles that must
guide both the development of the systemic response and the re-
shaping of the individual roles.
164. "The survey of judges makes it clear that many judges experience great diffi-
culty when dealing with pro se litigants in the courtroom." Meeting the Challenge,
supra note 1, at 68 (referring to a non-randomly administered study).
165. For a description of varying judicial attitudes and strategies in dealing with
unrepresented litigants, see id. at 52-61.
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A. Revisiting the Underlying Principles
1. The Adversarial System
The traditional notions of who should be giving legal advice, and
what it means to be impartial, were developed within the framework
of the adversarial system. The adversarial system presumes that both
sides will be represented by counsel, and that cases involving unrepre-
sented litigants are the exception, rather than the rule.166 Yet, with
the dramatic increase in the numbers of unrepresented litigants, cases
involving unrepresented litigants can no longer be viewed as the ex-
ception. 167 When both sides appear without counsel, the traditional
configuration of the adversarial system has been altered; when one
side is represented and the other is not, it has broken down. 168
The challenge to the adversary system, however, should not lead to
an abandonment of its goals. The adversarial system purports to pro-
mote fairness and justice. 169 Yet, the rules currently operate as barri-
ers preventing unrepresented litigants from participating meaningfully
in the legal system and thereby frustrate the goal of dispensing fair-
166. See, e.g., Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-18 (1982) (stating
that lawyers should not undertake to give advice to a person who is attempting to
represent himself except to advise him to obtain a lawyer). The ethical rules give little
direct attention to cases involving unrepresented litigants. In the Model Rules, only
Rule 4.3 speaks directly to a lawyer's dealings with an unrepresented party. See
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.3 (1998). In the Model Code, only a
single subsection of one disciplinary rule focuses on this scenario. See Model Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 7-104(A)(2) (1982).
167. In many contexts, particularly the "poor people's courts" that handle civil
cases, it is the case involving two represented parties that is more likely to be the
exception. See infra Part III.
168. See, e.g., Sales, et al., supra note 53, at 559-60 ("Self-representation may place
the litigant at a disadvantage when facing the expertise and skills of an attorney.");
McLaughlin, supra note 115, at 1124 ("The effective operation of the adversary sys-
tem relies on the assumption that the parties to a lawsuit are approximately equal in
their legal representation. This rough balance, however, is entirely upset when one
side appears pro se." (footnotes omitted)).
169. Embedded in the ethical rules governing lawyers and judges is the underlying
goal of providing fairness and justice. See, e.g., Model Code of Judicial Conduct pmbl.,
at 3 (1990) ("Our legal system is based on the principle that an independent, fair and
competent judiciary will interpret and apply the laws that govern us." (emphasis ad-
ded)); Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-19 to -39 (1982) (grouped
under the title "Duty of the Lawyer to the Adversary System of Justice" (emphasis
added)); id. EC 7-23 ("A tribunal that is fully informed on the applicable law is better
able to make a fair and accurate determination . . . ." (emphasis added)); id. EC 7-24
("In order to bring about just and informed decisions.... ." (emphasis added)); id. EC
7-39 ("[P]roper functioning of the adversary system depends upon cooperation be-
tween lawyers and tribunals in utilizing procedures which will ... make their deci-
sional processes prompt and just . . . ." (emphasis added)); Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 3.6 cmt. 1 (1984) ("It is difficult to strike a balance be-
tween protecting the right to a fair trial .... " (emphasis added)); id. Rule 3.3 cmt. 15
("The object of an ex parte proceeding is nevertheless to yield a substantially just
result."). The Preamble to the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, which preceded
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, similarly referred to "the system for
establishing and dispensing Justice." Canons of Professional Ethics pmbl. (1908).
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ness and justice. Given a choice between clinging to the rules at the
expense of the goal, or modifying the rules to further the goal, the
rules must be modified. New rules, or new interpretations of the
traditional rules, must govern scenarios that are here to stay. That the
modifications may bring changes in our traditional expectations of
some of the players in the system is inevitable, and should not prevent
change. These changes must be designed to overcome the barriers
facing unrepresented litigants and promote fairness and justice for
them.
2. Impartiality
One important barrier is the narrow conception of impartiality that
typically permeates the discussions of the various roles. The notion
that a court cannot provide extensive assistance to one party without
compromising its impartiality must be rejected.170 To the contrary, a
court may need to provide more help to one side than to the other to
maintain the impartiality of the proceeding. 71 The absence of counsel
has a dramatic effect on the outcome of the proceedings."7 A system
that routinely favors parties with lawyers over parties without, regard-
less of the merits of the cases, cannot be viewed as impartial. 73 As
long as a court is prepared to provide extensive assistance to both
parties if necessary, the court will maintain its impartiality. 74
Cases involving a lawyer pitted against an unrepresented litigant
therefore provide the greatest challenges to the impartiality of the
170. For the purposes of this discussion, the word "court" applies not only to the
judge but to the overall court system, including any of the individual actors in that
system who must maintain impartiality.
171. See, e.g., Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary
System, 64 Ind. L.J. 301, 321 n.96 (1989) ("A judge can be impartial but very active in
developing the case .... Impartiality is a requirement for fair adjudication, but judi-
cial passivity is not.").
172. See infra Part III.
173. Cf. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, inpartiality and
Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 95, 98-99 (1997) (distinguishing
between structural and individual impartiality in arguing "that the Fourteenth
Amendment's judicial impartiality mandate is violated by the persistent presence of
an all-white bench in jurisdictions with significant minority populations" (footnote
omitted)).
174. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 752 (6th ed. 1990) (listing, as the first three
definitions of "impartial": "Favoring neither, disinterested; treating all alike .... ").
This is not to minimize the problems created in terms of the appearance of impartial-
ity where the court provides more help to one side than the other. Nor does it mini-
mize the dangers that an arbiter might be moved by a "sympathetic identification"
with a party that the arbiter begins to assist. See Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall,
Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160-
61 (1958). Given the difficulties facing unrepresented litigants in the courts, a failure
to assist unrepresented litigants is a greater threat to the impartiality of the court
system than the dangers flowing from the provision of assistance.
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court system. 175 Rather than refusing to provide the necessary help,
the court instead may need to explain why the help is targeted to one
side, and be prepared to help all parties as needed. That a given case
calls for the court to provide more help to one side than the other
does not merit a conclusion that the court is violating the principle of
impartiality.
3. Voluntary Choices and Informed Consent
A second barrier is the courts' failure to measure the voluntariness
of an unrepresented litigant's choices by the standards of informed
consent. Unrepresented litigants routinely waive significant rights,
despite having had limited, if any, opportunities for receiving in-
dependent advice. They may be acting on bad legal advice, poor ex-
planations, or-where opposing counsel is involved-manipulation
and threats. Yet, courts routinely, and swiftly, conclude that the waiv-
ers are knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 176
The voluntariness of an unrepresented litigant's choices must not be
determined solely by whether the litigant appears to be acting by her
own free will. The actions and decisions must be accepted as volun-
tary only if they result from informed choices. The assessment of in-
formed choices should be analogous to the doctrine of informed
consent, developed in the medical context. "True consent to what
happens to one's self is the informed exercise of a choice, and that
entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options avail-
able and the risks attendant upon each., 1 77 The need for the rule
175. See, e.g., Boston Bar Ass'n, BBA Task Force on Unrepresented Litigants Re-
port 26 (1998) [hereinafter BBA Report] ("[T]he judges . . . worry over potential
unfairness to both sides in a case where one of the litigants is unrepresented."); Meet-
ing the Challenge, supra note 1, at 52-53 (stating that judges found it difficult to main-
tain their impartiality where one litigant was unrepresented); Goldschmidt, supra
note 3, at 13-14 ("Some judges indicate they [sic] under some agonizing moments
during the course of trials where one party is represented and one is pro se .... Some
of the judges' comments concerned problems arising from attorneys' actions in these
situation [sic] of one party appearing pro se.").
176. As noted, courts expect most cases to settle, provide minimal supervision to
the settlement, and rarely overturn the settlement agreement. See supra notes 158-62
and accompanying text. The agreements routinely involve the waiver of significant
rights by the unrepresented litigants. See id. Some commentators therefore prefer the
concept of "informed waiver" to that of "informed consent." See, e.g., Nina W. Tarr,
Clients' and Students' Stories: Avoiding Exploitation and Complying with the Law to
Produce Scholarship with Integrity, 5 Clinical L. Rev. 271, 298-99 (1998).
177. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (footnote omitted).
Other formulations of the doctrine, developed in the medical context, consistently
include the elements of evaluating options based on an understanding of the risks and
alternatives. See, e.g., Harnish v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 439 N.E.2d 240, 242
(Mass. 1982) ("Knowing exercise of this right requires knowledge of the available
options and the risks attendant on each."); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 685 (R.I.
1972) (describing the informed consent doctrine as standing for the proposition that
"a patient's consent to a proposed course of treatment was valid only to the extent he
had been informed by the physician as to what was to be done, the risk involved and
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arises from the fact that "[tihe average patient has little or no under-
standing of the medical arts, and ordinarily has only his physician to
whom he can look for enlightenment with which to reach an intelli-
gent decision.' 178
Without minimizing the complexities involved in the doctrine of in-
formed consent, or the perils of transferring doctrines from one con-
text to another, the doctrine exposes the dangers in rubber-stamping
as "knowing, intelligent and voluntary" decisions by unrepresented lit-
igants. Just as patients have minimal knowledge of medical science,
the average litigant has little or no understanding of the law. The duty
to assist the litigant in making informed choices, after weighing the
pros and cons of different options, rests on the lawyer.1 79 Where the
litigant appears unrepresented, the unrepresented litigant's decisions
cannot be presumed to be informed unless someone else assumes that
duty.
As in the medical context, the issue of how much information must
be disclosed to ensure informed consent is an enormous one.1s Yet,
the central concept remains valid: for a decision to be informed, the
litigant must have had the "opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably
the options available and the risks attendant upon each."'" The vol-
untariness of an unrepresented litigant's choices to settle or proceed
to trial, to agree to particular terms of settlement, or to choose media-
tion in the first place, must be measured by the extent to which the
litigant understands the risks of the alternatives, which in turn de-
pends on the litigant's understanding of the applicable law and
facts.18 Unrepresented litigants cannot be presumed to have had the
the alternatives to the contemplated treatment"). For a listing of many of the
landmark cases discussing informed consent, see Harnish, 439 N.E.2d at 242 n.3, 243
n.4.
178. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780 (footnote omitted).
179. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
180. For example, the cases split over the issue of whether disclosure should be
measured from the patient's point of view, see Harnish, 439 N.E.2d at 242 n.3, or in
light of the standards of the medical profession, measured by the information as is
customarily disclosed by physicians in similar circumstances. See id. at 243 n.4. Even
when measured by the custom of the profession, the concept of putting the patient in
a position to make informed choices about alternatives remains central. See, e.g.,
Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1128 (Me. 1980) (explaining the general princi-
ples behind the doctrine of informed consent).
181. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780 (footnote omitted). Black's Law Dictionary de-
fines "informed consent" as: "A person's agreement to allow something to happen
that is based on a full disclosure of facts needed to make the decision intelligently;
Le., knowledge of risks involved, alternatives, etc." Black's Law Dictionary 779 (6th
ed. 1990) (describing the concept of informed consent as the necessary disclosures so
that a patient "faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, or alterna-
tive treatment, or none at all, may intelligently exercise his judgment by reasonably
balancing the probable risks against the probable benefits").
182. The doctrine of "informed consent" already appears in the mediation litera-
ture both as a standard for measuring a litigant's decision to mediate and as a stan-
dard for measuring a decision to accept an agreement. See, e.g., Mass. Unif. R. on
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benefit of competent advice enabling them to weigh the advantages
and disadvantages of the choices they are making. 18 3
4. Legal Advice
A third barrier is the widespread use of the prohibition against giv-
ing legal advice. In redefining the roles of court personnel and those
staffing assistance programs, the prohibition against the giving of legal
advice by some of the actors in the system must be abandoned. The
distinction between help that constitutes legal advice and help that
does not provides little guidance to those on the front lines. More-
over, most assistance needed by unrepresented litigants is likely to in-
volve what would fall within an intellectually honest definition of legal
advice.' 84 While guidelines should be developed for what help a par-
ticular office or program may provide in a given context, the limits
should not turn on what constitutes legal advice.' 85
Dispute Resolution 9(c) (describing rules for informed consent to ADR), reprinted in
26 Mass. Law. Wkly. 2129, 2131 (1998); Henikoff & Moffitt, supra note 95, at 103
(noting that "[i]nformed consent includes both the parties' agreement to participate in
the mediation process and their acceptance of any ultimate substantive agreement");
Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 95, at 86-87 (describing different views of the role
of informed consent in the mediation process); see also infra Part II.B.2 (describing
the mediator's role). For a discussion of the concept of "informed consent" in the
context of the lawyer-client relationship, see Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client
Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 41
(1979). For recent examples of efforts to impart concepts and practices from the med-
ical world to the legal world, see Gay Gellhorn, Law and Language: An Empirically-
Based Model for the Opening Moments of Client Interviews, 4 Clinical L. Rev. 321
(1998); and Linda F. Smith, Medical Paradigms for Counseling: Giving Clients Bad
News, 4 Clinical L. Rev. 391 (1998).
183. Rather than assuming that the unrepresented litigant has had access to help,
the unrepresented litigant must be viewed at best as having received no legal advice at
all. In reality, the unrepresented litigant has probably received somc combination of
information and misinformation, that may or may not be accurate or helpful, and that
the litigant may or may not have understood. Particularly in the "poor people's
courts,"' the litigant's appearance without counsel cannot be viewed as one of choice,
but one forced on the litigant by necessity. See infra Part II.A.5.
184. See supra Part I.A.
185. This point necessarily follows from the need for a broad definition of what
constitutes legal advice. Moreover, it is consistent with the view that far more interac-
tions between lawyers and unrepresented adversaries involve impermissible advice-
giving than generally is recognized. See generally Engler, supra note 43, passim (exam-
ining the issues surrounding lawyers' interactions with lay adversaries). That more
actors should provide more help does not imply that opposing lawyers should be un-
leashed on their unrepresented adversaries. The increased assistance from the court
and advocates and relaxation of the prohibition against giving legal advice in that
context should be combined with enforcing the limitations on the interactions with
opposing counsel. The lawyer has a vested interest in influencing the unrepresented
party to adopt a course of action serving the goals not of the unrepresented party, but
of her client.
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5. Voluntariness in the Choice of Appearing Without Counsel
Particularly in the "poor people's courts," a litigant's appearance
without counsel must be presumed to be coerced, rather than volun-
tary, due to the shortage of counsel. Although some litigants who
could afford counsel refrain from doing so, the notion that most liti-
gants choose to forego legal representation is fictitious in many con-
texts.'8 6 Despite this reality, many of the rules regarding the handling
of unrepresented litigants, and much of the backlash from lawyers and
judges, arise in response to the behavior of notorious, overly-litigious
plaintiffs. l s Most unrepresented litigants in eviction cases and debt
collection cases are defendants, as are some in family law cases. ts
Unrepresented plaintiffs in family law cases and bankruptcy cases are
unlikely to be repeat players.189 The case law that has been developed
in response to actions by individual plaintiffs filing multiple proceed-
ings is inapposite to these scenarios. The litigant who is the exception,
rather than the rule, should not dictate the court's response to unrep-
resented litigants in general. 190
6. The Importance of Context
The roles of the players are inter-connected and should be shaped
by context. Yet the rules governing clerks and judges are carried over
from court to court, without regard to the specific needs of a given
court. Whether clerks should be encouraged and trained to provide
extensive assistance should depend on whether the other players in
that context are giving advice, how their roles are defined, and the
needs of the unrepresented litigants in that context. Similarly, the
judge's role will depend, in part, on what is happening in the clerk's
office and what other assistance programs are available to the unrep-
resented litigants.
186. See BBA Report, supra note 175, at 20 ("Most of the unrepresented litigants
[in the Boston Housing Court] reported that they wanted an attorney but felt they
could not afford one."); infra Part III.
187. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text; see also Meeting the Challenge,
supra note 1, at 60 (noting that pro se litigants who pursue a political agenda in court
are seen as pests by judges); Robert M. Daniszewski, Coping with the Pro Se Litigant,
N.H. BJ., March 1995, at 46 (discussing the trend toward pro se litigation); Paul B.
Zuydhoek, Litigation Against a Pro Se Plaintiff, Litigation, Summer 1989, at 13 (dis-
cussing the difficulties of litigating against pro se plaintiffs).
188. See infra Part III.
189. For a description of courts handling family law and bankruptcy cases involving
unrepresented litigants, see infra part III.A-B.
190. Litigants exercising the right to self-representation should not face a bias
favoring represented parties. The right to self-representation is well established. See,
e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816-32 (1975) (discussing a litigant's right to
self-representation). Many observers nonetheless perceive a pattern of bias against
the unrepresented litigant. See, e.g., Mosten, supra note 48, at 435 (commenting on
negative perceptions of the pro se litigant); Elias, supra note 47, passin (discussing
the bias in the court system against unrepresented litigants and proposing solutions).
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B. Revisiting the Roles
1. The Judges
In light of the general principles outlined above, and the need to
assess the individual roles from a systemic point of view, in context, it
is essential to address the judge's role first. As the Illinois Court cor-
rectly observed in Oko v. Rogers, 9' "[t]he buck stops there."1 92
While the Oko court was describing the judge's role at trial, the obser-
vation applies to each aspect of the judge's role. The judge bears the
"heavy responsibility" for presiding over a "fair" proceeding, 193 which
includes not only what occurs at trial itself, but outcomes produced by
the more common result of settlement. 194
Because the buck stops with the judge, she must be as active as
necessary to ensure that the legal system's promise of fairness and
substantial justice is not frustrated by the litigant's appearance with-
out a lawyer. Far from offending notions of impartiality, the call forjudges to provide vigorous assistance to unrepresented litigants is con-
sistent with the need for impartiality.
The judge's role at trials involving unrepresented litigants should be
modeled on precedent from the small claims courts and administrative
agencies. Judges should conduct trials in the manner "best suited to
discover the facts and do justice in the case."'195 "In an effort to...
secur[e] substantial justice," the court must assist the unrepresented
litigant on procedure to be followed, presentation of evidence, and
questions of law. 196 Further, the court may call witnesses and conduct
direct or cross-examinations. 97 The court has a "basic obligation to
develop a full and fair record .... 19s Each of these duties is not only
wholly consistent with the notion of impartiality, 199 but also necessary
for the system to maintain its impartiality.
191. 466 N.E.2d 658 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
192. Id. at 661.
193. See id.
194. Indeed, the same holds true for defaults as well. Judicial duties are not limited
to ministerial acts. Compare, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1) (discussing when a defaultjudgment may be entered by the clerk), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) (discussing when
a default judgement must be entered by the clerk). Where a party fails to appear, the
court still must take appropriate steps to ensure that the appearing party is entitled to
any relief it is seeking against the defaulting party. The high incidence of default
among debtors in debt collection cases, for example, is a poignant reminder of the
need for judicial oversight even where litigants default. See, e.g., Caplovitz, supra note
158, at 221 (finding default judgement rate of three city cross-section at over ninety
percent).
195. Mass. Unif. Sm. Cl. R. 7(c).
196. Fla. Ct. Sm. Cl. R. 7.140(e).
197. See Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 286(b).
198. Lashley v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 708 F.2d 1048, 1051 (6th
Cir. 1983) (quoting McConnell v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 604, 606 (5th Cir. 1981)).
199. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
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The need to assist the unrepresented litigant in developing a full,
factual record, and to help the litigant with matters of procedure and
substantive law, extends to the judge's role in settlements. Rather
than pressuring the unrepresented litigant to settle the case with mini-
mal judicial intervention, the judge must take a far more active role.
The judge must help the unrepresented litigant develop the relevant
facts and identify potential claims and defenses.' 0 The judge must
examine the papers in the case and talk to the unrepresented parties
to ensure that possible claims and defenses are being articulated.
Only by first assessing the merits of the case can the judge gain per-
spective as to what, if any, claims are being compromised or waived,
whether such waivers truly are knowing, intelligent, and voluntary,
and whether the judge should place the court's imprimatur on the
result.20 '
The judge must identify what advice the litigant received, to correct
for misinformation. Where the opposing party is represented by
counsel, the judge must inquire into the substance of the negotiations
with the opposing counsel, to ensure that the unrepresented litigant's
decisions are not based on improper advice, manipulation, or
threats.20 2 As tools to aid in this inquiry, judges might ask the unrep-
resented litigants why they are signing the agreement and whether
they think the agreement is fair. While the answers elicited may not
dictate a particular result, they may assist the judge in identifying
whether the decisions result from misinformation or coercion.
To the extent the judge does not oversee the negotiations and is
presented with an agreement reached elsewhere, the inquiries set
forth above should be undertaken by the judge prior to approving the
agreement and with an eye toward rejecting agreements that do not
protect the rights of the unrepresented litigant. In other cases, the
judge may be involved in the negotiation that produces an agreement.
Assuming the judge's involvement ensures the substantive fairness of
the agreement, the judicial efforts during the negotiations would obvi-
200. Where the opposing party is represented by counsel, the judicial inquiry could
be aided by imposing a duty on the opposing counsel to "inform the tribunal of all
material facts known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an in-
formed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse[,]" a requirement currently im-
posed by the Model Rules in ex parte proceedings. Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 3.3(d) (1998). Such a duty may be imposed by ethical rule or court
rule. See generally Engler, supra note 43, at 139-40, 143 (discussing the need for courts
to enact rules regulating unrepresented adversaries).
201. See supra Part II.A.3-5.
202. Judicial oversight, including inquiries into the substance of the negotiations
between lawyers and unrepresented parties, is one of the most important steps for the
legal system to take in its effort to curb attorney misconduct in such negotiations and
to protect unrepresented litigants from the misconduct. See Engler, supra note 43, at
142-47.
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ate the need for an extensive colloquy upon completion of the
agreement.20 3
The active judicial role extends to each phase of the proceeding at
which the unrepresented litigant makes decisions since the events oc-
cur under the judge's auspices. Whether a litigant decides to engage
in negotiations with the opposing party, go to mediation, settle, or go
to trial may be as important as the specific decisions made at trial or in
settlement. These decisions, too, must be informed and knowing, and
the judge must assist as necessary to ensure that they are.
Busy judges with crowded dockets, and supervising administrativejudges, undoubtedly will contend that these proposals are impractical
and that the court system would grind to a halt upon their implemen-
tation. Some judges, and many lawyers facing unrepresented litigants,
will argue that even if it were practical for judges to take the recom-
mended actions, doing so would compromise the impartiality of the
system. 2°4 Where judicial intervention leads to the rejection of a pro-
posed settlement, a further objection might be raised: that the judge
is interfering with the parties' right to engage in a private contract.
Each of these objections fails to justify the continuation of limitedjudicial roles and the resulting harm suffered by unrepresented liti-
gants. The concern about interference with private contract is wholly
without merit. Parties are always free to engage in private contracts.
If they wish, the parties could withdraw their respective claims and
enter into a private contract outside the court. They do not do so
because at least one party is seeking not merely a private contract, but
a court order with the corresponding enforcement power. Before ex-
ercising its power, the court has not only the right, but the obligation,
to ensure that the exercise of its power will further, rather than frus-
trate, the goal of providing justice.
The concerns about impartiality are resolved by reference to the
revised understanding of the concept of impartiality. 2 5 As long as the
court would be equally willing to help each party, as necessary, the
active judicial role does not constitute partial behavior. To the con-
trary, the failure to accept such a role is more likely to constitute parti-
203. For a discussion of ethical issues raised by the participation of trial judges in
the settlement process, see Goldschmidt & Milord, supra note 151, at 9-18. Note,
however, that the discussion does not focus on cases involving unrepresented litigants
or courts with a large number of unrepresented litigants.
204. See, e.g., Changing the Culture, supra note 58, at 27 (reporting that lawyers
find it unfair when judges assisted an unrepresented opponent); Meeting the Chal-
lenge, supra note 1, at 29 ("The data collected in this study show that the most serious
concern of trial judges is their perceived inability to assist a pro se litigant due to their
duty to maintain impartiality."); Daniszewski, supra note 187, at 48 ("When the court
deviates from its neutral course to lend assistance to otherwise overmatched pre se
litigants the adversarial system itself can suffer."); Sales et al., supra note 53, at 558("Courts cannot be expected to assume the awkward position, not to mention the
imposition, of serving as both adjudicator and counsel for the pro se litigant.").
205. See supra Part II.A.2.
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ality, since the court's current operation, particularly where only one
party appears without counsel, favors one party for reasons unrelated
to the merits of the claims.
The practical concerns are the most imposing, but also the most im-
portant to overcome. In one sense, the issue may be framed as a con-
sumer protection issue. If the courts hold out the promise of fairness
and justice, but claim for practical reasons to be unable to achieve
such a result, the advertising is false. It is hypocritical to claim to pro-
vide fairness to everyone through a system that is not prepared to do
so for those without lawyers. An unattractive, but at least more hon-
est solution would be to change the advertising and remove the public
promise that those without lawyers will get a fair shake in court. The
only acceptable solution is to overcome the practical objections.206
A systemic approach provides the most important clue as to how to
overcome the practical problems. The judges must correct for the
problems that have arisen before the cases reach them. The more that
others, including court personnel, adequately assist unrepresented liti-
gants in advance of their appearance before a judge, the easier will be
the role of the judge in each case. For example, if a mediator or a
judge's law clerk is involved in settlement negotiations, and intercedes
as necessary to protect the interests of the unrepresented litigants, the
burden on the judge will be reduced. The extent to which it is appro-
priate for judges in a particular context to rely on their law clerks,
mediators, or other non-judicial court personnel will depend on the
roles of those non-judicial actors.20 7 In courts that continue to restrict
the roles of court personnel, fail to provide well-funded programs of-
fering comprehensive advice and assistance, resist the use of trained
lay advocates, and refuse to appoint counsel, the judicial role will, and
should be, immense. The buck stops with the judge.
2. The Mediators
Even without the expanded role of the judge discussed in the previ-
ous section, courts increasingly are turning to mediation in an effort to
maintain docket control. The more time judges must spend with cases
involving unrepresented litigants, the greater the temptation will be to
utilize court-connected mediation. 20 8 Reports of high settlement rates
and litigant satisfaction with the process will provide justification for,
and added momentum to, the call for more court-connected media-
206. In one survey, "[s]everal judges pointed to the need for rules permitting judges
to actively assist self-represented litigants." Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at
59.
207. For a description of one judge's extensive use of law clerks as part of a "Pro Se
Assistance Program" see Halberstadter, supra note 54.
208. As stated previously, for purposes of this Article, I am using the term "media-
tion" broadly enough to include all forms of court-connected ADR. See supra note 92.
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tion.2 °9 Yet, the increased use of alternative dispute resolution will
cause more problems than it solves for courts in their handling of un-
represented litigants if the role of the "mediator" is not similarly
revised.
As described in part I.C, the current understanding of the media-
tor's role, as limited by the prohibition against giving legal advice and
a narrow view of impartiality, leaves unrepresented litigants vulnera-
ble to the waiver of important rights in mediation. The danger is par-
ticularly acute where mediation involves an unrepresented litigant
against a represented party. Unless safeguards are in place to ensure
that the unrepresented litigant is protected during mediation, the in-
creased use of mediation is no solution at all.
There are three general choices in response to this dilemma. One
choice is to make no changes at all. Under the guise of impartiality,
the court system funnels a large number of unrepresented litigants
through mediation, a forum that produces systematically unfavorable
results to unrepresented litigants when measured in terms of out-
come."' ° Far from providing an impartial forum yielding fair results,
the process routinely favors the more powerful party, particularly
where one party is represented by counsel. The result is a process that
is both unfair and partial.
A second choice is to maintain the current role for the mediators
and leave the burden on the judges to correct resulting problems. The
previous section detailed the active role the judge must play in settle-
ment to ensure that the resulting agreement is fair and reasonable .1
The need for such extensive judicial intervention in mediated cases is
inefficient in two respects. First, one goal of court-connected media-
tion is to diminish the amount of judicial resources necessary. If cases
"settled" by mediators nonetheless require extensive judicial re-
sources, then the wisdom of utilizing mediation in the first place is
questionable. While the judge still must provide a detailed level of
oversight even where the mediator has accepted the responsibility for
producing a fair agreement, the resources involved would be substan-
209. See, e.g., John C. Cratsley, Mediation: A Device That Is "Here To Stay", 26
Mass. Law. Wkly. 2055, 2077 (1998) (reporting results of key findings of ADR Stud-
ies, including findings that "ADR produces high user satisfaction" and in "high settle-
ment rates"). "When users of District Court programs-usually pro se litigants-arc
asked about the fairness of the mediation process, their satisfaction is overwhelming."
Id. at 2055. These findings mainly relate to small claims cases, which may or may not
apply to other contexts. Moreover, the perception of fairness is only one measure of
fairness. See, e.g., Cecilia Albin, The Role of Fairness in Negotiation, 9 Negotiation J.
223 passim (1993) (analyzing four classes of fairness issues affecting negotiators);
Bohmer & Ray, supra note 97, at 39 (same). If the unrepresented poor, routinely and
without their informed consent, are waiving significant rights in court-connected me-
diation, high settlement rates and high litigant satisfaction should not compel a con-
clusion that the procedures are appropriate or fair.
210. See supra Part I.C.
211. See supra Part II.B.1.
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tially less if the mediator has conducted the necessary inquiries during
mediation. Second, if the mediators fail to consider the fairness and
reasonableness of agreements, then the court presumably would need
to reject an unfair agreement. At that point, the judge either must
oversee additional negotiations or send the case back to mediation.
The inefficient cycle continues.212
The third choice is to change the role of the mediator.1 3 For medi-
ation to provide a useful component for courts dealing with large
numbers of unrepresented litigants, the mediators must ensure that
the mediation process does not provide a forum for the represented
party to gain an unfair advantage over the unrepresented party. Pro-
viding justice, rather than clearing the court's docket, must remain the
primary goal of the mediation process.214
The mediator's role must be defined to achieve that goal. The me-
diator must ensure that the claims and concerns of the unrepresented
party are addressed in the mediation and resulting agreements, and
where one party is represented by counsel, that the agreement does
not result from the advice, threats, or promises of the attorney to the
unrepresented party.215 Courts referring cases to mediators must clar-
ify to the unrepresented litigant whether the mediation is voluntary or
mandatory, and, in either case, the mediator must avoid leaving the
unrepresented party with the belief that the mediation must result in
212. This efficiency is illustrated by Wright v. Brockett, 571 N.Y.S2d 660 (Sup. Ct.
1991). The Wright court declined to enforce a court mediated agreement because it
was not "a provident decision by the [unrepresented] tenant, free of coercion ... ." Id.
at 665. For a discussion of the Wright decision, see Nolan-Haley, supra note 92, at 87-
88.
Moreover, to ensure that litigants are making informed choices to mediate,
mediators should be advising all litigants that it is not their job to ensure that agree-
ments are fair, and that they cannot provide assistance at all. Otherwise, the unrepre-
sented litigant might be choosing mediation based on a misunderstanding of the
mediation process.
213. As discussed above, the term mediation as used here is intended to cover all
forms of court-connected ADR in which the unrepresented poor participate. See
supra note 92. The focus must become the role played by the person conducting the
settlement session, not the person's title.
214. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resohiion: Panacea or Anath-
ema?, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 668, 671-72 (1986) (expressing concern that ADR may "result
in an abandonment of our constitutional system in which the 'rule of law' is created
and principally enforced by ... government"); Fischer et al., supra note 93, at 2156
("[Olne can infer that a primary motivation in sending [domestic disputes] ... to
mediation is that it helps clear court dockets of troublesome cases ... ."); Fiss, supra
note 92, at 1075 (arguing that ADR "should be treated instead as a highly problematic
technique for streamlining dockets"); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 92, at 13 ("As
ADR becomes institutionalized wvithin the court system, one can ask ... what are the
implications for justice?").
215. Cf. Stark, supra note 95, at 794 ("[M]ediators who undertake case evaluation
ought to be obliged to provide the parties sufficient information about the law and its
application to their case to enable them to make reasonably informed decisions." (ci-
tation omitted)).
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an agreement. 16 The mediator must do what the previous section
urged the judge to do.217 Only in this manner can the mediator both
preside over a fair and impartial process and save judicial resources.
Whether such a role is a proper or permissible one for a mediator is
a matter of much dispute.218 The role diverges from the traditional
role of mediators developed in the context of mediation with repre-
sented parties.219 Yet the traditional notions of the mediator's role
fail to provide meaningful guidance for the mediator where a power
imbalance exists between the parties.22 0 The situation is difficult
enough where the mediation involves only unrepresented litigants,
and becomes most troublesome when only one party appears without
counsel.2 2' Mediation theory teaches that voluntariness is a corner-
stone of successful mediation, both in terms of voluntary participation
216. See id. at 794-95.
[I]ncluded within this duty [to inform] should be a responsibility to provide
information fairly, objectively, and in good faith, without regard for its effect
on the prospects for settlement .... Helping parties resolve their disputes
and assisting in unclogging crowded court dockets are positive goals. But I
am unaware of any mediator ethics code that considers them ethical goals.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
217. Mediators might be assisted in this immense undertaking by development of a
checklist tailored to a particular context. The checklist might include important intro-
ductory statements to clarify the role of the mediator and the mediation process. The
checklist might also include inquiries to elicit information related to claims that typi-
cally arise in the context; to provide the unrepresented party with an opportunity to
raise concerns other than those related to the typical claims; and to uncover improper
advice, pressure, or misperceptions that might hinder the unrepresented litigants from
giving informed consent or that might result in an unfair agreement.
218. Scholars even debate whether it is proper for mediators to engage in evalua-
tive mediation. See, e.g., Moberly, supra note 95, at 670-75 (discussing differing ap-
proaches to mediator evaluation).
219. See supra Part II.A.1. To the extent that the impartiality requirement bars
such a role, the revised notion of "impartiality" should overcome those objections for
the same reason it did with the role of the judges. See supra Part II.A.2. For a sugges-
tion that impartiality may not be essential for effective mediation, see Saadia Touval,
Multilateral Negotiation: An Analytic Approach, 5 Negotiation J. 159, 167-69 (1989)
(describing the effectiveness of Britain as a mediator in the dispute between China
and France over Indochina at the 1954 Geneva Conference, despite the fact that Brit-
ain was not an impartial third party, but instead possessed leverage over the parties to
perform an effective mediation). An exploration of that concept is beyond the scope
of this Article, and unnecessary, since the revised notion of impartiality discussed in
this Article should permit the mediator to maintain impartiality and protect unrepre-
sented litigants.
220. See, e.g., Henikoff & Moffitt, supra note 95, at 89 ("For most mediators, how-
ever, questions of when and how to inform ignorant parties of the law present an
unusually difficult dilemma."); Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Partici-
pants' Ethnicity and Gender on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated
Civil Cases, 30 L. & Soc'y Rev. 767, 794 (1996) ("In the name of neutrality, mediators
may fail to deal with power imbalances in negotiations.").
221. See Stark, supra note 95, at 792 ("What should be done about the dangers of
materially incomplete, misleading, and manipulative advice by evaluative mediators?
The dangers are clearly most pronounced in cases ... in which the parties are pro
se."); see also Florida Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, MQAP 96-003 (1997)
(stating that mediators should take additional steps to ensure fairness to unrepre-
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and voluntariness in deciding to settle on particular terms.2 a The de-
cision to mediate cannot be truly voluntary unless consent is informed:
"[i]nformed consent includes both the parties' agreement to partici-
pate in the mediation process and their acceptance of any ultimate
substantive agreement."'  The fundamental clash between the need
to achieve voluntary and informed choices by disempowered and le-
gally unsophisticated litigants without providing sufficient advice or
assistance to make the choices truly informed remains a major, un-
resolved dilemma in the context of court-connected mediation. 2 4
Something must give. One cannot cling to a classic vision of media-
tion while urging widespread use of mediation in settings involving
unrepresented parties. Either the role of the mediator must be
adapted to fit a given context, or mediation must be deemed inappro-
priate for certain contexts. '-' With the latter determination, the bur-
sented parties); Nolan-Haley, supra note 92, at 92-99 (discussing mediator's role with
unrepresented parties in court).
222. See, e.g., John D. Feerick et al., American Arbitration Assoc. et al., Model
Standards of Conduct for Mediators Standard I (n.d.) ("Self-determination is the fun-
damental principle of mediation. It requires that the mediation process rely upon the
ability of the parties to reach a voluntary, uncoerced agreement. Any party may with-
draw from mediation at any time."), available in <http'/wvw.adr.org/standard.html>;
Henikoff & Moffitt, supra note 95, at 102-03 ("[T]he parties must fully understand
that the process is voluntary and that they have the right to create, propose, evaluate,
accept, or reject any possible solutions."); Nolan-Haley, supra note 92, at 90 ("The
controlling principle of mediation is self-determination."); Stark, supra note 95, at 792
("[A]n agreement is not truly voluntary if it is based on a factual misunderstanding
(including a misunderstanding about governing law) that the mediator had an oppor-
tunity to correct but did not." (quoting James B. Boskey, The Proper Role of the
Mediator: Rational Assessment; Not Pressure, 10 Negotiation J. 367, 370 (1994))).
223. Henikoff & Moffitt, supra note 95, at 103. Kurtzberg and Henikoff illustrate
the tension by discussing competing visions of the meaning of the term "informed
consent." See Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 95, at 86. The issue of whether the
"informed consent" should be informed simply with respect to the nature of the medi-
ation process, or with respect to the terms of any agreement, parallels the procedural
versus substantive fairness debate. See supra note 97.
224. See, e.g., Henikoff & Moffitt, supra note 95, at 102-04 (considering principles
of self-determination and informed consent); Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 95, at
84-87 (same); Stark, supra note 95, at 775-79 (discussing arguments and counter-argu-
ments regarding mediator evaluation and informed consent); Nolan-Haley, supra note
92, at 79-83 (discussing the debate over the propriety of mediators giving legal
assistance).
225. Some scholars already argue that mediation is inappropriate in certain con-
texts-such as cases involving domestic violence-where a power imbalance exists
and the mediation process may be utilized by the stronger party to further the domi-
nation of the weaker party. See, e.g., Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce
Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 Buff. L Rev. 441, 522 (1992) ("The insidious
nature of mediation for divorcing women, though, remains hidden beneath its care-
fully crafted marketing rhetoric."); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process
Dangers for Women, 100 Yale LJ. 1545, 1605-07 (1991) ("Women who have been
through mandatory mediation often describe it as an experience of sexual domina-
tion, comparing mandatory mediation to rape." (citation omitted)); Henikoff & Mof-
fitt, supra note 95, at 92-93 (criticizing mediations involving power imbalances
between the sexes); Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 95, at 55-60 (considering why
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den of adjudicating these cases may be returned to the judges, raising
issues affecting judicial resources and docket control. Alternatively,
someone other than a judge must be designated to facilitate settle-
ment along the guidelines set forth above. If such a role offends the
concept of "mediator," then it must be called something else. If the
court is prepared to authorize existing court personnel, such as law
clerks, to play the extensive and protective role in settlement, then
these personnel may need to handle the cases that would have been
sent to mediation. If none of the existing personnel is authorized and
trained to perform the necessary role in the negotiations, then a new
role must be created. Regardless of the title, the role must be per-
formed in a manner designed to produce fair and just agreements
where unrepresented litigants are involved. Otherwise, the allocation
of resources is a poor one.
3. Court Personnel
The role of court personnel, particularly clerks, must be expanded
beyond the barrier of "no legal advice." ' 6 Greacen's article demon-
strates that the rules and practices governing clerks must be loosened
for them to be able to provide effective help. 27 Another commenta-
tor goes further, urging courts to "unleash court clerks. '2 28 Some
states have begun to recognize the need to expand the role of clerks as
part of their efforts to assist unrepresented litigants.229
critics find mediation to be harmful to the poor and disempowered). Similar argu-
ments led to the exemption of unrepresented litigants from mediation in the Family
Division in the Maryland Circuit Court. See, e.g., Letter from Judith Moran, Esq.,
Family Division Case Coordinator, Circuit Court of Baltimore City, to Sandra F.
Haines, Esq. (Aug. 8, 1997) (on file with author) (critiquing the rule, labeled as Rule
9-205(b)(1)(A)).
226. See supra Part I.A. The discussion in this section focuses on the role of clerks
in the clerk's offices. A discussion of the possible role of law clerks in the settlement
process is included in the discussion of the role of the judge. See supra Part II.B.1.
227. See Greacen, supra note 24, passim. While Greacen recognizes that simplified
procedures, easy-to-understand-and use forms, guidebooks, and volunteer bar efforts
all are helpful, "even these efforts will not succeed unless court staff are capable of
providing extensive information to litigants without lawyers, and [are] willing to do
so." Id. at 12.
228. Elias, supra note 47, at 5. Elias argues that "[c]lerks should be able to provide
the same information to the self-represented as they do to lawyers and their staffs,"
that the boundary be pushed back as to what is considered legal advice, and that court
clerks should be required "to facilitate equal access regardless of whether a party is
represented by counsel." Id.; see also Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 25 ("Assistance to
the pro se litigant should also be proactively provided by court staff.").
229. See, e.g., Minn. Conference Report, supra note 40, at 14; Greacen, supra note
24, at 12 (citing The Task Force on the Future of California's Courts, Justice in the
Balance 2020 (1993)). Modifying the rules regarding the unauthorized practice of law
might be necessary to provide comfort to clerks providing expanded assistance. See,
e.g., Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 41-45 (discussing recent proposals to
guide court staff).
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Greacen recommends that court staff keep in mind the following
five principles when providing advice and information to court users:
1. Court staff have an obligation to explain court processes and pro-
cedures to litigants, the media, and other interested citizens....
2. Court staff have an obligation to inform litigants, and potential
litigants, how to bring their problems before the court for
resolution....
3. Court staff cannot advise litigants whether to bring their
problems before the court, or what remedies to seek....
4. Court staff must always remember the absolute duty of impartial-
ity. They must never give advice or information for the purpose of
giving one party an advantage over another. They must never give
advice or information to one party that they would not give to an
opponent....
5. Court staff should be mindful of the basic principle that counsel
may not communicate with the judge ex parte. Court staff should
not let themselves be used to circumvent that principle, or fail to
respect it, in acting on matters delegated to them for decision. 30
The Greacen principles are an excellent start. The first two, which
require the clerk to provide information about the processes and pro-
cedures are important guidelines; the fifth, which cautions against fa-
cilitating ex parte communications is an important safeguard as well.
The fourth principle, regarding impartiality, may need to be modified
to conform to the revised notion of impartiality discussed above."3
As the first and third sentences of the fourth principle urge, court staff
must indeed remain impartial and must not give information or advice
to one party that they would not give to an opponent. To the extent
the purpose of the second sentence of the fourth principle simply is to
prohibit clerks from choosing sides and trying to help one side gain an
advantage when the clerks would not provide equivalent help to the
other side, 2 the sentence is redundant: the prohibition against favor-
ing one side is included in the last sentence. The sentence may be
eliminated or replaced wvith: "They must never favor one party over
another." The sentence must not be read to prohibit clerks from pro-
viding any such assistance that might be viewed as giving one party an
advantage over another. In an adversarial system, it is inevitable that
much, if not all, information that helps one side could be viewed as
giving one party an advantage over another. As long as the last sen-
230. Greacen, supra note 24, at 14. Graecen also develops a description of the
"Sample Staff Guidelines for Providing Information." See id. at 15. For a critique of
the guidelines, see Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 42-43. In Michigan, a
group of court managers and support staff announced a description of guidelines. See
id- at 43-44.
231. See supra Part II.A.2.
232. According to Mr. Greacen, this is the reading he intended. See Letter from
John M. Greacen, Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, Supreme
Court of New Mexico, to Russell Engler, Clinical Director & Professor of Law, New
England School of Law 4 (July 29, 1998) (on file with the author).
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tence remains, and the clerks are as willing to help one side as the
other, concerns about impartiality are overcome.
The third principle, prohibiting court staff from advising litigants
whether to bring their problems before the court, or what remedies to
seek, is troubling and ill-advised as a rule of universal application.
Unrepresented litigants must have access to competent advice to help
them decide whether they should bring their problems before the
court, and, if so, what remedies they should seek. Without an exami-
nation of a particular context, it is not clear in the abstract who will
best be situated to provide the necessary advice. In some settings,
court clinics, lay advocates, and "lawyers-for-the-day" may relieve the
clerks from the need to provide the assistance. If the help is non-
existent or inadequate, the clerks must be trained and permitted to
provide the needed assistance. Otherwise, the litigant either is de-
prived of the needed assistance, or the judge is required to provideit. 233
The details of how much assistance clerks should provide must be
tailored to particular courts. In some courts, compliance with proce-
dural rules may be a major hurdle facing unrepresented litigants. In
other courts, discovering and understanding possible claims and de-
fenses may be critical. Litigants may need help completing forms, ar-
ticulating their stories, or correlating their stories to cognizable claims.
They may need guidance as to the importance of witnesses or docu-
ments. Nothing in the description of a clerk's job should bar this type
of assistance unless a given court has provided someone else to do so.
Providing such a broad license to clerks and other court personnel
may be ill-advised. The role of the clerk may feel uncomfortably close
to the role of the lawyer. Clerks may not be equipped to provide the
necessary advice and may give bad advice. The courts may increas-
ingly be faced with litigants having relied to their detriment on poor
advice from clerks, or on a misunderstanding of a clerk's accurate
statements.
As troubling as these issues are, they do not call for blanket rules
discouraging or barring clerks from providing assistance. Adding a
guideline that clerks must not act as a lawyer for the unrepresented
party provides little guidance for the clerks. A similar "rule" appears
233. As with my reservations about the fourth Greacen principle, my discomfort
with the third principle may be one of semantics, rather than substance. As propo-
nents of a "client-centered" approach to counseling might contend, even lawyers ar-
guably should not be telling litigants whether to bring their claims to court; the
lawyers should be helping clients choose by advising clients of their options and the
advantages and disadvantages of the options. See generally Binder et al., supra note
45, at 258-86 (discussing the proper and desirable ways lawyers can offer advice and
guidance). To the extent the third Greacen principle only prohibits the telling, it is
less objectionable, but it also provides clerks with less guidance. To the extent it is
intended to bar clerks in all contexts from providing the type of information that
might help unrepresented litigants make informed choices, my objections remain.
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in the cases discussing the judge's role in interacting with unrepre-
sented parties;234 judges remain without appropriate guidance as to
their role in such cases.235 The provision of limited assistance by law-
yers serves as a reminder that settling on a universal understanding of
"the lawyer's role" is an impossible task;236 defining the clerk's role by
contrasting it to the lawyer's role is equally impossible. As with the
barrier of "no legal advice," a guideline of not acting in a manner that
a lawyer for the litigant might act would prove to be both unworkable
and harmful to unrepresented litigants. Much of the help that lawyers
often provide is precisely the help that unrepresented litigants need.
With respect to the problem of clerks not being capable of provid-
ing accurate advice, one solution is to provide sufficient numbers of
appropriately trained lawyers, law students, or lay advocates to pro-
vide the needed assistance. In those contexts, limiting the clerk's role
is not only acceptable, but may be advisable. Where limited assistance
programs are inadequate to meet the demand, court personnel must
provide the needed assistance. Training of the clerks and oversight of
the advice they give is imperative. The solution to bad advice-giving
should be to improve the quality of the advice, rather than eliminate
the advice-giving. 237
Where an unrepresented litigant relies on erroneous advice to her
detriment, or misunderstands accurate statements by a clerk, judges
should consider the reliance in determining whether to grant relief. A
number of courts have found "good cause" to exist within the mean-
ing of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 46) when the failure to effect
service was attributable to the advice or actions of someone in the
clerk's office. 3 If an unrepresented litigant defaults based on errone-
ous advice from a clerk, the misunderstanding might rise to the level
of excusable default, providing part of the basis for vacatur of the de-
234. See supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
235. See supra Parts I.D, II.B.1.
236. See supra Part I.B.
237. See Increasing Access to Justice, supra note 33, at 10; Meeting the Challenge,
supra note 1, at 109 ("State Court Systems and Local Courts Should Train Court Staff
on How to Assist Self-Represented Litigants."). Clerks may need to preface their
assistance with clear disclosures about their role, including their status as non-lawyers,
where appropriate, and the fact that they might be called upon to help the other side.
Given the realities facing the unrepresented poor, it is hard to imagine that the disclo-
sures will deter many litigants from accepting whatever assistance the clerks can pro-
vide. A discussion of the court's role where clerks give poor advice to a represented
party is beyond the scope of this Article.
238. See Poulakis v. Amtrak, 139 F.RtD. 107 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Patterson v. Brady,
131 F.R.D. 679 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (holding that where a pro se litigant's failure to com-
ply with service requirements was attributed in part to the clerk's office, the pro se
plaintiff satisfied the good cause requirement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)), affd mem.
sub nom. Patterson v. Rubin, 89 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Patterson, 131
F.R.D. at 684 n.7 (citing cases where courts found good cause in a pro se litigant's
reliance on the clerk's advice).
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fault.2 3 9 Similarly, if an unrepresented litigant waives important rights
in settlement due to misinformation or misunderstanding, from a clerk
or otherwise, the misunderstanding might lead the court to vacate the
agreement, particularly where the failure to do so would constitute a
miscarriage of justice.240
This scenario is less troubling than it seems. As discussed in the
previous section, a critical role for the judge is to identify the advice
and information on which the unrepresented litigant is relying. This
precaution would not only reveal any reliance on erroneous advice
from clerks, but from others as well, including family friends and op-
posing counsel. If the judge is conducting an appropriate inquiry,
before the court accepts the unrepresented litigant's choices, many of
the problems can be uncovered before they cause harm. Where the
problems do not arise until after the litigant has acted, such as in a
situation of default, the improper advice can and should provide a ba-
sis for relief.
This discussion illustrates the inevitable connection between the
role of the clerks or other court personnel and the role of the judge.
The less help the nonjudicial court personnel provide, either because
they refuse to do so, are prohibited from doing so, or are providing
incorrect "help," the greater the burden on the judge, either in provid-
ing the help in the first place, or undoing the effects of incorrect ad-
vice. The more that clerks provide extensive, competent assistance,
the less the burden on the judge.
4. Beyond the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks
The ability of people beyond judges, mediators, and clerks to assist
unrepresented litigants will be enhanced to the extent that rules that
act as barriers to assistance can be modified or eliminated. Inside the
courthouse, programs staffed by nonlawyers should not be restricted
by the traditional prohibition against giving legal advice for the same
239. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); Mass. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
240. See, e.g., supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text. Greacen refers to the
consequences of misunderstood advice as an "extraneous" issue of "estoppel."
Greacen, supra note 24, at 12. Greacen cites a series of cases that he contends stand
for the proposition that reliance on erroneous advice from clerks does not "ab-
solve[]" procedural responsibilities, constitute "excusable neglect" or permit
"rel[iance] thereon for the purpose of estoppel." Id. at 12-14 (citing Brown v. Quinn,
550 N.E.2d 134, 136, 137 (Mass. 1990); Krupp v. Gulf Oil Corp., 557 N.E.2d 769, 771
(Mass. 1990); and Wyoming ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Compensation Div. v. Halstead,
795 P.2d 760, 775 (Wyo. 1990), superseded by statute as stated in Neal v. Caballo Rojo,
Inc., 899 P.2d 56 (Wyo. 1995)). The cases cited by Greacen do not stand for the prop-
osition that when an unrepresented litigant relies on incorrect advice from a clerk,
such reliance does not constitute estoppel. The two Massachusetts cases, as well as
the cases cited in those two cases, do not involve unrepresented litigants. See Brown,
550 N.E.2d at 135; Krupp, 557 N.E.2d at 770-71. In the third case, which does appear
to involve an unrepresented litigant, the Supreme Court of Wyoming granted relief on
other grounds, "negat[ing] the need to discuss the issue of estoppel." Halstead, 795
P.2d at 762.
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reasons the clerks should not be so restricted. The giving of legal ad-
vice by a nonlawyer should not constitute the unauthorized practice of
law since no fee is charged and the advice is under the auspices of the
court.24' As with the clerks, the danger that lay advocates will give
poor legal advice should be addressed by training and oversight, not a
prohibition against giving the advice. For lawyers staffing the assist-
ance programs, the biggest theoretical danger is litigation, either by
dissatisfied unrepresented litigants or their adversaries. 42 At a mini
mum, staff at the court-based programs should have malpractice cov-
erage provided for them and, in some circumstances, be immune from
civil suit.243
Outside the courthouse, commentators have promoted policy argu-
ments supporting a relaxation of the unauthorized practice of law with
respect to lay advocacy. 244 As prohibition gives way to permission,
241. See, eg., Wis. Stat. Ann. § 757.30(2) (West 1981) ("Every person who ... for
compensation or pecuniary reward gives professional legal advice not incidental to his
or her usual or ordinary business... shall be deemed to be practicing law within the
meaning of this section."). For a narrower formulation, see Fla. Sup. Ct. Rule 10-
2.1(a) ("it shall not constitute the unlicensed practice of law for nonlawyers to engage
in limited oral communications to assist individuals in the completion of blanks on a
legal form approved by the Supreme Court of Florida."). For a similar recommenda-
tion relating to court staff, see Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1. at 112. See also
Letter from William Griffin, Chief Assistant Attorney General, State of Vermont Of-
fice of the Attorney General, to Jan Rickless Paul, Esq., Paul & Paul (Aug. 8, 1994)
(on file with author) (writing in response complaint regarding the unauthorized prac-
tice of law by a Family Court Case Manager).
It is my opinion.., that the activities of a case manager in conformance with
the job description does not constitute the practice of law. Even if they did,
since the activities are authorized by the Court and performed on its behalf,
the Attorney General would be hard pressed to argue that they are unau-
thorized (albeit unlicensed).... There may be a policy argument against
allowing court personnel to help litigants complete forms and understand
their right [sic] and the legal process, but I do not know what that argument
might be.
Id. at 2.
242. See, e.g., Changing the Culture, supra note 58, at 34-35 (describing how a law-
suit against a volunteer attorney jeopardized future LFD programs).
243. See, e.g., Mosten, supra note 48, at 430-35 (discussing malpractice exposure
and civil immunity in the context of limited representation). With court-sponsored
limited assistance programs, it is difficult to envision sound policy reasons to permit
litigation. The appropriate focus should be court oversight and training. Litigants
receiving harmful advice should have their remedy in the litigation itself in the form
of relief from adverse decisions. The closer the assistance provided comes to full rep-
resentation, the weaker the argument for civil immunity will be. For a similar recom-
mendation relating to court staff, see Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 113.
244. See Nonlawyer Practice, supra note 77, at 1-12, 73-157; Derek A. Denckla,
Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law. An Overview of the Legal and
Ethical Parameters, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2581, passim (1999); Alex J. Hurder, Nonlaw-
yer Legal Assistance and Access to Justice, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2241, passim (1999);
Rhode, supra note 77, passin (surveying developments in the unauthorized practice
of law). As Gary Bellow and Jeanne Kettleson observed twenty years ago, -[mluch
more effective lay ... representation would be a necessary component of any signifi-
cant expansion of access ...." Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to
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new rules authorizing and regulating lay advocacy need to replace the
current restrictions.2 45 Finally, changes to the ethical rules and mal-
practice standards are necessary to encourage discrete task represen-
tation consistent with the notion of "unbundled legal services. '246
A relaxation of the rules must be accompanied by a change in atti-
tude by judges and other court personnel regarding the presence of
lay advocates in court and the provision of limited assistance by attor-
neys. This Article has identified the extensive assistance judges,
mediators, and clerks must provide unrepresented litigants to ensure
that important rights of those litigants are not forfeited due the ab-
sence of counsel.247 The more that unrepresented litigants receive
competent assistance before and during their court appearance, the
lighter the burden on the court personnel will be.
Rather than resisting the presence of lay advocates in court or in
mediation, the courts should be assisting the efforts to expand, up-
grade, and oversee available non-attorney counseling.248 Rather than
Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. Rev.
337, 386 n.193 (1978). The increased use of lay advocates, however, would not neces-
sarily benefit indigent litigants. As Barbara Bezdek's study of Baltimore's Rent
Court revealed, the lion's share of non-attorney assistance is used against, rather than
for, the indigent litigant. See Bezdek, supra note 23, at 562-63. Professor Bezdek's
study confirmed the earlier predictions of Professor Abel: if advantaged parties were
prohibited from using lawyers, they "could retain representatives who were not for-
mally qualified as lawyers but possessed all of the lawyer's competence." Richard L.
Abel, Socializing the Legal Profession: Can Redistributing Lawyers' Services Achieve
Social Justice?, 1 L. & Pol'y Q., 5, 20 (1979).
245. See Murphy, supra note 80, at 138-39; Rhode, supra note 77, at 221.
246. See, e.g., Responding to the Needs, supra note 25, at 37-38 (discussing the
problems the non-traditional attorney-client relationship raises for malpractice insur-
ance coverage); Millemann et al., supra note 57, at 1188-89 (discussing the need for
reform in order to provide better legal services for unrepresented litigants); Mosten,
supra note 48, at 430-34 (purporting that clear communication and a positive personal
relationship between lawyer and client is mandatory until immunity or limitation on
malpractice exposure are enacted for discrete task representation); Long & Lee,
supra note 62, at 40-41 (exploring the possibility of providing incentives for the pri-
vate bar to service those now unrepresented in family law matters); see also Meeting
the Challenge, supra note 1, at 112 (recommending enhancement of unbundled legal
services in pro bono cases). Recognizing a standard of care consistent with the lim-
ited representation, rather than measuring the provider of discrete task representa-
tion by the standards of full representation, and embedding the sliding standing into
analysis under the ethics and malpractice rules, seems to be the most sensible ap-
proach. Requiring the attorney to set clear limits, particularly through a retainer, as
to the scope of the representation is consistent with this approach. Mosten's call for
civil immunity, however, seems unnecessary and goes too far. See Mosten, supra note
48, at 433-34. Even Mosten seems to recognize this: "I do not suggest complete im-
munity for unbundled lawyering malfeasance. Rather, I propose that liability should
attach according to the contracted scope of lawyer engagement." Id. at 434. For a
thoughtful set of recommendations designed to balance the need to protect vulnera-
ble clients while expanding the use of discrete-task representation see McNeal, supra
note 86. at 335-38.
247. See supra Part II.B.1-3.
248. See, e.g., infra Part III.B (discussing lay advocates in the context of bankruptcy
cases).
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forcing attorneys to appear in court or refrain from assisting at all,
courts should be building on the limited assistance. 49 Courts con-
cerned mainly with docket control might find meddlesome and annoy-
ing the increased use of lay advocates and limited assistance. Courts
dedicated to providing fairness to unrepresented litigants should wel-
come the increase in assistance from outside the court.
C. Developing Guidelines and Considering Context
An analysis of necessary change in a particular context will depend
on the identification of the barriers facing unrepresented litigants not
on a piece-meal basis, but systemically. The features of a particular
context are important in determining the extent to which the tradi-
tional roles must be revised. While the details of revised roles may
vary from context to context, it does not follow that judges, mediators,
and clerks should be left without guidance as to how to handle cases
involving unrepresented litigants. As with the development of rules of
procedure, the supreme courts or equivalent rule-making bodies in
particular jurisdictions should develop general standards, which then
should be tailored to particular courts by the administrators of those
courts. Individual variation between judges and clerks would occur
within the context of specific guidelines and rules. The development
of rules in the small claims context regarding the role of the judge
attests to the feasibility of such an approach.-'
Judges, mediators, and clerks currently receive little or no guidance
as to how to handle cases involving unrepresented litigants. 2 1 Yet
solutions to the problems described in this Article require the promul-
gation of guidelines consistent with the underlying principles and re-
249. See part I.B.2 for a discussion of the judiciary's and the profession's reaction
to the provision of limited assistance by attorneys. Appropriate inquiries by judges
and mediators would help identify the advice received by the unrepresented litigant
and provide a measure of oversight. See supra Part II.B.1-2. Once attorneys are per-
suaded that the provision of limited assistance is welcomed, they may become more
willing to provide the assistance. Rules requiring disclosure in pleadings might then
become appropriate safeguards, rather than a device for chilling the practice.
250. See supra Part I.D.
251. Ninety-one percent of judges in one recent survey reported "that their courts
had no general policy addressing the manner in which pro se litigants should be han-
dled in the courtroom or in the litigation process generally." Goldschmidt, supra note
3, at 16; see Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 54, 117. Forty-eight percent of
court administrators in the same study reported that their court had no established
rules, policies, or instructions to guide court staff in responding to pro se-related ques-
tions; of those responding that their courts had such policies, only 38% said the poli-
cies were in writing. See Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 50, 123; Goldschmidt,
supra note 3, at 21. For a discussion of the lack of guidance for mediators, see supra
notes 217-25 and accompanying text. See also BBA Report, supra note 175, at 18
("there is no systemic approach to unrepresented litigants in the [Massachusetts] Dis-
trict Court[s]"); id. at 3, 66 (recommending the adoption of guidelines to assist
judges).
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vised roles discussed in the preceding sections. 252 The rules need to
distinguish between cases involving only unrepresented litigants and
cases pitting unrepresented litigants against represented ones, since
the scenarios present different issues for the court system. While rule
changes alone are unlikely to eliminate the problems facing the unrep-
resented poor, 53 the continued absence of appropriate guidelines tai-
lored to context is a gaping hole that must be filled if the courts are
serious in their efforts to provide unrepresented litigants meaningful
access to the courts.2
54
Context is important not only in assessing the extent to which the
traditional roles must be revised, but also the extent to which the revi-
sion of the roles must be supplemented by assistance programs, and
the type of assistance programs that should be considered. The fol-
lowing factors may be useful as a starting point for the analysis.
1. The prevalence of unrepresented litigants. The higher the per-
centage of unrepresented litigants, the more the court's rules in gen-
eral must be geared toward meeting the needs of unrepresented
litigants.
2. The volume of cases. The higher the volume of overall cases,
particularly of those involving unrepresented litigants, the greater will
be the need to develop assistance programs. An isolated unrepre-
sented litigant in a low-volume court might be accommodated simply
by revising the roles of the existing players, whereas a large number of
unrepresented litigants in a high volume court may render the devel-
opment of additional programs imperative.
252. Policy recommendations include: "Courts, in conjunction with the bar, should
establish policies to guide court staff in assisting self-represented litigants" and
"[e]ach state should establish judicial protocols to guide judges assisting self-repre-
sented litigants." Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 109, 111. The policy recom-
mendations also call for the education of judges and clerks. See id.
253. As Professor Galanter warned 25 years ago in his classic study explaining why
the "haves" come out ahead of the "have nots":
Rule change is in itself likely to have little effect because the system is so
constructed that changes in the rules can be filtered out unless accompanied
by changes at other levels.... The system has the capacity to change a great
deal at the level of rules without corresponding changes in everyday patterns
of practice or distribution of tangible advantages.
Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y Rev. 95, 149 (1974) (footnote omitted) (describing rela-
tive success of repeat players versus one-shot players in court).
254. In promulgating rules, it will be important to ensure that rules or guidelines
protect unrepresented litigants, rather than self-interested lawyers and judges. As a
number of commentators observed, the process of adopting the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct produced rules favoring lawyers at every turn, providing a basis for
the concern that self-interest might prevail in rule-making. See, e.g., Stephen Gillers,
What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model
Rules, 46 Ohio St. L.J. 243, 245, 268 (1985) (noting the tendency of the American legal
profession to adopt self-serving rules); Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A
Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 689, 691 (1981) (discuss-
ing potential conflicts of interest among members of the bar in adopting rules).
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3. The complexity of the proceeding. The simpler the substantive
law and the procedure, the less likely the need for comprehensive
legal advice and assistance, and the greater the likelihood that the de-
velopment of forms and information systems might overcome many of
the problems facing unrepresented litigants. 55 The more complicated
the substantive law, procedures and forms, the more help the unrepre-
sented litigant will need." 6
4. The adversarial or contested nature of the proceeding. The more
a type of case has the potential for being contested, the greater the
level of assistance that will be necessary to build into the system.
Although not all name changes are simple and not all custody battles
bitterly contested, name change cases typically are less adversarial
than custody cases." 7
5. The extent to which cases regularly pit an unrepresented party
against a party represented by a lawyer. Cases involving a lawyer and
an unrepresented party are the most difficult challenge, requiring the
greatest level of intervention. Where both parties are without coun-
sel, both litigants are likely to need assistance. The court system at
least is not generally faced with helping an unrepresented litigant sur-
vive and overcome the efforts of an adversary schooled in using, and
often manipulating, the legal system.
255. This is not to suggest that simplifying the procedures %vill inevitably benefit
indigent litigants, the most common unrepresented litigants. Scholars have vigorously
debated advantages of formal versus informal procedures in considering changes that
might benefit poor people. See, e.g., Richard Abel, Infornmalisin: A Tactical Eqtti-
valent to Law?, 19 Clearinghouse Rev. 375, 379-83 (1985) (arguing that formal proce-
dures protect the pro se litigant); Galanter, supra note 253, at 149 (suggesting that
substantive rule change alone is not likely to "be determinative of... outcomes");
William H. Simon, Legal Informality and Redistributive Politics, 19 Clearinghouse
Rev. 384, 385-88 (1985) (analyzing the strategic advantages of the anti-informalist ar-
gument). Viewed only from the perspective of simplicity, difficulties facing unrepre-
sented litigants in prosecuting breach of warranty of habitability might be equally met
by making the proof of the defense easier for the tenant on the one hand, or eliminat-
ing the defense on the other. Both changes would "simplify" the procedure, but with
very different substantive results.
256. Notwithstanding the importance of a generalized assessment of complexity by
subject matter, assistance models must also plan for varying degrees of complexity in
individual cases. See, eg., Cox & Dwyer, supra note 48, at 19 ("[Just as legal fields
vary in complexity, so do individual cases. Some cases present simple fact situations,
and others present complex situations. An otherwise simple divorce case, for exam-
ple, may be made complex by the presence of marital children or substantial marital
property.").
257. In making this assessment it is critical that the inquiry not turn on settlement
rate of the cases; as has been seen, the pressure on unrepresented litigants to settle is
immense, and the fact of their capitulating with great regularity is more a comment on
the difficulties they encounter in court than on the contested nature of the action. A
more instructive test might be to measure the contested nature of the action where
both parties have lawyers. If the type of case is one that typically may be easily re-
solved, the case may be viewed as one that is not tremendously adversarial. One's
view as to whether the presence of lawyers exacerbates or facilitates the dispute reso-
lution process will affect one's view as to the appropriateness of such a test.
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6. The extent to which a power imbalance exists between the parties.
Cases involving a lawyer against an unrepresented party are but one
example of power imbalance. Other examples include consumer cases
generally pitting creditors against debtors," landlord-tenant cases
pitting institutional landlords against poor tenants, who often may be
women of color,259 and family law cases, particularly those involving
domestic abuse or disparity in the economic situation of the husband
and wife.
For consideration along with the factors listed above are the various
mechanisms for assisting unrepresented litigants. Many of the mecha-
nisms may be organized on a spectrum ranging from those that pro-
vide the least intervention to those providing the most. 60
Informational kiosks and hand-outs, instructional forms, simplified
procedures, and the implementation of user-friendly court forms
might require the fewest changes in a court's current operation. Ex-
panded roles for clerks, or the development of programs using non-
lawyers limited by the type of advice they may give, might be next
along the spectrum. "Lawyers-for-the-day" programs, and clinic pro-
grams using law students and lay advocates trained and permitted to
dispense legal advice and help litigants complete their forms, might be
next. Providing "lawyers-for-the-day" or lay advocates who assist the
litigant throughout the proceeding, including in negotiation, in media-
tion and before the judge, might be next. Finally, at the far edge of
the spectrum would be the appointment of counsel to represent the
litigant.261
In designing programs to assist unrepresented litigants, the features
of the particular courts at issue must determine the required level of
assistance. The simpler and less contested the cases are, the more that
information kiosks and court forms may be sufficient. As cases be-
258. See, e.g., Caplovitz, supra note 158, passim (considering the serious problem of
debt disentanglement); Sterling & Schrag, supra note 158, at 360 (suggesting that pro-
cedural reforms to protect unrepresented debtors may be warranted).
259. See infra Part III.C.
260. Notwithstanding imperfections in any effort to place programs along such a
scale, the exercise nonetheless may provide assistance to those choosing among
programs.
261. While no jurisdiction has recognized a right to counsel in most civil cases,
judges in civil cases retain the discretion to appoint counsel where appropriate. See,
e.g., UBO Realty Corp. v. Fulton, No. 98761/91 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Dec. 9, 1991) (unpub-
lished opinion, on file with the Fordham Law Review) (assigning counsel to indigent
defendant where complex legal issues were at stake); Gardenia Realty v. McMillan,
No. 77216/87 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Aug. 3, 1987) (unpublished opinion, on file with the Ford-
ham Law Review) (assigning counsel to indigent defendant where risk of grave harm
existed). "Many states have poor persons statutes that authorize the appointment of
counsel in civil matters for people who cannot afford the costs of prosecuting or de-
fending a proceeding." Andrew Scherer, Gideon's Shelter: The Need to Recognize a
Right to Counsel for Indigent Defendants in Eviction Proceedings, 23 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 557, 585 (1988); see also Rubin, supra note 60, at 1008-09 (discussing court
appointed representation for indigent litigants).
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come complicated and contested, more help is needed. Cases with the
potential to be adversarial and complicated, with litigants of unequal
power facing one another, and with one side typically represented by
counsel, will require extensive assistance for unrepresented litigants if
the assistance is to be any help at all. The details of the revised roles
of the judges, mediators, and clerks in a particular setting must be
determined by the needs of the unrepresented litigants in that
setting.262
Part HI examines particular courts involving large numbers of un-
represented litigants. The factors identified in part II.C provide the
framework for analyzing the features of the different settings. The
analysis reveals the need for revised roles of the judges, mediators,
and clerks, the need for guidelines defining the revised roles, the need
for increased assistance to the unrepresented poor, and the need to
tailor changes to fit the varying contexts.
Il. HELP FOR UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTs-EXAMPLES
FROM CONTEXT
A. Family Court
The numbers of unrepresented litigants in family law cases have
surged nationwide, with some reports indicating that eighty percent
or more of family law cases involve at least one pro se litigant.2 63 The
262. As discussed above, the goal remains one of providing fairness and justice for
those without lawyers as well as those with lawyers. See supra Part II.A.I. As urged
throughout this Article, for that goal to have meaning, at a minimum, litigants should
not forfeit important rights due to the absence of counsel. Outcomes of cases should
relate to the merits of the claims, rather than the presence or absence of counsel. See
supra note 17. While similar questions of fairness arise when both parties have coun-
sel of differing levels of skill or the parties have unequal resources, those questions
are beyond the scope of this Article. The profession could choose to place the burden
on the court personnel to correct imbalances, increase its regulation of law yers, or
allow the imbalance to operate unchecked. None of the choices obviates the need to
solve the problem of assisting the unrepresented poor.
263. See, e.g., Changing the Culture, supra note 58, at 26 (reporting the impressions
of court personnel that "in approximately 80% of cases in the [Massachusetts] Pro-
bate and Family Court, at least one party is not represented by counsel"); Erin M.
Moore, The Cost of Divorce: Pro Se Litigants Flood Family Law Courts, De Novo,
May 1995, at 1 (reporting that 77% of all family cases in Washington State involve at
least one unrepresented litigant); Sales et al., supra note 53, at 571 n.82 (noting that
"in 88.2% of the divorce cases filed in Maricopa County [Arizona] in 1990, at least
one of the litigants was self-represented"); McKnight, supra note 126, at 1 (revealing
that 89% of the family law cases in Oregon involve at least one pro se party). The
numbers have been surging at least since the 1980s. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 77, at
214-15 (noting that the proportion of pro se filings in surveyed California counties
grew from 39% to 62% of family law cases during the 1980s); Cox & Dwyer, supra
note 48, at 2 (reporting that pro se filings for a sample of divorce cases in Arizona
increased from 24% to 47% between 1980 and 1985); see also BBA Report, supra
note 175, at 5 ("Although some growth in pro se litigation is reported in all categories
of civil litigation, the most drastic and consistent increase appears to be in domestic
litigation."); Meeting the Challenge, supra note 1, at 49 ("The area of law and court
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factors identified in part II.C suggest the need for a range of mecha-
nisms for assisting unrepresented litigants. The high percentage of un-
represented litigants, combined with the huge volume of the court's
cases, compels the need for a sweeping institutional response rather
than an ad hoc reaction to isolated litigants; the more the numbers
suggest that attorneys are becoming the exception rather than the
rule, the greater the need to operate the court in a manner that re-
flects that reality. Early reports identified the relative lack of com-
plexity of family law as a factor explaining the increase in numbers of
unrepresented litigants;264 where cases lack legal and factual complex-
ity, increased information and technical assistance may be a sufficient
response. At the same time, depending on factors such as the type of
family law case, the assets involved, or the extent of conflict between
the parties, cases may become quite complex, suggesting that assist-
ance programs will need to have the capacity to go beyond increased
information and technical assistance.265
The remaining factors suggest that unrepresented family law liti-
gants often may not only need assistance, but also protection. While
in many cases both sides appear without counsel, at least a third, and
often more, of the cases pit an unrepresented party against a law-
yer.266 Since unrepresented litigants typically are poorer than repre-
sented ones and unrepresented litigants disproportionately are
women, unrepresented women may therefore be facing their batterers
in the proceeding and may be dealing with tactics such as "custody
blackmail. '267 While some family law proceedings are amicable,
others are quite adversarial: "matrimonial matters. .. 'are unequaled
in stress and emotion,' ' 268 and family law lawyers have a reputation
operations that is feeling the brunt of the increase in the volume of pro se cases is
domestic relations.").
264. See, e.g., Cox & Dwyer, supra note 48, at 30 (concluding that after testing
theories as to why more litigants self-represent in divorce cases than in bankruptcy
cases, "[ojur empirical findings are consistent with our hypothesis that consumers' use
of self-help varies inversely with legal and factual complexity").
265. See, e.g., Sales et al., supra note 53, at 561-66 (identifying factors such as the
income of the parties, the presence of any children, the amount of property, and the
length of the marriage as affecting the complexity of the proceeding).
266. See, e.g., Sales et al., supra note 53, at 571 n.82 (reporting that in over 35% of
the divorce cases filed in Maricopa County, Arizona, in 1990, one side was pro se,
while the other was represented by an attorney); McKnight, supra note 263, at 1 (re-
porting that 44% of the family law filings in Oregon involved only one represented
party).
267. See Jana B. Singer & William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 Md.
L. Rev. 497, 503 (1988) (describing "custody blackmail," in which "divorcing hus-
bands routinely and successfully use the threat of a custody fight to reduce or elimi-
nate alimony and child support obligations"). But cf. Eleanor E. MacCoby & Robert
H. Mnookin, Dividing the Child 154-59 (1992) (questioning the extent of the practice
of "custody blackmail" based on a California study).
268. Jan Hoffman, New York's Chief Judge Imposes Strict Rules for Divorce Law-
yers, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1993, at Al (quoting Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye of the New
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for resorting to "unfair and unscrupulous practices" in divorce
litigation.269
The surging numbers of unrepresented litigants have caused judges
and lawyers to identify pro se litigation as a major problem affecting
courts that handle family law cases. The family law context has re-
ceived widespread attention in bar committee reports270 and arti-
cles271 in an effort to respond to the problem. The proposals include:
(1) a simplification of procedures, combined with utilization of court
forms; (2) an increase in educational and explanatory materials, often
involving self-service centers with information kiosks; (3) increased
"technical" or "procedural" assistance, with some capacity to provide
substantive assistance; (4) and an increase in the pool of pro bono
lawyers to take cases for free or at a reduced rate.-
Despite their impressive breadth, the proposals fail to discuss sys-
temically the proper roles of the key actors in the system. For exam-
ple, the reports routinely discuss the important rights that
unrepresented litigants forfeit during the course of their cases due to
their lack of representation. 3 Yet these discussions do not arise as
York Court of Appeals); see Grillo, supra note 225, at 1572 ("[Flamily conflicts...
often involve a combination of emotional and legal complaints .... ").
269. See, e.g., Richard E. Crouch, The Matter of Bombers: Unfair Tactics and the
Problem of Defining Unethical Behavior in Divorce Litigation, 20 Fam. LQ. 413, 415-
34 (1986) (describing unethical tactics used in divorce litigation). But cf McEwen et
al., supra note 93, at 1364-65 (describing the results of a study in Maine, including
reports from lawyers that they typically try to reduce, rather than exacerbate,
conflict).
270. See, eg., District of Columbia Bar Task Force on Family Law Representation,
Access to Family Law Representation in the District of Columbia: A Report of the
D.C. Bar Public Service Activities Corporation 12 (1992) (demonstrating that the ma-
jority of low income families and children in the District of Columbia are not receiv-
ing the legal assistance they need in family law matters); Changing the Culture. supra
note 58, at 26 (discussing the large number of unrepresented litigants appearing in
family courts); Minn. Conference Report, supra note 40, at 14 (recommending meas-
ures to address the needs of pro se litigants); Long & Lee, supra note 62, at 1-2 (dis-
cussing the pro per problem in California family law cases).
271. See generally Millemann et al., supra note 57, passim (describing an experi-
mental project in which law students provided legal information and advice to other-
wise unrepresented parties in family law cases); Murphy, supra note 80, at 123-24
(discussing the lack of access to the courts to resolve family law disputes and recom-
mending alternatives to adversarial proceedings); Sales et al., supra note 53. at 560
(discussing self representation as an alternative to attorney representation in divorce
cases).
272. See Responding to the Needs, supra note 25, at 12-13; Changing the Culture,
supra note 58, at 29-34; Murphy, supra note 80, at 142; Yegge, supra note 74, at 10-12;
Long & Lee, supra note 62, at 13-42. Some include reference to the concept of "un-
bundled legal services." See Responding to the Needs, supra note 25. at 37-38; Minn.
Conference Report, supra note 40, at 16; Wisconsin Comm. on the Delivery of Legal
Services, State Bar of Wisc., Final Report and Recommendations 29 (1996); Changing
the Culture, supra note 58, at 33; Millemann et al., supra note 57, at 1188-89; Long &
Lee, supra note 62, at 40-42.
273. See, e.g., Caroline Kearney, Pedagogy in a Poor People's Court: The First Year
of a Child Support Clinic, 19 N.M. L. Rev. 175, 176 (1989) ("One of the frequently
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concerns about the impartiality of the system and the need to revise
the roles of the players accordingly. Instead, impartiality is cited as a
limitation on the extent to which judges can assist unrepresented liti-
gants: providing too much help is seen as compromising the judge's
position. 74 Moreover, where the judges' role is discussed, the need to
ensure a fair settlement is ignored, despite the fact that most family
law cases settle, with minimal judicial oversight . 75 The focus of the
reports remains on the few cases that do not settle and the judges'
burden in dealing with unrepresented litigants.17 6
Similar gaps appear in the discussions of clerks and mediators. Un-
represented litigants are viewed as problems, unduly burdening the
clerks.2 77 The reports note the difficulties in providing help without
running afoul of the prohibition against giving legal advice, but do not
cited barriers to the establishment and collection of support orders is the inability of
large numbers of women to afford counsel." (citations omitted)); Golden, supra note
58, at 1 (reporting that, according to judges and other legal observers of the Massa-
chusetts Probate and Family Courts, "[wjithout attorneys, [unrepresented female liti-
gants] run more risk of losing their children, paying excessive support, being
pressured into an unfair settlement-or even making themselves vulnerable to batter-
ers ...."); Yegge, supra note 74, at 10 ("Research indicates that pro se litigants fre-
quently proceed without the benefit of critical information such as pretrial relief,
allocation of insurance, pension benefits, and tax consequences."); Long & Lee, supra
note 62, at 9 ("Pro pers appear to have a greater probability of experiencing an unjust
result"). See generally Bryan, supra note 153, at 931 (discussing the different back-
ground conditions that women face in divorce proceedings).
274. See Changing the Culture, supra note 58, at 29 (arguing that judges' practice of
using "valuable court time to explain rules and procedures or to ask questions of
witnesses in an attempt to be fair or to further discovery of critical information" may
be unfair to represented adversaries "since it creates the appearance that the court
favors the unrepresented party"); Cox & Dwyer, supra note 48, at 51 (noting a poten-
tial problem in divorce cases, where "courts are forced to take an active role in their
cases in order to protect [unrepresented] individuals' rights, thus jeopardizing judicial
impartiality"); Long & Lee, supra note 62, at 7-8.
275. See Bohmer & Ray, supra note 97, at 40; Bryan, supra note 153, at 937;
McEwen et al., supra note 93, at 1345-46; Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 158, at
956; Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dy-
namics of Greed, 3 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 168, 173 n.11 (1984).
276. See supra notes 274-76; see also Memorandum from Judith C. Nord, Staff At-
torney, Minnesota Judicial Center, to All Pro Se Subcommittee Members app. G
(May 2, 1997) [hereinafter Nord Memorandum] (on file with author) (recommending
a protocol to be used by the court during proceedings with pro se litigants); Long &
Lee, supra note 62, at 5-7 ("Pro pers demand ... more attention from judges....
[Some] judges feel that unrepresented parties place them in a compromising
position.").
277. See Daniszewski, supra note 187, at 49 ("According to one superior court
clerk's informal estimate, 75 percent of the staff time at the clerk's office counter is
spent dealing with inquiries by pro se litigants. Pro se litigants also consume 60 to 70
percent of staff telephone time."); Cox & Dwyer, supra note 48, at 54 ("[Tlhe major-
ity of court personnel indicated that self-help cases require more court time and re-
sources on a per case basis than do attorney-handled cases."); Long & Lee, supra note
62, at 5.
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call for the abolition of such a prohibition.28 The discussions about
mediation focus primarily on whether mediation is appropriate at all
where issues of domestic violence are involved.2 79 The proposals fail
to confront the harm caused to unrepresented litigants in mediation
conducted by a mediator who is not responsible for the substantive
terms of the mediated agreements and who is barred from providing
help if that help constitutes legal advice.
The support for assistance programs is increasingly accompanied by
a backlash against unrepresented litigants in the form of fear that, far
from being disadvantaged, unrepresented litigants use their status to
gain advantage in the proceedings. 280 The backlash includes a dis-
turbing trend calling for the adoption of rules designed to curb "pro se
abuses." 1 Nowhere do the proposals talk about the need to curb
attorney misconduct in cases pitting a lawyer against an unrepresented
party. 2'
278. See Responding to the Needs, supra note 25, at 24-26; Changing the Culture,
supra note 58, at 29 ("Significant numbers of pro se litigants seek to use court person-
nel as a source of legal advice."); Yegge, supra note 74, at 11 ("While court clerks may
not practice law, they must not hide behind that prohibition. Clerks must be trained
to give clear and correct procedural directions ...... (emphasis added)); Long & Lee,
supra note 62, at 5. While observing that court staff are "appropriately reluctant to
give information that could be construed as legal advice," the Minnesota Conference
of Judges has proposed following the advice of John Greacen. Minn. Conference Re-
port, supra note 40, at 14; see Nord Memorandum, supra note 276, app. F; see also
supra Part II.B.3 (stating that the role of court personnel should be expanded beyond
the barrier of "no legal advice").
279. See, e.g., Committee for Gender Equality of the Mass. Supreme Jud. Ct.,
Achieving Equity: Recommendations for Dispute Intervention Practice in the Pro-
bate & Family Court 10-11 (1995) [hereinafter Achieving Equity] (redefining media-
tion as "dispute intervention" in the family setting); Mass. Gender Bias Study, supra
note 49, at 23-27 (arguing that mediation, as it is currently practiced in the probate
court, disadvantages women because if their generally unequal bargaining power);
Grillo, supra note 225, at 1548-50 (challenging the view that mediation is preferred
over the adversarial system for women in custody disputes).
280. See, eg., Changing the Culture, supra note 58, at 28-29 ("Pro se litigants often
raise frivolous claims or legally meritorious claims in frivolous ways .... Pro se
litigants are rarely penalized for failure to follow the rules."); Sales et al., supra note
53, at 558 ("An issue ... is whether judicial assistance to self-represented litigants in
any way biases the outcome in their favor when the opposing parties are represented
by attorneys."); Daniszewski, supra note 187, at 47 (describing one school of thought
that proposes that "judges [may be] more prone to relax the enforcement of the rules
when they are dealing with pro se litigants.").
281. See Daniszewski, supra note 187, at 46; Charles P. Kindregan et al., Emerging
Changes in Domestic Relations Procedure, 26 Mass. Law. Wkly. 1241, 1262 (1998).
282. See generally Engler, supra note 43, at 122-30 (providing examples suggesting
that such misconduct is commonplace). Even where ethical issues are mentioned,
they are mentioned in terms of problems created for the lawyer by the unrepresented
litigant, rather than as lawyer misconduct that must be curbed. See, e.g., Changing the
Culture, supra note 58, at 28 ("Lawyers who represent a party against a pro se oppo-
nent are often placed in an ethical bind because the lawyer must deal directly with the
unrepresented opponent."); Long & Lee, supra note 62, at 5 (noting that one party's
lack of representation creates difficulties for the adversary).
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By failing to resolve the underlying tensions created by the applica-
tion of the traditional rules to a context with a high volume of unrep-
resented litigants, the reports and proposals miss a crucial component
of efforts to assist unrepresented litigants. Some unrepresented liti-
gants with amicable family law cases involving less complicated legal
issues, little power imbalance between the parties, and an unrepre-
sented party on the other side may find sufficient assistance from the
typical proposals. With complicated or adversarial cases involving sig-
nificant power imbalances, particularly those pitting unrepresented lit-
igants against represented ones, the limited assistance models alone
are insufficient. 83
B. Bankruptcy Court
A 1985 ABA study from Maricopa County, Arizona, found that
self-help was utilized much less in bankruptcies than in divorces.284
Self-representation by debtors in bankruptcy court nonetheless in-
creased dramatically in the early 1990s. 28 5 The numbers understate
the incidence of self-representation, because in many cases a lawyer
may commence the action on behalf of the debtor, but not appear in
subsequent negotiations or contested hearings.2 86 The numbers fur-
ther understate the need for assistance, because some debtors bewil-
dered by the process may refrain from filing at all.287 In addition,
some judgment proof debtors who file for bankruptcy pro se would
283. Even the source of the proposals underscores current limitations. The propos-
als come from individual lawyers and groups of lawyers, and remain as proposals.
Until and unless the proposals gain the backing of court administrators, the effective-
ness of the proposals will be limited. Rather than simply providing courthouse space
and cooperation, court administrators need to promulgate rules redefining the proper
role of the judges, lawyers, mediators and clerks consistent with the principals dis-
cussed in this Article. See supra Part II.C.
284. See Cox & Dwyer, supra note 48, at 2.
285. See Gary Klein & Maggie Spade, National Consumer Law Ctr., Self Represen-
tation in the Bankruptcy Court: The Massachusetts Experience 1 (1996) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author). The total number of pro se cases filed in Massa-
chusetts increased from 580 to 813 between 1990 and 1991. See id. Data from New
Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont reflected a similar pattern. See id. at 1 n.4.
Pro se filings in bankruptcies varied from 10% to 34% in certain California counties
by the late 1980s. See Rhode, supra note 77, at 214-215. "The Administrative Offices
of the United States Courts estimate that 12.7 percent of Chapter 7 cases were filed
pro se in 1992, or approximately 84,000 pro se petitions." Susan Block-Lieb, A Com-
parison of Pro Bono Representation Programs for Consumer Debtors, 2 Am. Bankr.
Inst. L. Rev. 37, 55 (1994).
286. See Block-Lieb, supra note 285, at 41.
287. "In addition to those who file pro se because they can't afford an attorney,
there is also undoubtedly a pool of people who would like to file bankruptcy but can't
afford the legal fees and don't feel confident to file pro se." Klein & Spade, supra note
285, at 36 (citing Jason DeParle, Poor Find Going Broke is Too Costly, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 11, 1991, at A24). Bankruptcy court, of course, provided the context for the
famous due process challenge of the debtor too poor to afford the filing fee for bank-
ruptcy. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434,450 (1973) (upholding a state filing fee
requirement conditioning access to judicial discharge in bankruptcy).
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not have done so had they received proper advice.'"s Bankruptcy
cases have been a fertile ground for the increased use of self-help kits
and non-lawyer assistance, creating concerns regarding the unauthor-
ized practice of law in this area.2 9
The factors identified in the previous section indicate a need for
substantial assistance to unrepresented litigants. The prevalence of
unrepresented litigants creates strains on the system.21 Unrepre-
sented litigants routinely face lawyers in these proceedings, since
"bankruptcy cases generally involve lawyers representing adverse par-
ties, including creditors and the trustee. ' 291 The economic imbalance
inherent in the creditor-debtor context is exacerbated by the fact that
unrepresented debtors are poorer than represented ones; many unrep-
resented litigants are low-income.292
The remaining factor-the complexity of the proceeding-suggests
not simply that unrepresented litigants may need assistance, but that
the type of assistance required may turn on the type of case.
288. See Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 29 ("Most lawyers advise [judgment
proof] debtors not to bother with the bankruptcy process, because they have little to
gain from filing which they cannot achieve by ignoring their creditors.").
289. "[Pjetition preparation services and their advertising as well as 'self help*
bankruptcy kits, played a significant but unquantifiable role in the pro se filings we
studied. The data in this study strongly suggests that a high percentage of debtors
obtained assistance in some way, large or small, from non-attorneys." Klein & Spade,
supra note 285, at 34-35; see also Rhode, supra note 77, at 227 (noting that in response
to a recommendation by the California State Bar Commission on Legal Technicians
for limited reforms in the area of unauthorized practice of law, "[aldvisory groups in
bankruptcy, family law, and landlord-tenant stressed the significant risk of injuries
from lay practice.... ."). For cases involving the alleged unauthorized practice of law
in the bankruptcy context, see, for example, In re Bachmann, 113 B.R. 769 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1990); In re Anderson, 79 B.R. 482 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987); O'Connell v.
David, 35 B.R. 141 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983).
290. See Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 2. Nonetheless, the prevalence of un-
represented litigants and volume of cases might vary significantly from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, calling for different responses. See id. at 40 ("Pro se filing rates appear to
have substantial local impetus. For example, in California there are huge and unman-
ageable numbers of pro se cases. In other jurisdictions, such as Vermont, there are
almost none."). Klein and Spade identify the additional strains on clerks in terms of
dealing wvith paperwork that is improperly prepared and the need to address frequent
requests for significant information. See id. at 2. Judges and other courtroom person-
nel similarly "devote significant court time to explaining the intricacies of the bank-
ruptcy system to confused pro se debtors," and hearings "in pro se cases frequently
fray the nerves of not just the participants," but others in the courtroom as well. Id.
291. Id. at 5. Due primarily to this factor, the Bar Association in Minneapolis pro-
vides pro bono counsel for "adversary proceedings." Id. at 39.
292. "Nearly half the pro se debtors were low-income, while only 19% of the con-
trol group fell in this bracket. By comparison, nearly 40% of the represented debtors
had incomes recorded at the highest range, above $24,000 annually, while only 17% of
pro se debtors had similar income." Id. at 12. "The majority of the telephone inter-
viewees, 66% ... indicated their reason[ ] for filing pro se was that they were unable
to afford an attorney for the case." Id. at 17. Cox and Dwyer similarly found that
income for pro se debtors was generally lower than for represented debtors. See Cox
& Dwyer, supra note 48, at 44. "Payment of attorneys fees is ... out of the reach of
many individuals in bankruptcy." Block-Lieb. supra note 285, at 39.
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Although bankruptcy cases tend to be "extremely technical in na-
ture," '93 "pro se debtors can generally manage successful results in
Chapter 7, but not in Chapter 13. ' '294 The complexity of the Chapter
13 proceeding requires more complicated forms, including the need to
file a feasible reorganization plan. 95 One study found that most dis-
missed cases were dismissed due to incomplete or missing forms or
reorganization plans or to unpaid fees.2 96 The complexity of the
Chapter 13 proceeding leads to higher attorney fees, in turn increasing
the likelihood that the unrepresented debtor will appear without
counsel.2 97 This likelihood, however, is tempered by the fact that
lower income debtors tend to have fewer assets and, therefore, less
complicated bankruptcy cases.298
293. Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 4. Cox and Dwyer previously identified the
complexity of bankruptcy cases as a major reason consumers' use of self-help was
greater in divorce ("the less complex field") than bankruptcy. Cox & Dwyer, supra
note 48, at 2. Cox and Dwyer assumed that legal complexity was important to con-
sumers' choice of legal representation, and therefore compared "consumers' use of
self-help divorce (a relatively simple legal procedure) to that of self-help bankruptcy
(a more complex legal action)." Id. "Our empirical findings are consistent with our
hypothesis that consumers' use of self-help varies inversely with legal and factual
complexity." Id. at 30.
294. Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 20. While both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13
bankruptcies are options for an individual debtor, Chapter 7 involves a simpler pro-
cess, often resulting in discharge of debts but typically involving liquidations of the
debtor's assets. See id. at 27-28. Chapter 13 "has substantial procedural and substan-
tive complications," including a reorganization plan and the need for ongoing pay-
ments; the stakes are higher, since the successful debtor can "protect and keep non-
exempt property, take advantage of the broader discharge, and ... make installment
payments on the arrears of a secured debt after default." Id. at 28.
Klein and Spade measured success primarily by the extent to which the debtors'
debts were discharged, the goal of most bankruptcy cases. Since a discharge releases
the debtor from the legal obligation to repay discharged debts, "[d]ischarge is ... a
good outcome." Id. at 18. In contrast, case dismissal is "generally a bad outcome,"
since the debtor is turned away without relief. Id. "In Chapter 7 [cases], 97.5% of
represented debtors and 93.5% of unrepresented debtors obtained discharges." Id. at
19. In contrast, in only 2% of the Chapter 13 bankruptcies (possibly rising at most to
12%, since not all cases were completed at the time of the study) were the debts of the
unrepresented debtors discharged. See id. at 19-20. Comparatively, 27.3% of the rep-
resented debtors already had received a discharge by the end of the data collection
(possibly rising as high as 82%, given the pendency of additional cases). See id. Cox
and Dwyer earlier had found that self-helpers tended to reaffirm too many debts. See
Cox & Dwyer, supra note 48, at 49. Klein and Spade, however, found that this con-
cern, which requires the debtor to remain legally bound to pay a debt which would
otherwise be eliminated, was not born out by their study. See Klein & Spade, supra
note 285, at 21.
295. See Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 20.
296. See id. "Pro se debtors had more problems filling out the bankruptcy forms
than debtors represented by an attorney." Id. at 24.
297. See id. at 28-29. Pro se "debtors are priced out of [Chapter 13] bankruptcy
unless they can afford the $800-1500 attorney fee for such cases-in addition to the
amounts necessary to cure their defaults and propose a feasible plan." Id. (footnotes
omitted).
298. See id. at 12 ("Represented debtors.., tended to have more assets than pro se
debtors."). For Cox and Dwyer, however, the clearer correlation was with debt:
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The consequences of the lack of counsel often are devastating: the
"[a]bsence of counsel undermines the likelihood that an individual
debtor will obtain a 'fresh start' from bankruptcy."'2 99 Commentators,
therefore, have proposed a variety of mechanisms to provide assist-
ance to unrepresented litigants, beginning with increased pro bono re-
sources. 3 1 With Chapter 7 debtors, the resources might be directed
"at limited technical assistance," possibly involving a "pro se clinic" to
provide advice.30 ' In contrast, since "attorney help with a Chapter 13
is crucial," pro bono help in the nature of representation is critical in
that context.0 2 Since "[n]o amount of pro bono resources will elimi-
nate pro se cases entirely, 30 3 additional recommendations include:
(1) upgrading the available non-attorney counseling;304 (2) designating
a pro se clerk to provide formal assistance to pro se debtors;35 (3)
Through experimentation with various debt and asset measures of relative
case complexity, we found that consumers' use of self-help bankruptcy was
best explained by the dollar amount of total debt involved in each bank-
ruptcy case .... As total debt increases, use of self-help declines. The rela-
tionship between consumer income and the incidence of self-help
bankruptcy, on the other hand, is a quadratic one. As income increases from
very low levels to lower middle income levels, the incidence of self-help
bankruptcy falls; but, between $20,000 and $50,000 of annual income, the
incidence of self-help bankruptcy increases slightly.
Cox & Dwyer, supra note 48, at 27 (footnote omitted).
299. Block-Lieb, supra note 285, at 37; see Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 18-27.
Bankruptcy judges in Massachusetts have expressed concerns about unrepresented
litigants, including "the loss of valuable rights by litigants who do not understand the
process." BBA Report, supra note 175, at 38.
300. See, e.g., Block-Lieb, supra note 285, at 42-45 (describing existing programs for
pro bono representation of individual debtors); Pro Se Debtors & Creditors in Bank-
ruptcy Cases: An Excerpt from the Case Managenent Manual for U.S. Bankruptcy
Judges, FJC Directions, June 1996, at 37, 39 [hereinafter Banknptcy Excerpt] (offer-
ing suggestions regarding development of district-wide programs to address the needs
of pro se parties); Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 37 (proposing a "pro se clinic"
model for unrepresented Chapter 7 debtors).
301. Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 37. Klein and Spade caution that the clinic
would be designed to provide "advice to those who feel comfortable proceeding with-
out an attorney, as long as pro bono help is provided to qualified debtors who need it."
Id. (emphasis added). Klein and Spade envision that the help would be available on
an ongoing basis, "for example, if a motion for relief or adversary proceeding is filed."
Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. This proposal involves "[aiggressive enforcement work" under 11 U.S.C. § 110
to put "the bad actors out of business" and the elimination of publications known to
be out of date. Id. at 38. Elsewhere, the authors assert that "[t]he bar should en-
courage rather than discourage responsible non-attorney participation in that process,
through bankruptcy kits and petition preparation services." Id. at 36; see also Bank-
ruptcy Excerpt, supra note 300, at 39 (identifying the need to control "improper filings
by 'bankruptcy mills' as a key component to a strategy to assist pro se parties in
bankruptcy court).
305. See Bankruptcy Excerpt, supra note 300, at 37 (describing the possible use of
clerks to provide early review of pro se filings to allow for prompt curing of technical
defects); Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 38 ("The number of pro se cases has
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promulgating special rules for litigation involving pro se debtors;3 6
and (4) creating official forms with user-friendly instructions. 30 7
The recommendations of the various reports, if implemented, would
undoubtedly benefit unrepresented litigants in the bankruptcy courts.
Yet, as with the reports discussing unrepresented litigants in family
law cases, the recommendations fail to address the fundamental issues
relating to the proper roles of the judges, clerks, and mediators in
dealing with unrepresented litigants. Judges are mentioned only to
the extent that the prevalence of unrepresented litigants makes their
jobs more difficult 30 8 and that an active judicial role creates traditional
problems of impartiality.3 9 Bankruptcy clerks are portrayed often as
helpful to unrepresented litigants, at times as antagonistic to unrepre-
sented litigants, and frequently without guidance as to the permissible
scope of assistance.310 The use of mediation is touted without discus-
increased to the point in many jurisdictions where it makes sense to designate clerk's
office personnel for special training and assistance to pro se debtors.").
306. Examples include regulation of reaffirmation agreements and uniform protec-
tions for motions and other litigation filed against pro se debtors. See Klein & Spade,
supra note 285, at 39 (footnote omitted); see also Bankruptcy Excerpt, supra note 300,
at 37-39 (discussing generally management techniques for individual cases and pro-
ceedings involving pro se litigants).
307. See Bankruptcy Excerpt, supra note 300, at 39 (discussing sample forms and
instructional materials as components to a districtwide program to assist pro se par-
ties); Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 39.
308. Klein & Spade state that:
[J]udges ... frequently devote significant court time to explaining the intri-
cacies of the bankruptcy system to confused pro se debtors, providing infor-
mation about bankruptcy which is normally conveyed by an attorney in the
course of paid representation. Judicial proceedings involving pro se debtors
may be time consuming and frustrating for all concerned.
Klein & Spade, supra note 285, at 2. The authors attribute the relative scarcity of
motions for stays by creditors in cases involving unrepresented debtors in part to
"creditor awareness of judicial protectiveness of pro se debtors." Id. at 23 (footnote
omitted).
309. "Since judges regularly engage in substantial efforts to assist pro se debtors
because of a perception that they are at a disadvantage, it is not uncommon for par-
ties opposing pro se litigants to feel unjustly treated." Id. at 2. "Taking such precau-
tions [of sample instruction sheets] can alleviate the need for judges to serve as ad hoc
protectors of the interests of pro se debtors together with the appearance of partiality
which that creates." Id. at 39. "Discussions with other members of the bar about this
study suggest that many perceive the judges in Massachusetts to bend over backward
to protect the rights of unrepresented debtors. There was little objection to this prac-
tice." Id. at 23 n.48; see also Cox & Dwyer, supra note 48, at 51 (noting that one
problem created by self-helpers in both bankruptcy and divorce cases is that "courts
are forced to take an active role in their cases in order to protect individuals' rights,
thus jeopardizing judicial impartiality").
310. See Greacen, supra note 24, at 12 (observing that the phrase "I am not allowed
to give legal advice" is an easy way to "get rid of" an unrepresented litigant seeking
assistance); Cox & Dwyer, supra note 48, at 50 ("Some judicial personnel even display
a marked degree of antagonism for the self-helper."); Klein & Spade, supra note 285.
at 32 ("The clerk's office in Massachusetts will almost always accept filings unless they
are so deficient as to be incomprehensible .... Although personnel seek to avoid
providing legal advice, it is not completely clear where the line lies,"). See generally
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sion of the proper role of the mediator.311 Seemingly fundamental
issues are thus left to individual resolution, without guidance or corre-
sponding consistency.312
B. A Tale of Two Housing Courts
1. Boston Housing Court
The judges in Boston's Housing Court describe their role in presid-
ing over trials involving an unrepresented litigant as follows:
A judge cannot act as the lawyer for either party appearing before
the Court.... A judge cannot be expected to scour the case file for
evidence that might be relevant and admissible on some issue in the
case. The parties must present the facts of their cases at the time of
trial. I listen carefully to what the litigants and their witnesses have
to tell me, and attempt to give each person the opportunity to tell
me whatever it is they want to say about their case. I endeavor to
be patient and courteous to all persons who come before me. If I
perceive during the trial that one of the parties is attempting to raise
an issue or claim, albeit imperfectly, or says something that needs
clarification, I will ask follow up questions.313
Greacen, supra note 24 (arguing that the phrase "no legal advice from court person-
nel" has no inherent meaning and has negative consequences in the courts' ability to
serve the public).
311. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Excerpt, supra note 300, at 38 (noting the equalizing ef-
fect of mediation in litigation between pro se parties and represented parties); Barry
Russell, U.S. Bankruptcy Court Initiates Inmovative Mediation Program with Success,
Resolutions, Winter 1997, at 4, 4 (measuring "success" of mediation program by a
settlement rate of 62%).
312. As one commentator has noted:
Judges disagree as to the level and type of assistance they or other members
of the court staff can provide to pro se parties without creating a perception
of, or actually, favoring unrepresented parties, engaging in the inappropriate
"practice of law" in the cases before the court, and compromising the court's
impartiality. These materials are not intended to provide support for any po-
sition on these issues, but rather to provide suggestions for consideration by
judges in light of their individual views.
Bankruptcy Excerpt, supra note 300, at 37 (emphasis added). Moreover, the recom-
mendations remain such until and unless they are adopted by the courts themselves,
or the proposals receive the full support of the courts. See id. ("[Tihe Case Manage-
ment Manual for United States Bankruptcy Judges['] ... suggestions reflect the varied
experiences of both bankruptcy and district court judges, but not any official position
or recommendation of the Judicial Conference, the Administrative Office [of the U.S.
Courts], or the [Federal Judicial] Center."(emphasis added)).
313. Wisdom v. Brunache, No. 96-05297, at 2-3 (Boston Housing Ct. Mar. 6, 1997)
(unpublished opinion, on file with the Fordham iLaw Review). The other justice,
Chief Justice E. George Daher, stated that the court's decision "accurately reflects my
own views." Letter from E. George Daher, Chief Justice, Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts, Housing Court Department, City of Boston, to Barbara Sard, Senior Manag-
ing Attorney, Greater Boston Legal Services 1 (Mar. 13, 1997) [hereinafter Daher
Mar. 13, 1997 Letter] (on file with the author). In Wisdom, the defendant received
assistance from Greater Boston Legal Services in completing her answer and filing
discovery. Wisdom, No. 96-05297, at 2 n.2. Despite the presence of claims relating to
a violation of Massachusetts' Security Deposit Statute and a breach of the implied
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With respect to the judge's role at settlement, one judge articulated
his view of his role as follows:
It would be prudent, especially in cases where the tenant is not rep-
resented by counsel, for a judge to conduct a colloquy with the par-
ties before deciding whether to approve an agreement . . . [that
includes] (3) whether the tenant understands that she has a right to
a hearing on the merits where the landlord would have the burden
of [proving] by a preponderance of the evidence ... ; (4) whether
the tenant understands that by entering into the agreement she is
waiving her right to such a hearing; (5) whether she understands the
terms of the agreement; (6) whether she signed the agreement vol-
untarily; and (7) whether she has any questions for the Court re-
garding any aspect of the Court proceeding or the agreement. If the
judge is dissatisfied with any of the responses he or she has the op-
tion of: (1) rejecting the agreement and conducting a hearing on the
merits; or (2) suggesting modifications to the agreement adequate
to address the judge's concerns. 314
warranty of habitability, no evidence relating to these claims was elicited at trial. See
id. at 2. As the court further explained:
There are hundreds of cases on the summary process docket on any given
Thursday. The answer form filed by the defendant was apparently provided
to the her [sic] by Legal Services. The defendant checked off boxes, filled in
a few blanks and signed her name. These form pleadings are filled out and
filed by tenants in thousands of summary process actions. Sometimes the
tenant presents evidence in support of a claim check off on the form. Often
they do not. The parties (both represented and pro se) file numerous papers
with the Court prior to trial (including discovery) that are never introduced
in evidence. The defendant now points to information about a security de-
posit in the plaintiff's answer to an interrogatory which was not mentioned
during the trial.... I am obligated to decide cases based upon the evidence
and testimony presented at trial.
Id. at 2-3.
314. Benchmark Apartment Management Corp. v. Mercer, No. 96-00949, at 8-9 n.8
(Boston Housing Ct. Jan. 3, 1997) (unpublished opinion, on file with the Fordham
Law Review). The Mercer decision arose in the limited context of a motion to vacate
a consent judgment involving a federal subsidized tenancy. At issue was a proceeding
brought under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 139, section 19 to annul and void
the tenancy based on alleged illegal acts, in this instance involving an altercation be-
tween the tenant and her neighbor. See id. at 1. Despite the fact that the tenancy was
a section 8 tenancy, the landlord did not provide termination notice, as required by
federal law, believing that the federal law did not apply in a Massachusetts General
Laws chapter 139, section 19 proceeding. See id. at 9. On the court date, the case was
referred to mediation where the tenant entered into an agreement to vacate her
apartment. See id. at 4. The tenant thereafter retained counsel, who filed a motion to
vacate the consent judgment on a variety of grounds, including a lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction based on the failure to serve a termination notice. See id. at 1. Finding
that federal law did not conflict with state law; that federal law required service of the
termination notice; that the failure to serve the termination notice deprived the court
of jurisdiction; and that the lack of jurisdiction could not be waived by the tenant by
entering into a consent judgment, the court allowed Defendant's Motion to Vacate
the Agreement and dismissed plaintiffs complaint. See id. at 12.
The court's proposed colloquy included the following additional questions specifi-
cally relating to the federal subsidy reached in a case brought under Massachusetts
General Laws chapter 139, section 19. At a minimum the judge should determine:
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When measured by the traditional standards articulated in case law
involving unrepresented litigants, the Boston Housing Court decisions
reflect a judicial role well within the mainstream, and possibly moving
toward the "liberal" end of the spectrum. The context of the court,
however, reveals the inadequacy of the judicial role and the drastic
consequences for unrepresented litigants. Most cases pit a repre-
sented landlord against an unrepresented tenant.315 The unrepre-
sented tenants typically are poor, female, and people of color.316 The
court handles a huge volume of cases, particularly on Thursday,
known as "Summary Process Day," when the eviction cases first ap-
pear on the court's docket.31 7 Housing law in Massachusetts is com-
plex, and the cases routinely are quite adversarial. 318
The court, nonetheless, provides minimal assistance to unrepre-
sented litigants outside the courtroom. 319 While individual clerks may
"(1) whether a federally subsidized tenancy is involved; (2) if yes, whether the land-
lord has served the tenant with a legally sufficient termination notice prior to the
commencement of the legal action." Id. at 8 n.8.
315. Various studies have indicated that landlords are represented in approximately
75% of the cases in Boston Housing Court, while tenants are represented in approxi-
mately 10% of the cases. See Letter from Paul R. Collier, Esq., Senior Clinical In-
structor, Greater Boston Legal Services, et al., to the Honorable Paul J. Liacos, Chief
Justice, Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 2 (May 23,
1996) [hereinafter Collier May 23, 1996 Letter] (on file with author); Russell Engler &
Craig S. Bloomgarden, Summary Process Actions in Boston Housing Court: An Em-
pirical Study and Recommendations for Reform 5 (May 20, 1983) (unpublished man-
uscript, on file with the author); Neil Steiner, An Analysis of the Effectiveness of a
Limited Assistance Outreach Project to Low-Income Tenants Facing Eviction 2 (Oct.
14, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also Fox, supra note 23,
passim (exploring the role of "self-agency" in negotiations between landlords and ten-
ants); Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 95, at 60-61 (arguing that poorer, unfamiliar
tenants are at a legal disadvantage against wealthier, knowledgeable landlords).
316. See, e.g., Bezdek, supra note 23, at 557 (noting that rent court "is a theater of
class conflict in which businesses and their hirelings constitute a class of professional
claimants exercising significant advantages over the individual defendants whom they
bring before the court, who are poor and poorly situated with respect to the attributes
that garner respectful hearing in court rooms"); Fox, supra note 23, at 92-93 ("Groups
in the hallway [of the Boston Housing Court] are stratified by socio-cconomic class
and authority with the court. In addition to visible discrepancies such as style of dress
and color of skin, other palpable distinctions exist between those with more and less
privilege.").
317. See Fox, supra note 23, at 91-92; Steiner, supra note 315, at 2.
318. See, e.g., Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 95, at 63-70 (noting that the com-
plexities of Massachusetts housing law present obstacles to tenants in defending their
rights). In the words of a Boston Housing Court Judge, "[t]he laws regulating land-
lords and tenants in Massachusetts are technical and complex and often traps for the
unwary." Engler, supra note 43, at 117 n.166 (quoting Associate Justice Jeffrey Winik,
Remarks from the Bench (Nov. 30,1995)). With respect to the adversarial nature, the
frequent battles in the legislature and the courts between landlords' interests and ten-
ants' interests are one indicator of the conflict. The court cases reflect conflicting
policies of protecting a tenant's home and a landlord's property (and home as well, in
the owner-occupied context).
319. See, eg., Fox, supra note 23, at 92 ("No information was available regarding
the rights and responsibilities of landlords or tenants. Similarly, no one was available
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be helpful, they are prohibited from giving legal advice. The court has
not designated anyone to explain possible claims and defenses or to
help unrepresented litigants make informed choices. Not surprisingly,
unrepresented litigants interviewed "were often intimidated and
frightened by the process of appearing in the Boston Housing
Court." 32
0
The difficulties facing unrepresented litigants are compounded,
rather than ameliorated, by the roles played by the mediators and
judges. Most cases result in settlements in which tenants routinely
forfeit their rights. 321 Many cases are funneled through "voluntary"
mediation,32 2 although, as one observer noted, "[t]he court officials
gave no explanation of mediation, nor did they mention its voluntary
nature. '' 323 Mediators are expected to resolve cases;324 they are pro-
hibited from giving legal advice or assistance to the unrepresented
party.32 5 Most cases not resolved in mediation are settled in the hall-
ways, a result achieved through unmonitored negotiations between a
lawyer and an unrepresented tenant and which often involve attorney
misconduct.
326
to answer questions."); see also BBA Report, supra note 175, at 20 ("There are not
sufficient signs to direct people to the correct floor and no information desk or other
means for litigants to know where to go or what to do.").
320. BBA Report, supra note 175, at 20.
321. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 23, at 92-93, 98 (citing examples of tenants' unwilling-
ness to assert valid defenses); Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 95, at 71 ("Without
the benefit of legal counsel, tenants frequently forfeited their formal legal protections
.... "); Collier May 23, 1996 Letter, supra note 315, at 2-3 ("The tenant families were
evicted in approximately 80% of these cases.") (citing Massachusetts Law Reform
Inst., Survey of 1993 and 1994 Summary Process Cases in the Housing Courts and
District Courts in Massachusetts (1995)).
322. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 23, at 85 (stating that the majority of housing court
cases in Boston are sent to mediation).
323. Id. at 91-92. The mediation office is called the office of the housing specialists,
and the mediators are referred to as "housing specialists." Id. at 91.
324. See, e.g., id. ("In an effort to manage the hundreds of cases docketed for a
single day, the housing court instituted mediation with housing specialists.").
325. See, e.g., Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 95, at 90 (referring to the Harvard
Mediation Program's "policy which prohibits mediators from providing parties with
'the law' during mediation"). Not surprisingly, unrepresented tenants fare worse
when they settle cases in mediation than when they appear before a judge. See BBA
Report, supra note 175, at 21; Engler & Bloomgarden, supra note 315, at 5-6; Steiner,
supra note 315, at 28.
326. See generally Engler, supra note 43 (arguing for the regulation of lawyers' ne-
gotiations with the unrepresented poor). Whether unrepresented tenants fare worse
in the hallways or before the mediators is a matter of dispute. Compare Steiner, supra
note 315, at 28 (stating that tenants who choose mediation fare worse), with Kurtzberg
& Henikoff, supra note 95, at 73-74, 108 (stating that tenants who negotiate in the
hallways fare worse). The disparity may be due in part to the fact that Kurtzberg &
Henikoff did not limit their study of mediation in housing cases to mediation con-
ducted by the specialists in Boston Housing Court; they examined other jurisdictions
in Massachusetts and other mediation mechanisms. See Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra
note 95, at 73-74. Neither report, however, questions the fundamental conclusion that
unrepresented tenants generally fare poorly both in the hallway and in mediation.
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The pressured settings in which unrepresented tenants are expected
to settle their cases seem to guarantee that the settlements will favor
the represented party. Yet the judicial role is not designed to uncover
and correct the problems. Where the judges approve the agreements,
the level of inquiry fails to elicit the information needed to ensure that
the agreements are fair and reasonable or that the unrepresented liti-
gant's decisions are the product of informed consent, as opposed to
misinformation, misunderstanding, and coercion.32 7 Many agree-
ments do not even reach a judge for approval, but rather go to the
clerk/magistrate, who rubber-stamps the agreements.328 In the few
cases that reach trial, the judges often fail to develop a full and fair
record, assist the unrepresented litigant on procedure and questions of
law, or conduct the trial in a manner "best suited to discover the facts
and do justice in the case. '329 The Boston Housing Court declines
even to examine the files or inquire about claims and defenses in pro
se pleadings.33 °
327. See supra Part II.A. Nor is it even clear that the Housing Court judges apply
their limited colloquy to all cases. Mercer, the Boston Housing Court decision dis-
cussing the judge's role in settlement, involved an injunction proceeding brought pur-
suant to chapter 139, section 19 of the General Laws of Massachusetts. See
Benchmark Apartment Management Corp. v. Mercer, No. 96-00949, at 8 n.8 (Boston
Housing Ct. Jan. 3, 1997) (unpublished opinion, on file with the Fordhan Law Re-
view). Most cases on the summary process docket are nonpayment cases, with the
balance of the remaining cases involving termination of tenancy proceedings, rather
than cases seeking an injunction pursuant to chapter 139, section 19.
328. See Daher Mar. 13, 1997 Letter, supra note 311, at 1-2. In routinely approving
the agreements, the Clerk/Magistrate asks even fewer questions than the court articu-
lated in Mercer. The clerk asks the parties only "whether they entered into the
Agreement voluntarily, and whether in the circumstances of the case, they are satis-
fied with the Agreement." Id. at 2. These questions provide even less of a basis to
explore the fairness of the agreement by identifying the applicable facts, law, and
waivers of rights than the minimal judicial inquiry discussed by the judge.
329. Mass. Unif. Sm. Cl. R. 7(c). The typical decision of the Chief Justice after trial
involving unrepresented tenants begins as follows: "The parties stipulate to tenancy,
occupancy, notice to quit, monthly rent of [dollar figure] and arrearage of [dollar fig-
ure]." Lawton v. Garwood, No. 98-01215, at 1 (Mass. Housing Ct. Apr. 6, 1998) (un-
published opinion, on file with the Fordhan Law Review); Bromley Heath Tenant
Management Corp. v. Day, No. 98-01188, at 1 (Mass. Housing Ct. Apr. 1, 1998) (un-
published opinion, on file with the Fordizam Law Review). Both cases involved a
represented landlord against an unrepresented tenant. The trials typically lasted a
matter of minutes. The tenants in essence "waived" any defenses they may have had
to the landlord's prima facie case, thereby stipulating to the landlord's entire case.
Under these circumstances, serious doubts should exist as to whether the waivers are
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary ones and are the product of anything resembling
informed consent. See supra Part II.A.3.
330. See, e.g., Wisdom v. Brunache, No. 96-05297 (Boston Housing Ct. Mar. 6,
1997) (unpublished opinion, on file with the Fordham Law Review) (refusing to re-
consider a pro se litigant's inability to communicate in English when the argument
was not raised at trial). The standard legal services clinic, providing assistance in com-
pleting pro se pleadings and motions, is of limited efficacy if judges fail to read the
papers.
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The goal of protecting and assisting unrepresented litigants yields at
every turn to the goal of docket control.331 The court's emphasis on
speed best explains its response to efforts by legal services advocates
to advise and counsel unrepresented families in Boston Housing
Court.33 2 Rather than embrace the proposal as a means of assisting
unrepresented litigants, the court raised concerns about whether the
proposal would involve the impermissible solicitation of business by
lawyers, 333 the inappropriate use of "public space and facilities for pri-
vate use, 3 34 and the appropriateness of providing limited assistance in
mediation.335  Despite explicit endorsement of the proposal by the
331. For example, if unrepresented parties were told the mediator would not help
or protect them, fewer cases might settle at mediation, again causing more work for
the judges. Similarly, if the court limited or monitored hallway settlements, either
fewer cases would settle or more resources would be dedicated to settlement. If
judges provided a detailed inquiry truly designed to assess the fairness of the agree-
ments, more judicial resources would be required and many of the proposed settle-
ments might be rejected. If judges actually had to assist unrepresented litigants at
trial, by developing facts and claims, the trials would take longer. Indeed, the judge in
Wisdom explicitly referred to docket control pressures in explaining his decision:
"There are hundreds of cases on the summary process docket on any given Thurs-
day." Id. at 2.
332. Advocates proposed not only to speak with litigants in court, as in a traditional
LFD program, but to assist families in mediation as well. For cases that did not settle,
advocates proposed to conduct an intake the following day and refer the case for full
representation to lawyers from a panel of pro bono attorneys. The advocates asked
the court's cooperation in allowing the families access to the advisors in court, al-
lowing the litigants to file amended answers with discovery, and re-scheduling the
cases that did not settle to a "date certain," to accommodate the schedules of the
volunteer lawyers and enable them to develop the case. Letter from Barbara Sard,
Senior Managing Attorney, Greater Boston Legal Services, & Paul R. Collier, Esq.,
Hale & Dorr Legal Services Center, to E. George Daher, Chief Justice, Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, Housing Court Department, City of Boston 2 (Mar. 22,
1996) (on file with the author).
333. Letter from E. George Daher, Chief Justice, Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts, Housing Court Department, Housing Unit, City of Boston, to Barbara Sard,
Esq., Senior Managing Attorney, Greater Boston Legal Services, & Paul R. Collier,
Esq., Senior Clinical Instructor, Hale and Dorr Legal Services Center 1 (May 6, 1996)
[hereinafter Daher May 6, 1996 Letter] (on file with the author). The proponents of
the plan subsequently responded to this concern by explaining that no tenant would
be "solicit(ed) for a fee" in violation of D.R. 2-103(C) and (D) and noting that the
disciplinary rules governing solicitation "do not limit the offering of legal services in
any manner where the representation is 'not for a fee.' D.R. 2-103(B)(1)." Collier
May 23, 1996 Letter, supra note 315, at 5-6. Although the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility has since been superseded in Massachusetts by the Rules of Professional
Conduct, the analysis would remain unchanged. See Massachusetts Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct Rule 7.3 & cmt. 1 (1998).
334. Daher May 6, 1996 Letter, supra note 333, at 2. Advocates responded that
"the provision and use of courthouse areas to permit counsel to meet with and consult
clients is a fairly traditional one." Collier May 23, 1996 Letter, supra note 315, at 6.
335. See Letter of E. George Daher, Chief Justice, Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts, Housing Court Department, City of Boston, to Paul R. Collier, Esq., Senior
Clinical Instructor, Hale and Dorr Legal Services Center 1 (June 19, 1996) (on file
with the author). "[T]he Supreme Judicial Court would have to amend the rules by
which a lawyer could advise and represent a pro se litigants [sic] at mediation, without
being compelled to file an appearance, should the case proceed to trial." Id. at 1.
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Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the Housing Court made clear
that it was not prepared to implement the program, citing a lack of
resources.
336
Given the needs of unrepresented litigants in the Boston Housing
Court, a sophisticated information kiosk alone cannot provide the
type of assistance unrepresented litigants require to safeguard their
rights in court. Absent counsel, or substantial assistance for every un-
represented litigant in every case, the burden will fall on the court to
revise the roles of the judges, mediators, and clerks to provide the
necessary assistance. Yet, the Court's own words to advocates as part
of its vigorous defense of the Housing Court's operation speak
volumes: "I hope that your disappointment in not having the Program
implemented immediately is ameliorated by my commitment and ef-
forts to initiate the program as soon as I can, without jeopardizing the
vitality and success of the Court. ' 337 As long as the "vitality and suc-
cess" of the court are measured by how well the docket moves, the
concerns of unrepresented litigants will remain secondary and their
rights and claims will continue to be trampled.
2. The New York City Housing Courts
The New York City Housing Courts are similar to the Boston Hous-
ing Court, although much larger in scale. The courts handle a crush-
ing volume of cases in decrepit and overcrowded facilities. 338 Most
Chief Justice Daher did not identify the rules to which he was referring. The court
sought a response to its concerns "to protect the integrity and impartiality of the judi-
ciary." Id_ at 2.
336. Letter from E. George Daher, Chief Justice, Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts, Housing Court Department, City of Boston, to Jeanne Charn, Esq., Legal Serv-
ices Center 2 (Apr. 9, 1997) (on file with author). "The Supreme Court has given me
a broad grant as to when and whether I want to initiate such a program-at this time I
have not done so." Id. Along the way, the Chief Justice of the Housing Court had (1)
accused legal services lawyers of a variety of unethical behavior, including soliciting
clients and interfering with the mediation process, see id.; (2) vigorously defended the
court's current practices in terms of the extent to which mediation was utilized, the
level of explanation of mediation provided and the extent of court oversight of result-
ing agreements by the Clerk/Magistrate, see Daher Mar. 13, 1997 Letter, supra note
313, at 1-3; and (3) even made gratuitous comments critical of legal services in his
decisions. See, eg., Arcadian Management v. King, No. 97-00257 (Mass. Housing Ct.
Mar. 14, 1997) (unpublished opinion, on file with the Fordham Law Review) (blaming
Legal Services for making receivership impossible, thereby jeopardizing tenancies in
affordable housing). In response to a motion by the Legal Services Center to permit a
tenant to raise a section 8A defense in an eviction proceeding brought by a receiver,
the court sua sponte terminated the receivership, ending its order as follows:
"Greater Boston Legal Services has constantly argued to the Court that they wish to
protect affordable housing for the poor-now they have an opportunity to come up
with a solution." Id. at 2. The Legal Services Center-not Greater Boston Legal
Services-was involved in the case. Both offices were involved in the effort to imple-
ment the program in court.
337. See Daher Mar. 13, 1997 Letter, supra note 313, at 4.
338. Nearly 400,000 eviction cases are filed each year. See 144 Woodruff Corp. v.
Lacrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d 956, 960 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1992). "Overcrowded, dirty, poorly
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cases handled by the court are eviction proceedings, typically pitting
an unrepresented tenant against a represented landlord.33 9 Unrepre-
sented litigants disproportionately are poor women of color, often
with a limited understanding of English.3 40 Landlord-tenant disputes
are hotly contested, and the governing law is complex. 341 Most cases
settle as the product of pressured, unmonitored hallway settlements
between the landlord's lawyer and the unrepresented tenant.342 The
negotiations are rife with unethical behavior by the landlord's attor-
ney, while the resulting agreements are routinely approved by the
court despite minimal oversight.343
In theory, the courts were designed to provide some assistance to
unrepresented litigants.344 In reality, long lines of litigants routinely
await the help of clerks, who remain prohibited from giving legal ad-
vice.345 In most boroughs, a "pro se" attorney works in the clerk's
office, providing legal advice to a handful of litigants. 46 The bewil-
derment of the unrepresented litigants is exacerbated by complicated
proceedings and incomprehensible pleadings. Various organizations
ventilated, inadequate seating" are among the physical problems cited by one report.
5 Minute Justice, supra note 110, at 20.
339. While landlords are represented in approximately 90% of the cases, tenants
are unrepresented in over 90% of the cases. See Lacrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 958; 5 Min-
ute Justice, supra note 110, at 28 (quoting a housing court judge outraged that "95
percent of the landlords [were] represented by attorneys, and only 5 percent of the
tenants [were]" (alteration in original)). "About 90 percent of the 321,000 cases filed
in Housing Court [in 1992] concerned overdue rent." Anthony M. DeStefano, In
Housing Court, Justice in a Jam, N.Y. Newsday, June 1, 1993, at 7 (quoting Ernesto
Belzaguy, chief clerk of the court).
340. See, e.g., Community Training and Resource Ctr. & City-Wide Task Force on
Housing Court, Inc., Housing Court, Evictions and Homelessness: The Costs and
Benefits of Establishing a Right to Counsel at iii (1993) [hereinafter Housing Court,
Evictions and Homelessness] (providing statistical profile of housing court litigants);
Jan Hoffman, New York's Court Interpreters: Overworked Link, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24,
1993, at Al (describing high demand for interpreters in New York housing court).
341. New York's housing laws are so complex that the New York Court of Appeals
has referred to them as an "impenetrable thicket, confusing not only to laymen but to
lawyers." 89 Christopher Inc. v. Joy, 318 N.E.2d 776, 780 (N.Y. 1974).
342. See, e.g., Lacrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 960 ("[S]tipulations are generally signed [by
tenants] without knowledge of possible defenses and out of fear of eviction or the
sense that there is no alternative."); Catherine T. Brody, In Housing Court: Not a
Clue, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1994, at B21 (noting that settlements occur "away from
the courtroom in the hurly-burly of the hallway").
343. See Engler, supra note 43, at 108-15.
344. See N.Y. City Civ. Ct. Act § 110(o) (McKinney 1989) ("There shall be a suffi-
cient number of pro se clerks of the housing part to assist persons without counsel.
Such assistance shall include, but need not be limited to providing information con-
cerning court procedure, helping to file court papers, and, where appropriate, advising
persons to seek administrative relief."). "Housing Court" is the common name for
the "Housing Part of the New York City Civil Court."
345. See Judith S. Kaye & Jonathan Lippman, Breaking New Ground 2 (1997).
346. See id. The inadequacy of the staffing is underscored by the Housing Court
Program's planned expansion of the number of pro se attorneys "to ensure that self-
represented litigants have access ...." Id. at 16.
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staff information tables outside the clerk's office to provide assistance.
The personnel at the tables, however, are prohibited from giving legal
advice, and the existence of the tables themselves was the subject of
litigation against the housing courts by landlords' organizations. 7
Although some cases are referred to mediators for resolution, observ-
ers have noted that "landlords' attorneys completely dominate the
mediation process in all boroughs."" 8  The problems of unrepre-
sented litigants in New York Housing Court are so vast that this forum
has been the subject of repeated articles and reports-including peri-
odic calls for its elimination-over its twenty-five years of
existence.349
In 1997, top New York State court officials announced sweeping
changes in a new Housing Court Program (the "Program"). 3 - The
court implemented a new case management system,-- designed, in
part, to eliminate unmonitored hallway settlements and increase the
use of mediation.352 To improve access for Housing Court litigants,
the Program proposes creating Night Housing Court; expanding the
hours of the clerks' offices; creating a Telephone Reference Service
with information about the court and its procedures; and Simplified
Proceedings and Procedures.35 3 The Program further envisions creat-
ing Resource Centers, an expanded information network including
computer programs in user-friendly format to prepare court forms,
small libraries, with publications and forms, and information from the
347. See Miller v. Silbermann, 832 F. Supp. 663, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (describing
allegations of landlords' groups that the systemic operation of the Housing Court de-
prives landlords of their due process and equal protection rights).
348. 5 Minute Justice, supra note 110, at 43.
349. See, e.g., Engler, supra note 43, at 104-15 nn.104-55 (citing criticism of New
York housing courts); see also Matthew Goldstein, State Legislator Urges Abolition of
Housing Court, N.Y. L.J., May 20, 1997, at 1 (reporting Manhattan Assemblyman
Scott M. Stringer's proposal to phase out current housing court judges and redistrib-
ute their case loads to an expanded New York City Civil Court).
350. See Kaye & Lippman, supra note 345, at 3. The judges asserted that -[the
Housing Court Program will immediately and dramatically change the Housing
Court-replacing a system of triage with orderly procedures, modern technology and
services to ensure fulfillment of the Court's stated mission while simultaneously pro-
viding for proceedings that are ... quick, simple and inexpensive." Ild.
351. The features included "Expedited Case Initiation"; creation of new -Resolu-
tion Parts," providing "court forum for the orderly negotiation of settlements under
the Court's supervision"; a "Motion Part," designed to "offer an opportunity for
prompt oral argument and hearings"; "Trial Ready Parts," available "for cases in
which a trial is necessary"; and a "Housing Court Mediation Program," designed to
begin in some counties in 1998. Id. at 8-11. The Program also "dispenses with outmo-
ded procedures, bringing in updated case management and specialized approaches to
particular case types to housing matters." Id. at 12.
352. See id at 8 ("Settlements in the hallway... will be eliminated and judges,
aided by trained staff, will maintain control over all aspects of the calendar. More-
over, an effective alternative dispute resolution program will be available to those
who seek settlement outside the traditional court process.").
353. See id at 14-17. The simplified pleadings are to be accompanied by supple-
mental instruction sheets available in six languages. See id. at 15.
1999] 2065
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
court's database.354 The number of pro se attorneys, renamed "Hous-
ing Court Counselors," would be expanded and supported by a corps
of non-lawyer volunteers. 5  Volunteer attorneys would staff a Hous-
ing Hotline to answer questions of self-represented litigants, assist in
the preparing of pleadings and "guide the litigants through the pro-
ceedings-answering questions and providing advice at the various
stages of the litigation. 356
Only time will tell the extent to which the planned changes actually
will be implemented, and what their impact will be. Yet the Program
itself was an important first step. The Program, issued by the state's
top court officials, includes a frank acknowledgment of many of the
Housing Court's shortcomings,357 and attempts to address the
problems rather than simply to defend the status quo. The Program
examines the problems systemically, draws from a rich menu of assist-
ance programs, and outlines a series of changes designed to work in
combination. The Program's effort to eliminate the unmonitored ne-
gotiation between lawyers and unrepresented litigants is an important
354. See id. at 15.
355. See id. at 16-17. The increase in the number of Housing Court Counselors is
"to ensure that self-represented litigants have access to attorneys who can provide
assistance regarding court procedures during the course of their housing matter." Id.
at 16. A Housing Court Counselor also will staff each Resource Center to answer
questions and provide information. See id. at 15. The non-lawyer volunteers, who will
include law or paralegal students, will be called "Housing Court Associates." Id. at 17.
356. Id. at 16. The attorneys will be organized into a new Citywide Volunteer Law-
yers Project. See id. Beyond caseflow and access changes, the Program announced
the submission of a constitutional amendment to restructure the New York State trial
courts, see id. at 6-7; an intent to explore the concept of decentralizing the courts and
create Community Housing Courts, see id. at 17; technological innovations to provide
an integrated, sophisticated computer technology into daily operations, see id. at 18;
and enhanced court resources through budget requests supporting additional judge-
ships, new and improved facilities, resource assistants, an expanded Interpreter Staff,
and additional training seminars for Housing Court judges, see id. at 22-24.
357. The report frankly acknowledged that the court's primary function had been
to process the large volume of eviction proceedings in a manner consistent with the
picture described by the numerous reports and articles. See id. at 2.
The combination of massive caseloads, litigants largely unfamiliar with the
legal process and limited judicial resources has resulted in an environment
that more closely resembles a hospital emergency room than a court. Court-
house decorum is noticeably lacking, with facilities ill equipped to accommo-
date the large number of litigants that appear daily. Landlords and tenants
come to the courthouse either to commence a proceeding or to respond to a
petition, forming long lines in the Clerks' Offices and seeking out the pro se
attorneys for assistance.... Throughout the process, settlement negotiations
take place in every corner of the courthouse-resulting in stipulated agree-
ments ....
Id. at 2. The report anticipated that the problems would only get worse in light of
changes in Federal and State law. "[I]mplementation of the Federal welfare reform
bill is expected to increase the number of nonpayment proceedings, as public entitle-
ments are reduced or terminated." Id. The report also referred to changes in the
State Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1997, requiring "rent deposits in all summary
proceedings upon a tenant's request for a second adjournment unless, at an immedi-
ate hearing, the tenant can establish one of several enumerated defenses." Id. at 3.
2066 [Vol. 67
AND JUSTICE FOR ALL
step toward regaining control of the dispute resolution process of the
court and curbing unethical lawyer conduct. 5
Despite its breadth, the Program suffers from critical omissions.
First, the Program is disturbingly silent on the role of judges both in
settlement and at trial. As demonstrated above, the unrepresented
litigant must receive assistance both during settlement negotiations
and during trial if the courts are to have any hope of providing sub-
stantial justice for unrepresented litigants.359 Second, while envi-
sioning an important role for mediation, 3" the Program fails to define
the role of the mediators. Whether the mediators are constrained by
traditional notions of impartiality and the prohibition against giving
legal advice, and whether they are responsible for producing a fair
agreement, will determine whether mediators help or harm unrepre-
sented litigants.36 ' Third, although less troubling, is the Program's
failure to detail the role of the clerks. Sufficient staffing of trained
Housing Court Counselors, Volunteer Attorneys and Housing Court
Associates, may obviate the need to broaden the role of the clerks.
Where the resources are inadequate, however, the clerks should pro-
vide the needed assistance.
Fourth, the details of how the unmonitored negotiations will be
eliminated remain obscure. Presumably, someone will be designated
to monitor the negotiations. To the extent that role will be played by
a judge or mediator, the failure to detail their roles in settlement be-
comes a more glaring omission. To the extent the negotiations will be
monitored by someone else, such as law clerks, law assistants, or any
other court personnel, those actors must similarly ensure the fairness
of the negotiations and resulting agreements. Dedicating scarce re-
sources to additional personnel not permitted or required to provide
the necessary assistance to the unrepresented poor is an unwise re-
sponse to the problem.
Beyond questions involving the roles of the personnel in programs
set up by the court, other questions remain involving the various play-
358. See Engler, supra note 43, at 142-47.
359. As with the overall changes to the Housing Court, changes in the roles of the
judges and other personnel should be recognized and endorsed at the top levels of the
State's judicial administration.
360. See Kaye & Lippman, supra note 345, at 8.
361. The Program's premise with respect to the mediators, while undoubtedly true,
does not resolve the concern. "In many instances, non-legal issues underlie Housing
Court proceedings and hinder resolution of housing disputes, adding cases to the
Court's calendar that can be resolved outside the courtroom." Id. at 11. Even assum-
ing that many issues exist which most observers would agree are "non-legal," the dis-
tinction between a "legal" and "non-legal" issue is unlikely to be evident through a
bright-line test. Moreover, even to the extent a clearly "non-legal" issue is present,
there may be legal issues impeding resolution of the case as well. Unless the
mediators are responsible for the fairness of the result, either the unrepresented liti-
gants typically will be harmed in settlement or inefficiencies will be the result as
judges are forced to correct for the shortcomings of mediation.
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ers and procedures. Whether the simplification of procedures will
lead to an enhancement or an erosion of the rights of tenants will be
an important component in assessing the wisdom of adopting various
procedural changes.362 Moreover, despite the impressive array of per-
sonnel to assist unrepresented litigants at various stages, the Program
is silent on efforts to provide an advocate for the unrepresented liti-
gant in settlement negotiations or at trial. The Program is also silent
on the extent to which lay advocates will be permitted to assist unrep-
resented litigants in settlement or at trial,363 or the court's views on
approving or encouraging a move toward the provision of limited
assistance by lawyers.3 64
At its root, the eviction cases in the New York City Housing Courts
typically involve a more powerful, represented litigant confronting a
less powerful, unrepresented one. The classic analysis by Professor
Galanter suggests that despite changes to the forum and the rules the
"Haves" nonetheless will come out ahead of the "Have Nots."365 For
these reasons, it is imperative that the changes in the forum be accom-
panied by significant shifts in the traditional roles of the players in the
court. Unless trained and well-prepared lawyers or lay advocates are
available not only in the early stages of the cases, but also during set-
tlement and at trial, the burden will fall on judges and mediators to
362. See supra notes 65, 255.
363. See supra Part II.B.4.
364. See supra Parts I.B, II.B.4. Although New York ethics opinions have ap-
proved the practice of providing limited assistance, they typically have done so with
limitations and against the backdrop of concern about the practice. For example, in
1990 the Committee on Professional Ethics of the New York Bar Association ad-
dressed the question as to whether a lawyer, "without entering an appearance as at-
torney of record, [could] agree to counsel and advise an indigent pro se litigant to the
extent of preparing pleadings for the litigant to sign and file with the court pro se."
Committee on Prof'l Ethics, New York State Bar Ass'n., Op. 613, reprinted in N.Y.
L.J., Oct. 15, 1990, at 4. The opinion ultimately approved the practice as long as the
attorney disclosed in the pleadings that the papers were prepared by a lawyer, along
with the name of the lawyer. See id. reprinted in N.Y. L.J., Oct. 15, 1990, at 4. The
opinion first recounted the long history of decisions condemning the practice, includ-
ing Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1328 (1st Cir. 1971); Klein v. H.N. Whitney, Goadby
& Co., 341 F. Supp. 699,702-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); and Klein v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg,
309 F. Supp. 341, 342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The decision observed that available ethics
opinions were more lenient. See id. (citing ethics opinions from New York City,
Maine, Virginia, and the ABA). The Committee was "not unmindful of the substan-
tial abuses that may arise from sanctioning the conduct proposed" by the inquirer, but
concluded that the courts and lawyers "subjected to such abuses will be vigilant to
root them out." Id. The Committee "firmly believe[d] that the creation of barriers to
the procurement of legal advice by those in need and who are unable to pay in the
name of legal ethics ill serves the profession." Id. The opinion approved the conduct,
with disclosure, along with the cautionary words that lawyers needed to provide "full
and adequate disclosures" to the litigant; that "[t]he prohibition against limiting liabil-
ity for malpractice was fully applicable ... [and] no pleading should be drafted for a
pro se litigant unless it is adequately investigated and can be prepared in good faith."
Id.
365. See generally Galanter, supra note 253, at 149-51 (describing the level of
change necessary to produce "tangible redistribution of benefits").
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ensure the fairness of the outcomes in Housing Court.' 6 The court's
willingness to modify the traditional roles will reveal the extent to
which the court's program truly "Breaks New Ground" or instead
comprises an elaborate facelift.
CONCLUSION
In one sense, the "pro se problem" has been vastly understated.
The flood of unrepresented litigants poses not simply a serious prob-
lem, but a fundamental challenge to many basic assumptions of our
adversary system. The roles of judges, mediators, and clerks are de-
fined in the context of an adversary system that generally assumes that
both sides have lawyers. The reality of civil litigation not only in the
"poor people's courts," but also in growing numbers of other courts,
compels revision of our underlying assumptions.
Until and unless the courts make fundamental changes in their han-
dling of unrepresented litigants, these litigants will continue to forfeit
important legal rights due to their lack of representation. Improved
information for unrepresented litigants, increased access to competent
advice and assistance, and procedural reform to make the courts more
accessible are important steps in helping unrepresented litigants. Yet,
the effectiveness of changes such as these will be limited, if not under-
cut, as long as the traditional roles of the judges, clerks, and mediators
remain unchanged.
As long as the rules reflect the traditional notion of impartiality,
with actors limited by the traditional prohibition against giving legal
advice, the actors will be unable to provide the necessary help. As
long as the rules and practice further reflect a need to resolve cases,
without concern for their outcomes, docket control will continue to
reign supreme over fairness in courts handling cases involving the un-
represented poor. The assistance will have failed to provide the
needed help.
The "pro se problem," however, is not only understated, but also
misnamed. The courage to make changes necessary to help unrepre-
sented litigants may require us to view the problem not as a pro se
problem, but as a judge problem and an attorney problem. The rules
of the game were crafted by judges and lawyers. Litigants not only
have the right to appear without lawyers, but, in tremendous numbers
of cases every day across the country, are forced to appear in court
without counsel through no choice of their own. The lawyers and
judges who establish the rules of the game have no right to make it
366. In light of all of the features of courts such as the New York City Housing
Court, dramatic changes in the forum and roles of the players will provide insight into
whether unrepresented litigants can achieve a fair result absent a civil right to counsel
in certain contexts. See, e.g., Scherer, supra note 261, at 562-87 (discussing federal and
state constitutional due process arguments for recognizing a right to counsel for ten-
ants faced with eviction).
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impossible or difficult for unrepresented litigants to handle their own
cases without forfeiting important rights for reasons unrelated to the
merits of the cases.
Courts responding to the surge of unrepresented litigants likely will
consider adding judges, mediators, clerks, and other court personnel
as a partial response to the problem. Whether the addition of court
personnel is a wise response will depend entirely on the roles of the
added personnel. If the new judges will process cases without inter-
vening in settlement and at trial as necessary to protect the unrepre-
sented litigants, then the use of resources is a poor one. If the new
mediators are not required to protect the interests of the unrepre-
sented parties, and the clerks are limited in the help they can provide,
then the decisions to add mediators or clerks are poor ones. The re-
sources squandered on new judges, mediators, and clerks should be
redirected to the provision of skilled lay advocates and lawyers, start-
ing with cases pitting unrepresented parties against represented ones.
The re-examination of the roles of the key personnel is therefore in-
tertwined with decisions about how to allocate scarce resources in the
court system.
The changes urged in this Article will not be easy to implement, will
not occur without conflict, and will not occur without affecting judges,
lawyers, mediators, and clerks in their daily operations. Yet, the way
in which courts currently handle their caseload harms the unrepre-
sented poor. If the courts can do no better, they should say so. If
reality dictates that the true goals of the legal system, as we head to
the twenty-first century, are "Justice and Fairness to the Extent Per-
mitted by Docket Control" or "Justice and Fairness for Those with
Lawyers," we should say so. But, if Justice and Fairness are goals
which the unrepresented poor are equally entitled to attain, it is time
to face reality and start making changes.
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